

AN UNUSED

BUT

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CONCEPT

The Notion of *Realrepugnanz*
in Kant's Early Philosophy
and *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*

W.J.F. van der Kuijlen

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The Notion of *Realrepugnanz* in Kant's Early Philosophy
and *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*

Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de
Filosofie

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Preface

In his essay *Negative Größen* Kant characterised the concept of “negative magnitude” as “a concept which has hitherto not been used but which is nonetheless of the utmost importance” (AA II, 170/21). He valued this concept highly, because he was convinced that philosophical thought in all its varieties could benefit a great deal from this fine example of abstract thinking. In *Negative Größen* he presented the considerations, arguments and examples to substantiate this claim.

Likewise, I intend to show in the present study that our understanding of Kant’s philosophy could benefit a great deal from the philosophical notion of *Realrepugnanz* (real repugnance, real repugnancy, real opposition), to which the major part of *Negative Größen* is devoted. Unlike other notions from the Kantian vocabulary “real opposition” has suffered from a certain neglect. It has rarely been used in view of explaining and understanding (parts of) Kant’s work. Although it may have been unused (*ungebraucht*) in this respect, I will argue that it is highly needful (*höchst nötig*). I think it could provide a helpful, sometimes even indispensable contribution to our understanding of several issues in Kant’s work.

When I first read Kant’s essay in the early 90’s, I was touched by a tone that was both light and resolute, by the great variety of subjects that was discussed in a very limited amount of pages. It also seemed a perfect prelude to some of his later thoughts, as well as an exemplary specimen of an approach to philosophy that he would continue to practice throughout his life. The relevance and importance of this essay, and especially of *Realrepugnanz*, in the larger context of Kant’s œuvre seemed obvious and beyond all doubt. Surprisingly, there was hardly any confirmation of this impression in secondary sources on Kant’s work. References to *Negative Größen* and *Realrepugnanz* were rare, and if there were such references, they looked more like ceremonious lip service than contributions to an explanation of the meaning and significance of this aspect of Kant’s work. This comparative lack of attention caused me to engage in a search for the

background, the meaning and the function of the notion of *Realrepugnantz*. The main results of this search are presented in this study.

I would not have succeeded in bringing these philosophical attempts to a favourable conclusion, if it wasn't for invaluable support I received from many people in many different ways. Encouraging remarks, occasional jokes, the hesitant question "What about your . . .?", the continuous, but not continuously expressed interest in my philosophical whereabouts, all of this turned out to be necessary for keeping me on the right track.

Thanks to the support of the department of Social & Political Philosophy (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Nijmegen) and its members I was offered the opportunity to get this project started.

I am thankful to the participants in our Kant study group for the possibility to share the interest in and fascination for this notoriously complicated author. I would especially like to mention Willem Perreijn. His meticulous approach to Kant offered me the example of the right intellectual attitude toward philosophical texts. I hope that I have been able to practice this approach at least at some points in the present study and I wish he could have seen the results.

Kind assistance provided by the Radboud Stichting (Vught) and the De Bussy Stichting (Eibergen) made it possible to attend the Eighth Kant Congress in Memphis (TN) where I presented some of the early results of this project.

Chapters 2–4 (except for §2.1) of my study comprise the revised and English version of 'Een metafysica van strijd. Logische en reële repugnantie in het vroegere werk van Kant' published in *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 57 (1995), 461–504. I gratefully acknowledge the editors of this journal for their permission to reprint the article in this form. I am grateful to Stephen Pursey for his efforts to translate the Dutch text into English.

Much of the material in chapter 7 was presented in my paper 'The Legal Metaphor in Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*: its Structure and Meaning' which was published in *Kantovsky Sbornik* 21 (1999), 108–140.

An earlier version of chapter 8 on infinite judgement appeared in 'Infinite Judgment in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*', *Logical Kant Studies* 4. *Proceedings of the International Workshop*, Kaliningrad 1998, 199–215. I am grateful to the editor for his permission to reuse the material.

I gratefully acknowledge the generous support offered by Mrs. J.E.H. Rombach-de Kievid (Rheden).

The patience of three women granted me the opportunity to remain preoccupied with this one idea for so long. I would like to thank them for granting me this opportunity, but much more than this I would like to thank

them for all of the ideas we manage to share. Julia, you have this precious ability to enrich the world with the abundance of your ideas. I am so lucky to be part of your world. Liesbeth, do you remember that sudden hunch occurring to the both of us at the same time? If that is what it means to be in touch, what more is there to ask for? And Christel, with you I share some of those rare ideas that derive their significance from the fact that they are better not, or at least not too often expressed in words. Breaking their silence would diminish what is important about them, and therefore *de nobis ipsis silemus*, Christina.

Note on references

Abbreviations of the titles of Kant's works consist of an obvious keyword or the initial letters of the most significant words in the title (see List of abbreviations).

References to the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (KrV) are to the standard A and B pagination of the first and second edition. References to the *Dissertation* are to the sections. All other references to Kant's works are to *Kant's gesammelte Schriften* (herausgegeben von der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften), Berlin, 1902–... (Akademie-Ausgabe). The Akademie-Ausgabe (AA) is cited by volume and page (a page number may be followed by a forward slash and line number).

In quotations the spelling of the Akademie-Ausgabe is maintained (e.g. *etwaz* at p. 3). Quotations from KrV, however, follow the edition in Wilhelm Weischedel, editor, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1982⁶, (*Immanuel Kant–Werkausgabe in zwölf Bänden*, Band III–IV, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 55). In quoted texts German *Sperrdruck* has been replaced by italics.

In quotations square brackets mark text or additions inserted by me. Lower case 'n' (for *nota*) in references is used to indicate that the text referred to is to be found in a footnote.

English translations from KrV are taken from Norman Kemp Smith, *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965 (1929¹).

English translations from Kant's earlier published works follow the translations by D. Walford (in collaboration with R. Meerbote) in *Immanuel Kant. Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 (1992¹), (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Volume I). We also consulted the German translations of the *Nova dilucidatio* (by M. Bock) and the *Dissertation* (by N. Hinske) in Volume 1 and 5 of Wilhelm Weischedel, editor, *Immanuel Kant–Werkausgabe in zehn Bänden*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968.

List of abbreviations

Works by Kant

AA	<i>Kant's gesammelte Schriften</i> , herausgegeben von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1902– . . . , (Akademie-Ausgabe).
<i>Allgemeine Naturgeschichte</i>	<i>Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels oder Versuch von der Verfassung und dem mechanischen Ursprunge des ganzen Weltgebäudes, nach Newtonischen Grundsätzen abgehandelt</i> (1755), AA I, 215–368.
<i>Anthropologie</i>	<i>Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht</i> , AA VII, 117–333.
<i>Aufklärung</i>	<i>Beantwortung der Frage: 'Was ist Aufklärung?'</i> , AA VIII, 33–42.
<i>Beweisgrund</i>	<i>Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes</i> (1763), AA II, 63–163.
<i>Beobachtungen</i>	<i>Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen</i> (1763), AA II, 205–256.
<i>Deutlichkeit</i>	<i>Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral</i> (1764), AA II, 273–301.
<i>Die Frage</i>	<i>Die Frage, ob die Erde veralte, physikalisch erwogen</i> (1754), AA I, 193–214.
<i>Dissertation</i>	<i>De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis</i> (1770), AA II, 385–419.
<i>Falsche Spitzfindigkeit</i>	<i>Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren</i> (1762), AA II, 45–61.
<i>Fortgesetzte Betrachtung</i>	<i>Fortgesetzte Betrachtung der seit einiger Zeit wahrgenommenen Erderschütterungen</i> (1756),

	AA I, 463–472.
<i>Gedanken</i>	<i>Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte und Beurtheilung der Beweise, deren sich Herr von Leibniz und andere Mechaniker in dieser Streitsache bedient haben, nebst einigen vorhergehenden Betrachtungen, welche die Kraft der Körper überhaupt betreffen</i> , (1746) AA I, 1–181.
<i>Gegenden</i>	<i>Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume</i> (1768), AA II, 375–383.
<i>Idee</i>	<i>Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlichen Absicht</i> (1784), AA VIII, 15–31.
KpV	<i>Kritik der praktischen Vernunft</i> (1788 = A), AA V, 1–163.
KrV, A/B	<i>Kritik der reinen Vernunft</i> (1781 = A; 1787 = B), AA III/IV.
KU, A/B	<i>Kritik der Urteilskraft</i> (1790 = A; 1793 = B), AA V, 165–485.
<i>Logik</i>	<i>Logik</i> (herausgegeben von G. B. Jäsche) (1800), AA IX, 1–150.
MAN	<i>Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft</i> (1786), AA IV, 465–565.
<i>Metaphysik Herder</i>	<i>Vorlesungen über Metaphysik</i> (Baumgarten) (1762–1764), AA XXVIII–1, 1–166.
<i>Monadologia</i>	<i>Metaphysica cum geometria iunctae usus in philosophia naturali, cuius specimen I. continet monadologiam physicam</i> (1756), AA I, 473–487.
MS	<i>Die Metaphysik der Sitten</i> (1797), AA VI, 203–493.
<i>Nachträge Herder</i>	The second half of <i>Metaphysik Herder</i> , AA XXVIII–2.1, p. 839–962.
<i>Negative Größen</i>	<i>Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen</i> (1763), AA II, 165–204.
<i>Neue Anmerkungen</i>	<i>Neue Anmerkungen zur Erläuterung der Theorie der Winde</i> (1756), AA I, 489–504.
<i>Neuer Lehrbegriff</i>	<i>Neuer Lehrbegriff der Bewegung und Ruhe und der damit verknüpften Folgerungen in den ersten Gründen der Naturwissenschaft</i> (1758), AA II, 13–25.

<i>Nova dilucidatio</i>	<i>Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio</i> (1755), AA I, 385–416.
<i>Optimismus</i>	<i>Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus</i> (1759), AA II, 27–35.
<i>Orientiren?</i>	<i>Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientiren?</i> (1786), AA VIII, 131–148.
<i>Prolegomena</i>	<i>Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können</i> (1783), AA IV, 253–383.
R and <i>Reflexion(en)</i>	Kant's handschriftlicher Nachlaß in AA (Dritte Abtheilung), especially AA XIV–XVIII. Items from this part of the <i>Nachlaß</i> are numbered progressively from 1 to 6455.
<i>Rechtslehre</i>	<i>Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre</i> (first part of MS), in AA VI, 229–372.
<i>Religion</i>	<i>Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft</i> (1793), AA VI, 1–202.
<i>Träume</i>	<i>Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik</i> (1766), AA II, 315–373.
<i>Tugendlehre</i>	<i>Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre</i> (second part of MS), in AA VI, 373–493.
ZeF	<i>Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf</i> (1795) AA VIII, 341–386.

Works by others

<i>Auszug</i>	Georg Friedrich Meier, <i>Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre</i> , Halle: J.J. Gebauer 1752 (based on Meier's much larger <i>Vernunftlehre</i> , also published in 1752), reprinted in AA XVI.
Crusius, <i>Logik</i>	<i>Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntniß</i> , Leipzig 1747 (facsimile reprint: Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1965).
Crusius, <i>Metaphysik</i>	<i>Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten, wiefern sie den zufälligen entgegen gesetzt werden</i> , Leipzig 1745 (facsimile reprint: Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1964).

Chapter 1

A Highly Needful Concept

1.1 Oblivion and the starry heavens

Towards the end of his life Kant had become increasingly dependent on the good care of others due to the decline of his mental abilities, and due to an increase of the physical infirmities of his old age. Martin Lampe, however, the servant who had been taking care of Kant for almost forty years, was no longer able to do so in a way that was acceptable to Kant; gradually, Lampe had become quarrelsome, he tried to obtain unreasonable favours, did not carry out his job properly and was frequently drunk, sometimes even at Kant's expenses. In January 1802 these habits, and the incidents they gave rise to, caused Wasianski to dismiss Lampe on behalf of his friend Kant. A new servant by the name of Johann Kaufmann was engaged, but for Kant it was hard to get accustomed to his presence, not in the least because Kaufmann was not familiar with Kant's peculiar habits and demands which had to be met with. Initially, Kant even called his new servant "Lampe". In an attempt to prevent himself from doing so, Kant wrote a note: "Der name *Lampe* muß nun völlig *vergessen* werden."¹ The name "Lampe" must now be completely forgotten. It seems as if Lampe's physical absence had to be completed by the eradication of his name, in order to keep away bad memories of the unpleasant events that had preceded it. Oblivion would have put Kant at ease again.

Anyone who is familiar with this story would be inclined to regard this strange note as decisive proof of Kant's deteriorated mental state. This is also the way this anecdote is dealt with in the world of Kant-interpretation. No

¹E. Wasianski, 'Immanuel Kant in seinen letzten Lebensjahren (Königsberg, 1804)', in: Felix Groß, editor, *Immanuel Kant. Sein Leben in Darstellungen von Zeitgenossen*, Darmstadt, 1968, 213–306, here: 264.

one writes down something in order to forget it, unless—of course—you have lost your mind. This is the common view with respect to Kant’s reminder.

In my opinion, however, the note is *not* a sign of the decline of Kant’s mental abilities. On the contrary, this strange reminder is an indication of a remarkable philosophical awareness on the part of Kant, even though his abilities had become increasingly weak. The note was *not* written down *due to* the steady decline of Kant’s mental abilities, but rather *in spite of* it. Furthermore, the note is exemplary for several closely related issues in Kant’s philosophy. I will substantiate these claims further on, but before doing so, I will present some evaluations representing the common view.

Wasianski, who reported on the events in relation to Lampe’s dismissal, was the first to express what has now become the common view. He called the note: “Ein sonderbares Phänomen von Kants Schwäche”.²

Uwe Schultz calls it an absurdity and an aporia to remember what must be forgotten. Surely, Kant would not have written this note, if the mental powers that enabled him to solve the antinomies in KrV had been available to him towards the end of his life.³

Manfred Kuehn has a rather reserved attitude towards the anecdotes about the last years of Kant’s life: “They indicate nothing about his philosophy or about his true personality. They are, if you will, post-philosophical.”⁴ Therefore, he states: “I will not mention most of them, since they add nothing to our understanding of Kant. A few examples should be sufficient to show that they were signs of senility.”⁵ The note about Lampe is Kuehn’s most telling example in this respect: “This kind of performative contradiction is perhaps more indicative of his condition than any of the other anecdotes that are told about the old Kant.”⁶ Kuehn seems to be suggesting that this note is an indication of Kant’s mental deterioration, and that there is no other philosophical or biographical significance to be attached to it. In this

²Sc. “A strange phenomenon of Kant’s weakness”, Wasianski, ‘Immanuel Kant ...’, 264.

³Cf. Uwe Schultz, *Immanuel Kant in Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten*, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1979 (1965), (Rowohlts Monographien 101), 59: “*Der Name Lampe muß nun völlig vergessen werden.* Das ist der Salto mortale, den sein Ordnungsprinzip hier bis ins Absurde vollführt und dessen er sich selbst nicht mehr bewußt war. Sich an das zu erinnern, was vergessen werden muß: einer solchen Aporie wäre der Philosoph, der das Problem der sich selbst widersprechenden vernünftigen Logik in der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* löste, sicherlich nicht verfallen, hätten ihm noch die Kräfte jener Zeit zur Verfügung gestanden.”

⁴Manfred Kuehn, *Kant: A Biography*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 416.

⁵Kuehn, *Kant ...*, 509n134.

⁶Kuehn, *Kant ...*, 417–418.

respect Kuehn also represents the common view.

Contrary to this view I think this note is an expression of Kant's presence of mind, and that it clearly expresses certain philosophical issues against the background of which it is easy to understand what Kant intended to do with the note. Indeed, this note is indicative of Kant's condition, but this condition should be characterised as one of a remarkable philosophical awareness; the story is neither post-philosophical, nor strange and absurd. By this I do not mean that each and every story about Kant's life is philosophically relevant. Like Kuehn one should take care not to attach too much meaning to anecdotes with respect to Kant's philosophy or personality. It is always difficult, if not impossible, to determine the relationship between a philosopher's life and his *œuvre*. Surely, we do not need to understand Kant's life in order to understand his philosophy. In this case, however, the event reported to us by Wasianski may serve as an example of certain philosophical issues and—on the other hand—against the background of these philosophical topics it is easier to understand that this note is not a sign of weakness.

If the note is regarded as decisive proof of Kant's mental deterioration, then one is forced to acknowledge that this decline of mental abilities had already started in the early 1760's, since there are written sources from this period which strongly *remind* us of the Lampe note. These sources are *Metaphysik Herder* and Kant's essay on the concept of negative magnitude. Surely, nobody would maintain that Kant had already gone out of his mind in those days. The sources mentioned will help us understand the note about Lampe and it will help us to put it in the proper philosophical perspective.

In the *Metaphysik Herder*, dating back to the years 1762–1764 when Herder attended Kant's lectures in Königsberg, we find a copy of Kant's comments on Baumgarten's *Metaphysica*. In relation to Baumgarten's §135 (about *Reale et negativum*) Herder wrote down the following remarks:

1 Remotio logica wodurch etwaz blos nicht gesetzt wird z.E. im Menschlichen Erkenntnis wird manches nicht gesetzt waz man nicht weis.

2 Remotio realis wodurch manches aufgehoben wird z.E. im Menschlichen Erkenntnis wird vieles durch *Vergeßenheit* aufgehoben.

Bei der Ersteren darf man blos unterlaßen (e. zu lernen) bei der zweiten *etwaz thun, vergeßen*. (*Metaphysik Herder*, in: AA XXVIII–1, 20, all italics by WvdK).⁷

⁷Jon Elster interprets oblivion in terms of Kuehn's "performative contradiction" notwith-

If we compare the term “vergessen” in the note on Lampe to “etwaz thun, vergeßen” in the Herder-remarks, it should not be too hard to figure out a plausible meaning of the seemingly strange note. “Etwaz thun, vergeßen”, or “durch Vergeßenheit auf[heben]” are examples of a *remotio realis* which is, according to Kant, opposed to a *remotio logica*. The difference between both kinds of *remotio* is exemplified by two different senses of “not knowing something”.

Firstly, one may not know something simply because any ground on which this knowledge would have to be based is absent. In this case one is ignorant about something. On the other hand, one may not know something, because one has forgotten it. In this case the ground on which knowledge or a thought is based is not simply absent, but annihilated. The result is oblivion, which is something quite different from ignorance. In the case of ignorance thoughts are lacking; in the case of oblivion thoughts that were present have been removed from one’s mind. This removal, cancellation, annihilation or *Aufhebung* (which would be the proper German equivalent in this context) of thoughts requires action (“etwaz thun”), whereas ignorance is based on negligence, in the sense of “blos unterlaßen (e.[twaz] zu lernen)”.

The note about Lampe is merely a reminder to do something about the awkward situation Kant was confronted with after Lampe’s dismissal. It echoes the Herder-remark: etwaz thun, vergeßen! It also expresses Kant’s philosophical awareness that thoughts can only be made to disappear if specific action is taken and it was written down to remind himself of the fact that he must make a real effort in order to get rid of the unpleasant thoughts.

However strange it may seem that Kant wrote down what had to be forgotten, he did not do so as a result of his deteriorating state of mind. To

standing his own careful distinction between internal and external negation which he even discusses in relation to Kant’s essay on negative magnitude (cf. Jon Elster, *Psychologie politique* (Veyne, Zinoviev, Tocqueville), Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1990, 78–79). Elster characterises the order “Oublie-le” (“Forget it!”) as an “injonction contradictoire” and “un projet impossible” (Elster, *Psychologie politique* . . . , 81). He concludes the paragraph by stating: “Vouloir oublier, c’est comme si l’on se décidait à créer l’obscurité par la lumière.” (Elster, *Psychologie politique* . . . , 82). In fact, creating darkness by means of light is possible. In the text immediately following the above quotation from the *Metaphysik Herder*, Kant draws the very same comparison though he does not make a joke out of it like Elster seems to be doing: “Die Nacht ist nicht blos Verneinung, denn es gibt wirklich Gründe des Lichts; es muß also eine Beraubung seyn davon.” There is a remarkable and persistent analogy in Kant’s work between thoughts or knowledge and light. “Night” conceived of as the result of a *remotio realis* could, for example, serve to understand the relation between the concepts of tutelage and enlightenment as they occur in the beginning of Kant’s essay on enlightenment.

be sure, Kant's mental abilities were declining during the last years of his life.⁸ Since his deteriorating short-term memory⁹ might cause him to forget it easily, he wrote it down in order not to forget it. He could do so because his long-term memory was still intact.¹⁰ He still knew that something had to be done, if thoughts were to be buried in oblivion.

So contrary to what I have been referring to as the common view, it is more plausible to maintain that the note was written down *in spite* of the decline of mental abilities, and that it served to overcome the consequences of Kant's deteriorating short-term memory. It reflects his philosophical considerations regarding ignorance and oblivion from the early 1760's. As such it is a sign of his resistance against mental weakness, rather than a sign of the fact that he had already surrendered to the infirmities of his age. It is the final flicker of a formerly brightly shining light, representing the tragic attempt to enlighten the remains of a daily life that is about to be swallowed by nocturnal darkness.

The note on Lampe is not a decisive sign of mental weakness. The kind of proof I have been providing may not be considered decisive either; the text is Herder's and therefore the evidence it contains is only circumstantial. However, Kant's essay on the notion of negative magnitude, *Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen*, published in 1763 when Herder attended his lectures, contains direct evidence to substantiate my claim.

In this essay Kant also makes the distinction between "unterlassen" (to neglect, to refrain from) and "etwas thun" (to do something) in the context of thoughts, knowledge or representations.¹¹ According to Kant the case of an absent thought is easy to understand:

Daß ich jetzt einen gewissen Gedanken nicht habe, ist, wenn er vorher auch nicht gewesen ist, daraus freilich verständlich genug, wenn ich sage, ich unterlasse dieses zu denken; denn dieses Wort bedeutet alsdann den Mangel des Grundes, woraus der Mangel der Folge begriffen wird. (AA II, 192).

⁸E. Grünthal, 'Die senile Gehirnerkrankung Immanuel Kant's', *Confinia psychiatrica*, 14 (1971), 36–63.

⁹Kuehn, *Kant* . . . , 415.

¹⁰Kuehn, *Kant* . . . , 415.

¹¹The general context is described in terms of "Accidenzien der geistigen Naturen" as opposed to "die körperliche Natur", "körperliche Welt" or "Zustand der Materie". More specifically, Kant refers to "thought" as "ein inneres Accidens, ein Gedanke der Seele", "durch die Thätigkeit der Seele wirklich gewordenen Vorstellungen", "Thätigkeiten unserer Seele", "Vorstellung", "Gedanke" (all these descriptions are taken from AA II, 190–192).

It is easy to understand the mere absence of a thought; where there is no ground, there can be no effect (sc. a thought), and thus the absence of a thought can be understood simply by referring to the lack of a ground. According to Kant the phrase “ich unterlasse dieses zu denken” serves to indicate the lack of a ground. This sense of “unterlassen” corresponds to the one that was mentioned in the quotation from *Metaphysik Herder* above. With reference to that quotation “absent thought” must be understood in the sense of a *remotio logica*. Kant continues his considerations by addressing the case of an absent thought that was present shortly before:

Heißt es aber: woher ist ein Gedanke in mir nicht mehr, der kurz vorher war?, so ist die vorige Antwort [sc. “ich unterlasse dieses zu denken”, WvdK] ganz nichtig. Denn dieses Nichtsein ist nunmehr eine Beraubung, und das Unterlassen hat anjetzt einen ganz andern Sinn, nämlich die Aufhebung einer Thätigkeit, die kurz vorher war. (AA II, 192).

If we want to understand the absence of a thought that was present shortly before, the previous answer (sc. “ich unterlasse dieses zu denken”) is void, except when “unterlassen” is taken in another sense, sc. that of “annihilating an action”.¹² The absence of a thought in this second case is not based on the absence of a ground, but it is a kind of “Nichtsein” resulting from the annihilation of a previous action. This kind of absence, understood in terms of “Beraubung” and “Aufhebung”, corresponds to the case of *remotio realis* in the Herder remarks above, where “aufgehoben” is mentioned explicitly.

Notwithstanding this confusing attempt to distinguish between two senses of “unterlassen”, it is clear that in *Negative Größen* we also find the opposition between “unterlassen” and “etwaz thun”, but Kant introduced new terms to describe the opposition: “Mangel” on the one, and “Beraubung” and “Aufhebung” on the other hand.¹³

¹²This sense of “unterlassen”, however, is confusing the earlier distinction between “unterlassen” and “etwas thun”. Kant was aware of this and therefore, he added a footnote to the phrase “einen ganz andern Sinn” stating that this (second) sense of the word “unterlassen” is inappropriate to the word (sc. “unterlassen” in a sense that indicates the absence of a ground): “Dieser Sinn selbst kommt dem Worte nicht einmal eigentlich zu.” (AA II, 192n1).

¹³Elsewhere in *Negative Größen* the distinction is also made in these terms. Cf. AA II, 177–178: “... Beraubung (*privatio*) ... Mangel (*defectus, absentia*) ... Die letztere erfordert keinen positiven Grund, sondern nur den Mangel derselben; die erstere aber hat einen wahren Grund der Position und einen eben so großen entgegengesetzten.” Cf. also AA II, 182 where “Übel des Mangels (*mala defectus*)” is opposed to “Übel der Beraubung (*mala privationis*)”.

In this part of *Negative Größen* (AA II, 190–192) Kant makes reference to the case of “not knowing something”, in the sense of “ignorance” as well as “oblivion”, which supports my reading of the Lampe note. Kant describes the case of “Abstraction” (in the sense of “distraction”, as well as “abstraction”):

Eine jede Abstraction ist nichts anders, als eine Aufhebung gewisser klaren Vorstellungen [...]. Jedermann weiß aber, wie viel Thätigkeit hiezu erfordert wird [...] das ist, ein wahrhaftes Thun und Handeln, welches derjenigen Handlung, wodurch die Vorstellung klar wird, entgegengesetzt ist und durch die Verknüpfung mit ihr das Zero, oder den Mangel der klaren Vorstellung zuwege bringt. Denn sonst, wenn sie eine Verneinung und Mangel schlechthin wäre, so würde dazu eben so wenig Anstrengung einer Kraft erfordert werden, als dazu, daß ich etwas nicht weiß, weil niemals ein Grund dazu war, Kraft nöthig ist. (AA II, 190–191).

With an appeal to common sense (“Jedermann weiß aber”) Kant argues that the process of abstraction requires a great effort, and therefore the “Aufhebung” in this case must be understood as “Beraubung” (as opposed to “Mangel” or *defectus*). In support of this appeal Kant provides a *reductio ad absurdum*: if (in the opposite case) the disappearance of a representation would be indistinguishable from the absence of a representation, then we would have to acknowledge that abstraction (or oblivion), just like ignorance, does not require any effort. Clearly, this is counter-intuitive, even absurd. Ignorance does not, but abstraction does require a considerable effort. This is commonly known to be a fact. On the same page, after yet other examples, Kant concludes:

Und so ist zu urtheilen, daß das Spiel der Vorstellungen und überhaupt aller Thätigkeiten unserer Seele, in so fern ihre Folgen, nachdem sie wirklich waren, wieder aufhören, entgegengesetzte Handlungen voraussetzen, davon eine die Negative der andern ist, zu Folge den gewissen Gründen, die wir angeführt haben, ob uns gleich nicht immer die innere Erfahrung davon belehren kann.

In fact, this conclusion is an example of the second rule of real repugnancy (AA II, 177) applied to actions of the soul.

In addition to this exemplification Kant mentions a new point. Although we know that there must have been an opposite action for a thought to be caused to disappear, we may not always be able to identify it by means of

inner experience.¹⁴ Notwithstanding the insufficiency of inner experience in this respect, Kant mentions an example of inner experience that seems to forecast his own situation in the winter of 1802. In the context of *Negative Größen* this example serves to indicate that relations between actions in a spiritual sphere are analogous to those in the material sphere:

Allein auch die innere Erfahrung über die Aufhebung der durch die Thätigkeit der Seele wirklich gewordenen Vorstellungen und Begierden stimmt damit [i.e. locomotion in material nature, WvdK] sehr wohl zusammen. Man empfindet es in sich selbst sehr deutlich: daß, um einen Gedanken voll Gram bei sich vergehen zu lassen und aufzuheben, wahrhafte und gemeinlich große Thätigkeit erfordert wird. (AA II, 190).

This appeal to one's own inner experience is intended to exemplify the point. If a body is moving in a certain direction (due to a moving force) it can only be stopped by a force exerted on the body in the opposite direction. Correspondingly, a thought can only be dispelled, if it is opposed by a strong action of the soul. Together with the theoretical background of the notion of real opposition this actual example provides the philosophical background for an adequate understanding of the note on Lampe. What is more, if we understand the note in this context there is no need to make extra-textual references to Kant's mental disposition. My interpretation of the note is based on texts, and it is backed by arguments. It is not based on arbitrary, psychological assumptions concerning Kant's mental state. An appeal to such assumptions would in my opinion disqualify the interpretation since it ignores the relevant, available texts and it makes the interpretation invulnerable for objections or alternative readings. If a claim about Kant's mental state of mind could be proven at all, it would still not instruct us with respect to the meaning of the note.

Taking into consideration Kant's mental illness (though not as a basis for explaining the meaning of the note) Kant's long-term memory must have been

¹⁴In the same paragraph (AA II, 191) Kant refers several times to the insufficiency of inner experience in this respect. This insufficiency, however, is no reason to doubt the fact that an opposite thought or force is required in order to cause a thought to disappear: "Überhaupt aber, auch außer den Fällen, da man sich dieser entgegengesetzten Thätigkeit sogar bewußt ist und die wir angeführt haben, hat man keinen genugsamen Grund sie alsdann in Abrede zu ziehen, wenn wir sie nicht in uns klar bemerken." and "welche bewunderungswürdige Geschäftigkeit ist nicht in den Tiefen unsres Geistes verborgen, die wir mitten in der Ausübung nicht bemerken, darum weil der Handlungen sehr viel sind, jede einzelne aber nur sehr dunkel vorgestellt wird." (AA II, 191).

comparatively good towards the end of his life. His short-term memory, on the other hand, was rapidly deteriorating (which, by the way, is another indication of the fact that the note was not written due to Kant's mental decline; if this had been the reason he probably would not have had unpleasant reminiscences in the first place). Lampe's dismissal, however, did pose a problem, because Kant had become accustomed to Lampe's presence in the course of the preceding forty years. Yet Kant was continuously confronted with the fact of Lampe's absence, and probably even with painful memories of events related to the dismissal. The experience of Lampe's actual but inexplicable absence in relation to old remembrances of his continuous presence must have caused an uneasiness that could only be remedied by an immediate and absolute eradication of any thought about Lampe whatsoever. Apparently, this would take away the source of uneasiness and therefore the name "Lampe" had to be forgotten altogether. In addition, this also had to be written down, because the risk of forgetting—due to an ever decreasing performance of his short-term memory—was too imminent. In this setting the note is not a sign of increasing mental weakness. It is Kant's way of coping with the mental disadvantages of his age; it testifies to his resistance to his mental decline. It also proves that the philosophical topics he had been dealing with forty years earlier were still present in his mind; he knew that it took a great effort "um einen Gedanken voll Gram bei sich vergehen zu lassen und aufzuheben" (AA II, 190).

I have drawn so much attention to this seemingly post-philosophical note because it is exemplary for the philosophical issue of *Realrepugnanz* (real opposition) which is the subject of this study. Earlier in this section terms like *remotio realis*, "Beraubung", and "Aufhebung" referred to issues closely related to that of real opposition. In *Negative Größen* Kant provides a systematic account of real opposition. Ever since the first time I read this essay I have been surprised by the fact that this comparatively early Kantian work does not get the attention I think it should get. What surprised me even more was the disregard of the idea of real opposition itself. The parallels to notions such as "unsocial sociability" and "purposiveness without a purpose" were so unmistakably clear that a reference to any such resemblance seemed completely superfluous.¹⁵ Much to my surprise though, I soon found out that this was not the reason why these parallels were not mentioned; many

¹⁵ *Freundschaft* could be added to the list of notions sharing structural resemblances with real repugnance. The outlines of an interpretation of *Freundschaft* in terms of real opposition have been sketched in Willem van der Kuijlen, 'Kant over vriendschap of: "To fight the unbeatable foe"', in: L. Pijnenburg, editor, *Vijandbeelden in de filosofie*, Wageningen: Landbouwniversiteit, Departement Sociale Wetenschappen, 1997, 37–43.

scholars simply did not seem to be aware of a link between the topic of this earlier work and notions from later periods of Kant's philosophical work. Consequently, this neglect of the proper background of some of the notions from Kant's later work may lead to misunderstanding the significance of this earlier work, and to misunderstanding the specifically Kantian meaning of those notions.

Every now and then in the history of Kant scholarship it has been noted that the essay on negative magnitude and the idea of real repugnance played an important role in the development of Kant's thought. Schopenhauer paid tribute to Kant for having made the distinction between absolute nothing and relative, or privative nothing.¹⁶ In 1840 Rosenkranz characterised the essay as one of the most profound and most elucidating of Kant's writings and even of philosophy in general. At the same time, however, Rosenkranz maintains that the essay and its central thought slipped out of Kant's sight like a meteor.¹⁷ Heimsoeth acknowledged the significance of this writing, but he restricted the significance of the notion of real repugnance to the field of morality.¹⁸ Saner has no explicit reference to the significance of *Negative Größen*, although real repugnance plays a role in his evaluation of Kant's moral and political philosophy.¹⁹ Michael Wolff maintains that Kant's introduction of the mathematical concept of negative magnitude "ist für Kants spätere Philosophie sowie für die nachkantische Dialektik

¹⁶Cf. Arthur Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I*, Zürich, 1977, (Werke in zehn Bänden, Zürcher Ausgabe, Band II), §71.

¹⁷"Man tut Kant nicht unrecht, wenn man behauptet, daß sie [the essay, WvdK] ihm wie ein Meteor ent schlüpft und selbst nicht wieder zu Gesicht gekommen sei." (Karl Rosenkranz; Steffen Dietzsch, editor, *Geschichte der Kant'schen Philosophie*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1987, (originally: Leipzig: Leopold Voss 1840), 118).

¹⁸Heinz Heimsoeth, *Die sechs grossen Themen der abendländische Metaphysik und der Ausgang des Mittelalters*, [s.l.]: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1958⁴, 56: "Der für die Kantische Entwicklung so bedeutungsvolle Grundgedanke seiner Schrift über die 'negativen Größen' zielt letztlich nicht auf die 'Realrepugnantz' von Plus und Minus im Mathematischen, von Anziehung und Abstoßung in der Natur—sondern auf die von Gut und Böse im sittlichen Leben."

¹⁹Hans Saner, *Kants Weg vom Krieg zum Frieden I (Widerstreit und Einheit, Wege zu Kants politischem Denken)*, München: R. Piper & Co, 1967, 51–57. Saner's interpretation is based on the claim that there is a similarity between real repugnance in the context of metaphysics and Kant's thought about peace and war. This relation between metaphysics and political philosophy is also mentioned by Knebel (S. K. Knebel, 'Repugnantz I', in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Volume VIII, Darmstadt, 1992, column 879–883, column 884). In his review of Saner's work Orth questions the tenability of this claim, cf. E.W. Orth, 'Kants Politikbegriff zwischen Existenzmetaphysik und kritischer Philosophie', *Kant-Studien*, 64 (1973), 103–119. Orth maintains (at p. 112–115) that a foundation of this claim should at least clarify the Kantian notion of analogy (cf. §7.3 below).

(insbesondere Hegels und des dialektischen Materialismus) von großer (aber bisher nur wenig beachteter) Bedeutung geblieben.”²⁰ In a more recent and extensive commentary on the first *Critique* Baumanns remarks that the significance of the notion of real repugnance with respect to Kant’s philosophical development must not be underestimated.²¹ An assessment of the exact role of the notion, however, is lacking.

The aim of the present study is to fill part of this gap. It is not my intention to come to a complete assessment of the meaning and function of “real repugnance” in Kant’s philosophy as a whole. The scope of this study is limited to the investigation into the *background, meaning and significance* of *Realrepugnantz* in Kant’s early philosophy and KrV. In the next section I will outline the methodological principle of this investigation into Kant’s texts.

The beginning of chapter 2 is devoted to a short historical overview of the notion of *repugnantia* in philosophy which will show that Kant’s *Realrepugnantz* had no precedent in modern philosophy, and that it would nevertheless be recognised as an obvious and appropriate philosophical term by anyone acquainted with German philosophy of the time. The main part of chapter 2 is focussed on Kant’s interest in metaphysics which is common to most of his earlier philosophical efforts. Insofar as this interest is aimed at a revival of metaphysics Kant does not want to ignore some of the achievements of the mathematical approach in philosophy. His metaphysical attempts in philosophy, to some extent also explicitly opposed to philosophical rationalism, constitutes the background for the introduction of real opposition.

This Kantian ambivalence with respect to rationalism is highlighted in chapter 3 and 4. In chapter 3 attention is drawn to logical repugnance, which will turn out to be the loyal guide of everything Kant has to say about real repugnance (cf. also §5.2 and §6.2). Due to its rationalistic origins contradiction may be a powerful, and in some respect even necessary philosophical instrument, but it is insufficient as far as Kant’s metaphysical and epistemological aspirations are concerned.

In chapter 4 we will see in what way philosophy could benefit from mathematics; the concept of real repugnance is developed on the basis of the

²⁰Michael Wolff, *Der Begriff des Widerspruchs. Eine Studie zur Dialektik Kants und Hegels*, Königstein/Ts.: Verlag Anton Hain, 1981, (Philosophie. Analyse und Grundlegung, Band 5), 62. Harry Mulisch also offers a discussion of *Realrepugnantz* in view of post-Kantian dialectic, cf. Harry Mulisch, *De compositie van de wereld*, Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1986², 63–65.

²¹Peter Baumanns, *Kants Philosophie der Erkenntnis. Durchgehender Kommentar zu den Hauptkapiteln der ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1997, 35: “Die Bedeutung, die der ‘Realrepugnantz’ in Kants Denkentwicklung zukommt, soll nicht unterschätzt werden.”

mathematical concept of negative magnitude. The metaphysical background in combination with the fruitful employment of a mathematical notion account for the fact that the notion of real repugnance is applicable to a wide variety of philosophical disciplines (ethics, physics, psychology, chemistry, etc.). With the help of real repugnance Kant is able to understand relations between significant concepts in these various disciplines as positive relations, instead of mere privative or exclusive relations. Real repugnance is philosophically important in that it enables Kant to exceed the possibilities of the application of rationalistic contradiction. As such it is a powerful tool that can meet some of the deficiencies of contradiction. It also enables him to put the question about the epistemology of causality very concisely.

In chapter 5 we will examine real opposition in the context of the *Dissertation*. The notion itself may be absent in this work, but real opposition will turn out to be a convenient pattern of thought in his critique of an overrated and misplaced use of contradiction and in his discussion of the relation between the cognitive faculties of sensibility and understanding. Kant does not really develop his thoughts about the philosophical problem of real repugnance, but he rather seems to be trying to understand this relation between cognitive capacities in terms of a real opposition.

In KrV the philosophical problem of real repugnance has become part of a more comprehensive project concerning the question about the possibility of the synthetic a priori. References in KrV to the notion itself indicate the significance of real repugnance; the case of real repugnance presents a firm counterweight to the rationalistic approach in philosophy. The line of thought that was initiated in 1770 is continued in KrV; real opposition offers a pattern of thought that may serve to structure the relation between seemingly incompatible opposites. In chapter 6 I will argue that this the pattern is applied in the cases of original apperception and the noumenon, both of which play an important role in Kant's critical answer to the question about the synthetic a priori.

As a result of this critical answer knowledge is limited to the field of possible experience. Beyond these limits there is no objective validity, but only illusory and dialectical knowledge. Yet, the determination of objects in a practical perspective, or metaphorical thought about objects is not ruled out by Kant's critique of illusory knowledge. On the contrary, meta-knowledge about the possibilities of reason beyond the limits of possible experience, which is critical self-knowledge of reason, is expressed by means of figurative speech. As we shall see in chapter 7, Kant employs the legal metaphor for this purpose.

In the final chapter we will focus on infinite judgement. This type of

judgement is, according to my analysis, the technical means available to Kant for the expression of the critical results. We won't be able to recognise this function of infinite judgement unless we fully appreciate Kant's own statements about infinite judgement, and unless we interpret this kind of judgement in terms of the legal metaphor. Furthermore, the basic structure of infinite judgement required for this function is derived from the pattern of real opposition.

This latter point shows in what way real opposition remains significant, even after the initial, related philosophical problems have been solved. The significance and the application of the pattern of real opposition is linked to the fact that Kant's interest in philosophy is primarily aimed at practical philosophy and metaphysics, rather than theoretical knowledge and epistemology.

1.2 Taking Kant's words for granted; methodological remarks

Apart from introducing the subject-matter of the present study, the previous section also served to make a methodological point with respect to Kantian texts. My reading of the note has shown that it is possible to provide a coherent and systematic explanation of this seemingly odd note with reference to Kant's texts only. The methodology of this approach to Kant's work can be expressed in one single formula: "Take Kant's words for granted!" By this I do not mean that Kant is always right, or that he has final authority in philosophical matters. Truth and authority are not the primary issues here. What I do mean is that while trying to figure out what a certain text means, we have nothing else to rely upon than the very words themselves.

The imperative to take Kant's words for granted is a methodological sign to indicate the starting point of the study of a Kantian text: the interpretation of that text must be based on textual evidence, not on a value judgement about the text or its meaning, nor on extra-textual or biographic material. If the text does not suffice to establish a clear meaning extra-textual evidence may be referred to, but only after the necessity for doing so has been made explicit. One may be surprised at certain phrases or one may be puzzled by the apparent meaning of a text, but extra-textual reference that is intended to reassure and ease the reader cannot replace the need for explanation of the text. Any such reference is simply not a substantial contribution to understanding the very words themselves, as has been shown in the case of the reference to Kant's mental state in relation to "vergeßen".

All this may sound too obvious, and it may look as if I was forcing an open door, but regretfully many discussions about Kant's work seem

to be characterised by negligence of just this methodological principle. So, for example, publication of the secret article in *Zum ewigen Frieden* is interpreted with reference to some (extra-textual) irony²² thereby neglecting the serious and theoretical (textual) conditions which make publication of the secret article possible and meaningful.²³ The hasty reference to irony is an obstruction to further text based interpretation and it distracts attention from the real issue presented in the secret article.

Another, quite random example would be Jonathan Bennett's approach to the Transcendental Dialectic of KrV. He frankly confesses that he is a commentator who is more interested in what Kant ought to have thought than what he actually did think, and he maintains that the Dialectic is full of mistakes and inadequacies. As to the motivation for taking this approach he states: "when there is evidence of error the truth is better served by an open accusation than by a respectful averting of one's eyes".²⁴ Surely, no one would disagree with this, but it is not fair to qualify the written text as erroneous simply because it does not correspond to what Kant ought to have thought, or to what the reader is having in mind. The writer and his text cannot be blamed for failing to satisfy the needs of the reader. The "evidence of error" must be found in the text, not in the mind of the reader. So when Bennett accuses Kant of a "poor selection of material for the antinomies [sic] chapter", and of a "feeble account of why there are exactly four antinomies",²⁵ these charges may be helpful as part of his own line of argument, but they fail to provide evidence, if Kant's arguments are not refuted. Bennett seems to have good reasons not to evaluate Kant's arguments in this respect, but again these reasons remain unsubstantiated, which makes Bennett's arguments hopelessly circular. He maintains that sections 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the antinomy

²²See for example Volker Gerhardt, *Immanuel Kants Entwurf 'Zum ewigen Frieden'. Eine Theorie der Politik*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995, (Werkinterpretationen), 126, 128; Georg Cavallar refers to this irony, but his approach is intended to explicate the serious philosophical tenor of the article (Georg Cavallar, *Pax Kantiana: systematisch-historische Untersuchung des Entwurfs 'Zum ewigen Frieden' (1795) von Immanuel Kant*, Wien/Köln/Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 1992, (Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Gesellschaft zur Erforschung des 18. Jahrhunderts, 2), 337, 339

²³For arguments supporting this claim, see Willem van der Kuijlen, 'The Politics of Reason: The Theoretical Background of Perpetual Peace and Secrecy', in: H. Robinson, editor, *Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress Memphis 1995*, Volume II-2, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995, 839–848. In this article Cavallar's sophisticated position is not mentioned.

²⁴Jonathan Bennett, *Kant's Dialectic*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974, viii. In my approach truth is not the primary issue; there is no point in wondering whether some statement is true, if one hasn't the faintest idea of its meaning.

²⁵Bennett, *Kant's Dialectic*, 114.

chapter are “less important than the rest” and the latter three are “not central, deep, or difficult”.²⁶ Evidence in support of these claims is absent. This evidence would have to be presented in the course of an evaluation of these sections. Apparently, there is no need for such evaluation because of their minor importance. If the claim about the minor importance of a text remains unsubstantiated, it cannot discharge the need to provide textual evidence in support of some accusation. And if the minor importance itself is a reason not to study the text, then the evidence is circular. While reading such accusations, one wonders why Bennett bothered to read Kant's texts at all.

The fact that we have nothing else to rely upon than the words seems to be a shortcoming and disadvantage—if only we had additional information about Kant's mental state that would explain the note; or about the real conception of the antinomy, which would account for Kant's errors; or about the ironic state of mind, which would reason away the apparent oddity of a published secret—if only we had such information, we could finally understand what was meant. However, our methodological imperative tells us to look at the text from the opposite point of view: if our understanding of the text would depend on information from outside the text, it simply is not a proper understanding of the text. Our interpretation must be based on the words contained in the text. The words suffice. This underlying assumption constitutes the backbone of my methodology and the full methodological strength of the imperative depends on it. Let us consider it in greater detail.

The assumption states that the words must suffice. Any meaning or interpretation of the text must be based on the words, simply because only the words are available. If an interpretation could be based on what is *not* available in the text (sc. a diagnosis of Kant's psyche; an ironic state of mind on the part of the author; the author's intention), *any* supposition in this regard would be as good as any other. When the words are considered to be sufficient, however, it is not implied that they *are*. Nor does it imply that the text represents the final words with respect to the subject under consideration (e.g. dialectic *tout court*). Our consideration is merely methodological; any meaning ascribed to the text is based on evidence contained in the text. A text may turn out to be erroneous or extra-textual reference may be needed, but only after the methodological assumption has proven to be wrong. The sufficiency of the text is assumed, its insufficiency must be proven.

²⁶Bennett, *Kant's Dialectic*, 116. In §8.5 below I will argue in favour of the opposite view; section 2 seems to be less important if we concentrate on Kant's main line of argument and if we recognise that in this argument Kant is dealing with the antinomy (singular).

The assumption is not made arbitrarily. It is necessary to make it if we want to do justice to the text and it is implied by an attitude towards the text (and its author) that I would describe as benevolent. To be sure, “benevolence” is to be understood in a methodological, not in a moral sense. By this attitude the reader acknowledges that the words presented in the text represent whatever the author intended to express. Supposedly, they are the adequate representation of what the author had in mind. Again, this does not mean that the author is right, or that the words in fact *are* an adequate expression of what he really had in mind. The point is just that the only way of gaining access to what the author meant is by means of the words he chose to write about it. If he chose to write down the things he did, they must—according to our methodology—be considered conclusive. The author was not stupid; if he chose to write the things he did, why should we interpret it in the light of something he did not write?²⁷ There is no way round it: either you adopt a benevolent attitude, acknowledge that words presented in the text are sufficient in view of an interpretation, or you quit reading the author’s text and state your case without reference to an authority or authoritative text, like a decent philosopher should. This is the basic and minimum prerequisite for the study of a text, if we want to do justice to the text, if we don’t want to jump to conclusions, and if we do not want to blame the author for failing to solve our own problems.

Thusfar I have been trying to clarify the phrase “taking for granted”, but which words qualify as Kant’s words? We need an answer to this question if we want to know which texts our investigation has to be based on. There are several more or less obvious answers. Any answer, however, immediately raises a question that is more difficult to answer, while at the same time its philosophical relevance seems to be greater in comparison to our initial question (i.e. “Which words are Kant’s?”). In this respect the philosophical relevance of a question seems to be inversely proportionate to the chance of getting an answer to that question. Let us consider some answers and see what happens.

Firstly, one would be inclined to take Kant’s *published* works for “his words”. Supposedly, the fact that they were published by Kant is a guarantee of their origin, and hence, those are the words to be studied if we want to understand his philosophical thought. The A- and B-edition of KrV show what kind of problems are to be expected if we try to approach his work by

²⁷I disagree with Kant on this point (thereby violating my own methodological principle!). In KrV, B370 he claims that it is not unusual to understand an author better than he did himself (“ein Verfasser [...] sogar besser zu verstehen, als er sich selbst verstand”). I think this kind of “better understanding” must not be aimed at.

means of the published works. What is the difference between both editions and what does it mean that in Kant's opinion there were reasons to revise the A-edition so as to restate his critical point in the form of the B-edition?

Secondly, the example of the *Rechtslehre* shows that a work published by Kant may contain his words, but at the same time it also shows that the originally published words do not necessarily represent Kant's thoughts about a certain subject. As B. Ludwig has shown the original publication of the *Rechtslehre* in 1797 represents a distorted version of the manuscripts Kant had prepared.²⁸ Hence, the words of the original *Rechtslehre* do not offer the appropriate access to the doctrine of right. If, on the other hand, the original version would be regarded to be the proper representation of Kant's thought one would be forced to conclude that it is merely the work of an old man, as some have done.²⁹

Thirdly, even if we would be able to avoid such complications, it is doubtful whether we are right in assuming that all of Kant's publications represent his philosophy. See for example the *Logik*, which was edited and published by Jäsche in 1800 under Kant's auspices, and which is a compilation of Kantian material on logic from different periods that was not written for the purpose of publication. Undoubtedly the words are Kant's, but in what way does the *Logik* contain Kant's thoughts on logic?

Lastly, one could ignore the author, his or her intentions, actual thoughts, etc. and just consider a text no matter what its origin or purpose may be. This would certainly solve the kind of problems mentioned, but it would also blur quite obvious and significant differences between different kinds of texts, e.g. publications, different versions of the same work, drafts, notes, and *Reflexionen*. This, of course, would be too high a cost; some words, like publications, seem to have priority over other words, like occasional scribbled notes.³⁰

²⁸Bernd Ludwig, *Kants Rechtslehre (mit einer Untersuchung zur Drucklegung Kantischer Schriften von Werner Stark)*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988, (Kant-Forschungen, Band 2), ch. 1.

²⁹Cf. Bernd Ludwig's introduction to Bernd Ludwig, editor, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre (Metaphysik der Sitten, Erster Teil)*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998², (Philosophische Bibliothek, Band 360), XXVII–XXVIII. In Ludwig, *Kants Rechtslehre . . .*, 39–41 Ludwig maintains that Kant's declining mental abilities did not affect the composition of the content of this part of the MS.

³⁰Especially in view of a *Entwicklungsgeschichte* of Kantian thought the works published by Kant himself have priority over other sources, cf. Norbert Hinske, 'Prolegomena zu einer Entwicklungsgeschichte des Kantischen Denkens. Erwiderung auf Lothar Kreimendahl', in: R. Theis and C. Weber, editors, *De Christian Wolff à Louis Lavelle. Métaphysique et histoire de la philosophie (recueil en hommage à l'occasion de son 75^e anniversaire)*, Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms, 1995, (Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte

Obvious answers do not settle the matter. They only confront us with more serious questions that are even harder to answer. I would like to suggest the following strategy to answer the question about Kant's words. It is a pragmatic strategy that enables us to continue our investigations without running the risk of getting entangled in fundamental discussions the outcome of which is either insignificant and meaningless, or more problematic than the initial issue.

Again, the previous section offers a clear example of the strategy I am proposing. We did not get a comprehensive explanation of the note until it had been related to other texts, which—in the course of interpretation—proved to be relevant to the topic of the note. According to this strategy a text must be interpreted in the context of related texts. Obviously, we cannot know which texts are related until we know what they mean, but this is where the pragmatic part starts. The interrelation between texts must also show in the course of interpretation. Supposedly, coherence and meaningfulness of an interpretation will increase depending on the degree of interrelation between texts. So the question whether one text is related to another depends on the question whether the former contributes anything to the understanding of the latter and *vice versa*. By “text” I do not necessarily mean an entire book or treatise as it was published or written by Kant. “Text” may also refer to a sentence, a phrase, or even a single word. As long as Kant's words are considered to derive their meaning from the way they are related to other texts, we may assume that these words are meaningful to the extent that they turn out to be so related. This vicious circle now seems to have replaced the threat of endlessly regressing questions of philosophical relevance. In the previous section, however, this pragmatic strategy proved to be fruitful. We took the initial, isolated phrase about Lampe's name for granted and we refused to reduce the matter to the simple question about Kant's mental condition. We also did not try to settle the matter by answering the question to what extent the words could be regarded as Kant's own. In fact, only a lesser part of the words that were used in the explanation of the note in §1.1 were Kant's own in the strict sense of the word and he is only an indirect source of the major part. “Kant's words” is more like a heterogeneous amalgam of related phrases and texts. The words of Kant's note as they have been handed down to us are Wasianski's copy of the words written by Kant. Since Wasianski is a reliable source, we have good reasons to suppose that they originate from Kant himself. The notes on *remotio logica* and *realis* from *Metaphysik Herder* are not Kant's either. They were written down

der Philosophie, Band 39), 102–121, 110–113.

by Herder, who is reporting on the words spoken by Kant about issues in Baumgarten's textbook. Finally, the words from *Negative Größen* are Kant's. Their origin may give these words priority over other, indirect sources, but this does not diminish the importance of the latter.

This pragmatic approach merely shows that it makes sense to take an isolated phrase for granted and that it makes sense to do so exactly to the extent that we are able to relate the phrase to other words that add to our understanding of the initial phrase. To some people such an explanation may look more like a self-fulfilling prophecy than a serious attempt to understand Kant's philosophy. Indeed, the explanation must prove itself, but reluctance to be satisfied with instant answers does not license the proclamation of random or prophetic associations. Successful interpretation of a phrase, once it has been taken for granted, depends on the way it turns out to be interrelated with other texts, some of which may have priority over others. Taking Kant's words for granted is what constitutes the pragmatic beginning of our understanding of Kant. We cannot get there unless we assume that some isolated phrase makes sense and that the phrase makes even more sense depending on the way it is related to other texts.

In a final attempt romantic minds might try to solve the entire issue about Kant's words by means of an answer to the question "Who is Kant?". Once we have a clear picture of the man, his life and character, i.e. once we know who he was, it is easy to understand what he wrote, or what he must have meant by some of the things he wrote. Unfortunately, all that is needed to make such a "picture" has been handed down to us in the form of texts.

Chapter 2

Metaphysics

2.1 Historical notes on the notion of *repugnantia*

The general meaning of the Latin noun *repugnantia* is “inconsistency” or “contradiction”. *Repugnantia* in the plural (neuter, nominative) derived from the participium praesens of *repugnare* means “incompatible or conflicting things”. The verb *repugnare* has both the literal and figurative meaning of “to resist”, and “to be in conflict with”. The Latin noun and verb have come down to pre-modern Romance languages (Spanish, Italian, French) and English in their literal and figurative senses. In modern Romance languages and English, however, noun, verb, and adjectival form acquired additional connotations which express a strong personal and subjective aversion to something. Moreover, these connotations of “aversion”, or “antipathy” and “distasteful”, “repulsive” and “objectionable” have become the prevailing meanings of the noun, adjective and verb in present day ordinary language. In English though, the verb has fallen into disuse. For example, in present day English “repugnancy” and “repugnant”, in the sense of “inconsistency” and “inconsistent”, are technical terms in legal discourse, but outside this particular field these terms will most likely occur in the context of personal or moral rejection.¹ In contemporary philosophy Derek Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion presents a unique but very fine example of “repugnant” in this

¹Cf. for example a lawyer arguing in a custody case against a lesbian mother and her friend: “They live a lifestyle that this court has condemned as repugnant, immoral and evil.” (*USA Today*, february 28 1995, 3A). Leon Kass recommended revulsion and repugnance as expressions of deep wisdom, as if the absence of sufficient moral and rational explanation would cause the emphatic expression of feelings to become the definite sign of supreme wisdom (thereby putting the burden of argumentative proof on the antagonist), cf. Leon R. Kass, ‘The Wisdom of Repugnance’, *The New Republic*, 216 (1997), 17–26.

sense.²

In Germanic languages like Dutch and German terms derived from *repugnantia/repugnare* have always been rare and unusual. In the 16th and 17th century the Dutch noun *repugnantie* means “contradiction”.³ The verb *repugneeren* occurs in legal discourse (also in the 16th and 17th century) in the sense of “being opposed to, in conflict with, contradictory to”. From the 16th until the 19th century it mainly occurs in dictionaries in the sense of “to resist”, and “to obstruct”.⁴ By now both noun and verb have become completely extinct in Dutch. In German occurrences of the notion are even more rare; it is completely absent in 19th century German.⁵ In the Duden dictionary, however, both *Repugnanz* and *Realrepugnanz* are listed.⁶ The former, presented in the general philosophical sense of “Widerspruch” and “Gegensatz”, seems to have been listed in support of the more specific term *Realrepugnanz*, which is presented in the Kantian meaning and which has a reference to him only. As is clear from this occurrence the terms do not belong to the current German (philosophical) vocabulary.

Cicero was the first to use *repugnantia* as a technical term in philosophy. He introduced it as the Latin equivalent of the Greek *machē* (conflict), a notion in Stoic logic. Throughout the history of philosophy *repugnantia* has retained the meaning of “contradiction” (*contradictio*) in the logical sense. It was often used as its synonym, although *contradictio* itself has remained the common term to refer to logical opposition. In Scholasticism it was used in different fields of philosophy (metaphysics, ethics, physics) to denote a variety of oppositions or inconsistencies. Apart from *repugnantia contradictionis*, we find *repugnantia* in expressions such as *repugnantia realis*⁷ and *repugnantia inter conceptus*, *repugnantia formalis*, and we find

²It is a conclusion regarding the poor quality of life of some extremely large future population. It is repugnant because it is “very hard to accept” and Parfit even maintains that it is “intrinsically repugnant”. Therefore it needs to be avoided (cf. Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, 388, 390).

³Cf. “repugnantie” in: *Woordenboek der Nederlandsche taal* (deel XII-3), 's-Gravenhage/Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff-A.W. Sijthoff's Uitg. Mij. N.V. 1972, column 2661.

⁴Cf. “repugneeren” in: *Woordenboek der Nederlandsche taal* (deel XII-3), column 2661–2662.

⁵Cf. J. Grimm & W. Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch* (Band 8), Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1893.

⁶Cf. “Repugnanz” and “Realrepugnanz” in: *Duden ‘Das große Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache’* (Band 7), Mannheim/Leipzig/Wien/Zürich 1999 (3. völlig neu bearb. und erw. Auflage).

⁷Ockham mentions *repugnantia realis* in discussion with Walter Chatton: “dico quod in re nulla est contradictio nec est aliqua repugnantia realis inter non esse deitatem et deitatem, quia non esse deitatem non importat aliquam rem quae repugnat.” Cf. Ockham,

descriptions of cases of incompatibility and impossibility in terms of *repugnantia*. The works of Thomas Aquinas show the great semantic variety of *repugnantia* in Scholasticism.⁸ As a consequence of changes in early modern philosophy of nature (non-Aristotelian approaches, changes of world view) *repugnantia* could become a category of conscience in the course of the 17th century.⁹

During the first half of the 18th century the term *repugnantia* was not very current in German philosophy, at least not in the Latin and German writings Kant was familiar with.¹⁰ *Repugnantia* and *repugnare*, whenever they occur in the context of logic, mean “contradiction” and “to contradict”, but there are also incidental cases in which they are used in the less technical, and general sense of “opposition” and “to oppose”. Notions such as *repugnantia realis*, *oppositio realis* are absent.

In Wolff’s *Logica*¹¹ *repugnare* is used in a general sense of “being opposed to” (e.g. §311). In §310 it is defined in a metaphysical context.¹² This definition is used in subsequent sections and depending on the context of these sections *repugnare* has more specific meanings: in §514 it indicates the relation between predicate and subject (in a logical and epistemological context), in §519 it recurs in a metaphysical and epistemological context of (im)possible notions, and in §609, §622, §720–721 it is mentioned in relation to epistemology. *Repugnantia* does not occur in the sense of “contradiction”, which is systematically referred to by *contradictio* (§309, §518), and related phrases like *propositiones contradictoriae* (§288, §300), and *contradicere* (§306, §550). However, it does occur in a sense closely related to the definition of *repugnare* in §310. In §526 *repugnantia* indicates the opposition between

Quodlibeta septem I, quaestio 2, in: *G. de Ockham Opera philosophica et theologica, Opera Theologica IX*, St. Bonaventure N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University 1980, 17, cited after Knebel, ‘Repugnantz’.

⁸For historical information and references regarding Cicero, Scholasticism and Aquinas cf. Knebel, ‘Repugnantz’, column 879–881.

⁹Cf. Knebel, ‘Repugnantz’, column 882. “Category of conscience” is my translation of Knebel’s “Bewußtseinskategorie”. He refers to the occurrence of *interior repugnantia* in Leibniz.

¹⁰Cf. “Opposition der Sätze” in: Johann Georg Walch, *Philosophisches Lexikon*, Leipzig, 1775⁴, which presents the common Aristotelian distinctions in the form of the square of opposites.

¹¹Christian Wolff, *Philosophia rationalis sive Logica*, Frankfurt/Leipzig, 1740³ (1728¹), (facsimile reprint in: Christian Wolff, *Gesammelte Werke* (II Abteilung, Band 1.1, 1.2, 1.3), Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms Verlag 1983).

¹²Wolff, *Logica*, §310: “Quae salvis essentialibus, aut attributis, vel iis, quae per modum attributorum insunt, consequenter definitione salva (§. 173. 174. 175. 176.), subjecto convenire nequeunt; eidem repugnare dicuntur.”

subject and predicate (which opposition serves to recognise the falsehood of a proposition).¹³ In §635 *repugnantia* occurs as the equivalent of “contrarity” (between a syllogism and the rules of logic). Remarkably, Frobesius¹⁴ in his compendium of Wolff’s *Logica* introduces a new entry called *Repugnantia* which refers to *repugnare* in §310 and which is presented as a fifth kind of opposition in addition to *contradictio*, *contrarietas*, *subcontrarietas*, and *subalternatio* (which are also Frobesius’s terms, since Wolff himself speaks of *propositiones (sub)contrariae*, etc.).

Repugnat in a general sense occurs in §66 and §574 of Baumgarten’s *Metaphysica*¹⁵ which Kant also used for his own lectures.¹⁶ *Repugnans* is mentioned in §7 in relation to the *principium contradictionis*. This principle, as well as the *principium identitatis*, is formulated in terms of *contradictio*. *Repugnantia* does not occur in this context (§7–13 about *possibile*). In his exposition of *reale et negativum* (§135–147) Baumgarten does not mention *repugnantia* either, but discusses the opposition between negation and reality.¹⁷ In R3558 Kant wrote *oppositio realis* in the margin of §136 commenting on this exclusive, privative opposition between negation and reality. Moreover, in R3753–3754, *oppositio realis*, as well as *oppositio logica*, occurs several times.¹⁸ In 1758 Kant used Baumeister’s handbook on metaphysics instead of Baumgarten’s.¹⁹ The following year, however, he resumed teaching according to Baumgarten. Baumeister’s metaphysics followed the Wolffian principles and style and we find no significant occurrences of *repugnantia* or *repugnare*²⁰,

¹³“Falsitatis criterium consistit in eo, quod praedicatum notioni subjecti repugnet. Cum enim propositio falsa sit, in qua praedicatum subjecto repugnat (§. 514.); ex ista repugnantia falsitas propositionis agnoscitur. Est igitur ea falsitatis criterium (§. 525.).”

¹⁴J.N. Frobesius, *Christiani Wolfii philosophia rationalis sive logica*, 1746, (facsimile reprint in: Christian Wolff, *Gesammelte Werke* (III Abteilung, Band 6), Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms Verlag 1980), 66.

¹⁵Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, Halle, 1757⁴, (reprinted in AA XVII and XV).

¹⁶In 1757 (cf. AA II, 10), in 1759–1760 (cf. AA II, 35) and in 1765–1766 (cf. AA II, 308).

¹⁷Cf. §135: “negationes et realitates sunt sibi invicem oppositae” (cf. the references to this section *Metaphysik Herder* in §1.1 above).

¹⁸These *Reflexionen* are entirely in Latin, and were written in phase ζ (1764–1766) and were written in the margins of *Metaphysica* §14. In R3754 Kant mentions *privatio* in the sense of a result of a real opposition.

¹⁹See Kant’s own announcement in AA II, 25.

²⁰Friedrich Christian Baumeister, *Institutiones metaphysicae (Ontologiam, cosmologiam, psychologiam, theologiam denique naturalem complexae, methodo Wolfii adornatae, Wittenbergae et Servestae, 1738*, (facsimile reprint in: Christian Wolff, *Gesammelte Werke* (III Abteilung, Band 25), Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms Verlag 1988). *Repugnantia* occurs in the sense of “contradiction” (*contradictio sive repugnantia* in §172, cf. §44) and *repugnare* is used in the context of “contradiction” (§46, §58).

with the exception of what is “morally impossible” (*moraliter impossibile*). Such an impossibility is not based on contradiction, like impossibility *tout court*, although it involves some *repugnantia*. Baumeister’s example is that God cannot prefer what is worse, in comparison to what would be better, because that would oppose his wisdom and sanctity, although it would not involve a contradiction if he did.

In Meier’s handbook on logic²¹, which Kant used for his own lectures on logic²², *repugnantia* does not occur. *Repugnare* is mentioned in §292 as the Latin translation of the German phrases “einander zuwider sein” and “mit einander streiten”, which refer to logical relations between concepts (“Begriffe”). In §263–265 these relations are indicated by the German term “widersprechen” without reference to the corresponding Latin phrases.²³ Meier does not mention the Latin terms in his treatment of contradictory judgements in §343.

In 1763 *Realrepugnantz* occurred for the first time in Kant’s publications.²⁴ It was introduced in *Beweisgrund* in close connection with logical opposition in a discussion about necessary being and supreme reality. Four years earlier this discussion had already been announced in *Optimismus*.²⁵ In *Negative Größen*, however, the term was used in a less restricted context. Apparently Kant had realized that “Realrepugnantz” was a convenient and appropriate term to refer to an issue that was common to a great variety of scientific disciplines (mathematics, economics, physics, psychology, metaphysics, moral philosophy). In the context of German philosophy the choice to adopt this term was a lucky one. Any philosopher familiar with this philosophy of the time around 1750 would recognize “Repugnantz” as the equivalent of *repugnantia*.²⁶ Although one would be inclined to identify *repugnantia* with “logical contradiction”, the philosophical practice of that time—as we have just seen—also offered the opportunity to use the Latin term, and in this case even the German equivalent, to indicate a quite specific kind of opposition.

²¹Georg Friedrich Meier, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, Halle: J. J. Gebauer, 1752, (based on Meier’s *Vernunftlehre* (1752) and reprinted in AA XVI)

²²Cf. AA I, 503; AA II, 35, 310. Presumably, Kant started using the *Auszug* in 1756–1757. Earlier lectures were based on the *Vernunftlehre*, cf. Hinske, ‘Prolegomena . . .’, 109–110, and his references in notes 27–30.

²³Kant, however, seems to be paraphrasing the first part of §263 in R2887 by the Latin formula *Qvicquid repugnat Generi, illud et speciei et individuo*.

²⁴In *Beweisgrund* (cf. AA II, 86/5–7), and later that year in *Negative Größen*.

²⁵Cf. *Optimismus* in: AA II, 31/34–35.

²⁶So, for example, Mendelssohn mentions “Repugnantz” as the equivalent of “Entgegensetzung” and “Opposition” in his review of *Negative Größen* (cf. Moses Mendelssohn, ‘324^{ter} Brief’, *Briefe die neueste Litteratur betreffend*, XXII^{ter} Theil (1765), 159–176, 162.

Kant attached the prefix “Real-” to specify what kind of opposition he had in mind, and to emphasize the difference with logical opposition. The first paragraphs of *Negative Größen* (first section) serve to achieve these objectives.

It is important to note that for Kant the immediate cause to introduce “Realrepugnanz” was the context of cosmotheology (in *Optimismus* and *Beweisgrund*). However, according to *Negative Größen*, which was written immediately after he had completed the manuscript of *Beweisgrund*²⁷, the underlying issue was present in every branch of philosophy. In section 2 of *Negative Größen* Kant presents these cases of real opposition but it is noteworthy that every example contains at least an analysis of the relation between the relevant concepts (*Undurchdringlichkeit–Anziehung*, *Lust–Unlust*, *Tugend–Untugend*) and that every analysis is carried out with the help of the mathematical notion of negative magnitude.

These three points (sc. the contextual origin for introducing *Realrepugnanz*, the great variety of cases of real opposition, and Kant’s mathematico-philosophical approach) need to be emphasized in order to make a historical remark with respect to the issue of real opposition (as opposed to the historical origin of the notion). According to Susan Shell “Hume is frequently credited with bringing to Kant’s attention the distinction between logical and real opposition”.²⁸ Surely, Hume’s distinction between *relations of ideas* (which can be ascertained by the operations of thought) and *matters of fact* (which cannot be demonstrated in the same way) resembles Kant’s distinction. Hume specifies the latter distinction by stating that “All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of *Cause and Effect*.”²⁹ Kant’s considerations and questions regarding this particular relation in the closing remark of *Negative Größen* may seem to be inspired by Hume, but there is no clear and direct evidence that Hume is to be regarded as the historical source of the distinction.³⁰ To do so on the basis of a similarity of corresponding phrases about cause and effect would, in addition to Kreimendahl’s arguments, ignore the three points mentioned

²⁷For details about this chronology cf. remarks at AA II, 470, 478.

²⁸Susan Meld Shell, *The Embodiment of Reason. Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996, 359. At p. 338 she also refers to Hume as the historical source: “The distinction between real and logical opposition is generally attributed to Hume.”

²⁹Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, 1740–1749, section IV, part 1. The German translation of this Enquiry was published in 1755.

³⁰For an extensive evaluation and rejection of the view that Hume’s influence on Kant—the famous wake up call—dates back to the years 1762–1763, cf. Lothar Kreimendahl, *Kant—Der Durchbruch von 1769*, Köln: Jürgen Dinter Verlag, 1990, 28–38.

above and in particular it would be a depreciation of Kant's philosophical efforts. These efforts are not limited to the specific problem of causality. Kant mentions the problem of causality, because it represents a specific case of a more general metaphysical problem that he is dealing with. Moreover, in *Negative Größen* the means by which Kant is trying to do so is a concept (sc. negative quantity) which he borrowed from mathematics, a discipline that according to Hume belongs to the realm of mere operations of thought.

The amount of attention that Kant had given to the notion and idea of real repugnancy during the first half of the 1760's remained unparalleled in the course of his later philosophical publications. In his later writings "Realrepugnantz" does not occur. Perhaps the term was regarded as an awkward Latinism, but in any case there were more obvious, equivalent German notions and descriptions available, like for example "Widerstreit", "Widerspiel", "Gegensatz", and "Opposition"³¹, which were all used by Kant in his works published after 1781 whenever real repugnancy was the issue.³² In KrV we find the following descriptions: "nur logisch, nicht realiter [...] entgegengesetzt" (B290n), "so läßt sich zwischen den Realitäten kein Widerstreit denken" (B320), and "reale Widerstreit" (B329).

The 1796 Latin translation of Kant's first *Critique*³³ is indicative of the fact that the term "Realrepugnantz" had not become a current notion.

³¹Cf. "Gegensatz" in: Rudolf Eisler, *Kant-Lexikon*, Hildesheim/New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1979, (8. unveränderter Nachdruck der Ausgabe Berlin 1930; 1916¹); "Opposition" in Georg Samuel Albert Mellin, *Enzyklopädisches Wörterbuch der kritischen Philosophie (in sechs Bänden)*, Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1970–1971, (facsimile of Züllichau/Leipzig 1797–Jena/Leipzig 1804), Band 4, 472–482 and "Widerstreit" in Mellin, *Enzyklopädisches Wörterbuch ...*, Band 6, 173–174.

³²In line with current academic practice (see, for example, Meier's *Auszug*) sometimes the Latin expression is mentioned in addition to a German notion or description. Significant occurrences in Kant's later works are: "Der Tugend = +a ist [...] das Laster [...] = -a als Widerspiel (*contrarie s. realiter oppositum*) entgegen gesetzt" (MS in: AA VI, 384); "Vergnügen ist die Lust [...] Schmerz ist die Unlust [...]. Sie sind [...] eines dem anderen nicht bloß als Gegentheile (*contradictorie s. logice oppositum*), sondern auch als Widerspiel (*contrarie s. realiter oppositum*) entgegengesetzt."; (*Anthropologie* in: AA VII, 230); "Wenn das Gute = a ist, so ist sein contradictorisch Entgegengesetztes das Nichtgute. Dieses ist nun die Folge entweder eines bloßen Mangels eines Grundes des Guten = 0, oder eines positiven Grundes des Widerspiels desselben = -a; [etc.]" (*Religion* in: AA VII, 22n).

³³Fredericus Gottlob Born, 'Critica rationis purae', in: *Immanuelis Kantii Opera ad philosophiam criticam (Volumen primum)*, Lipsiae, 1796. *Pugna* in this sense seems to be echoing the meaning of the original Greek notion *machē*. Born's translations in this respect are very consistent; "Widerstreit" is translated into *pugna* (for example in B450 and in the four titles announcing the antinomical conflicts), and *repugnantia* (Born, 'Critica rationis purae', 205, 354) is reserved for "Widerspruch" (B310, 532) in the logical sense.

“Reale Widerstreit” (B329) is translated into *pugna realis*³⁴, whereas one would have expected *repugnantia realis* or *oppositio realis* on account of *Negative Größen*. In the Latin translation *repugnantia* was reserved for “contradiction” (“Widerspruch”).³⁵ Although *repugnantia* could be used in this sense—as is shown by the case of Baumeister above—the obvious translation of “Widerspruch” would have been *contradictio*.

Born’s Latin translation of *Negative Größen* (published 1798)³⁶ does not show remarkable differences from what he did with the *Critique*. He follows Kant’s German terms very closely, and consistently. Repugnantia is reserved for contradiction (“Widerspruch”) and *repugnantia logica* is the literal translation of “logischer Repugnanz”. “Satz des Widerspruchs” is translated into *decretum repugnantiae*. Each Latin description of real opposition closely follows the German original: *repugnantia realis* (for: “Realrepugnanz” and “reale Widerstreit”); *oppositio realis* (for: “reale Entgegensetzung” and “reale Opposition”). Since *repugnantia* is primarily used to refer to logical opposition, the translation of Kant’s first description of real opposition in *Negative Größen* seems strange. Born translated “Diese Entgegensetzung [...] ist real, d.i. ohne Widerspruch.” into “Haec oppositio [...] est [...] realis, sine repugnantia.”³⁷

After 1763 the word “Realrepugnanz” has disappeared from Kant’s vocabulary. In *Negative Größen* it was a convenient term to cover all of the philosophical issues he wanted to discuss. It is, I think, precisely because of this great *variety* of issues, that Kant, in his later discussions of these topics, chose terms that suited the issue at hand, instead of employing this artificial notion over and over again. The very word itself may have disappeared after 1763, the underlying subjects and Kant’s concern about them certainly did not. On the contrary, the philosophical issue of real repugnancy remained a persistent theme throughout Kant’s work. Although he used different

³⁴Born, ‘Critica rationis purae’, 216. “Realiter entgegengesetzt” (B290n) is translated into *realiter oppositum* (Born, ‘Critica rationis purae’, 193n.).

³⁵Cf. for example “Widerspruch” (B818) and Born, ‘Critica rationis purae’, 543; *Decretum repugnantiae* is Born’s translation of “Satz des Widerspruchs” (B12, 190), cf. Born, ‘Critica rationis purae’, 10, 128. “Satz des Widerspruchs” at B14 is translated into *effatum repugnantiae/repugnantium* (Born, ‘Critica rationis purae’, 12). An exception is “Widerspruch” right at the beginning of B330 which Born translates into *contradictio* (Born, ‘Critica rationis purae’, 217, also 211), because it occurs in the context of the discussion about *logice repugnare* and *pugna realis*.

³⁶Fredericus Gottlob Born, ‘Specimen de conceptu quantitatum negativarum in philosophiam introducendo’, in: *Immanuelis Kantii Opera ad philosophiam criticam (Volumen quartum)*, Lipsiae, 1798, 161–199.

³⁷Cf. AA II, 171/4–5 and Born, ‘Specimen de conceptu quantitatum negativarum ...’, 164.

concepts, terms and phrases to discuss this theme in various contexts, the notion of real repugnancy as presented in *Negative Größen* may still offer the basic framework for interpreting these issues throughout his work.

2.2 Metaphysics

For the study of Kant's work we shall employ a twofold approach: we shall view Kant's work in terms of its *chronology*, and our review of this work shall be based on the assumption that it should be classified as *metaphysics*. The emphasis on chronology is prompted by the fact that Kant's earlier work on the concept of negative magnitude prominently features the theme of real repugnance. In order to ascertain the precise position and meaning of this theme within the broader context of Kant's earlier work, we need to establish what exactly were the most significant themes and developments from that period. The emphasis on metaphysics is in keeping with what is referred to as the metaphysical or ontological Kant-interpretation³⁸, in which it is emphasized that metaphysical themes are the key to our understanding of Kant's work. As such this interpretation specifically goes against the neo-Kantian interpretation in which Kant's philosophy is more one-sidedly viewed as epistemology. Metaphysical themes specifically mentioned by Heimsoeth include the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity and the conceptions of space and time.³⁹

As we shall see, Kant also treats the concept of real repugnance in the context of metaphysical topics. When we view these topics in the light of the chronology of Kant's work, this provides us with a clearer understanding of our theme, but it also ensures that Kant's different works are not studied as separate, isolated entities but rather as a whole. In chapters 2, 3 and 4 we will focus entirely on the works from the period before 1770 including the *Reflexionen*.⁴⁰

³⁸Cf. particularly Max Wundt, *Kant als Metaphysiker. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie des 18. Jahrhundert*, Hildesheim/Zürich/New York, 1984, (facsimile reprint of Stuttgart 1924) and two compilations of articles by Heinz Heimsoeth: Heinz Heimsoeth, *Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants I. Metaphysische Ursprünge und ontologische Grundlagen*, Bonn, 1971², (Kantstudien, Ergänzungshefte 71); and Heinz Heimsoeth, *Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants II. Methodenbegriffe der Erfahrungswissenschaften und Gegensätzlichkeiten spekulativer Weltkonzeption*, Bonn, 1970, (Kantstudien, Ergänzungshefte 100).

³⁹Heinz Heimsoeth, 'Metaphysische Motive in der Ausbildung des kritischen Idealismus', in: *Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants I. Metaphysische Ursprünge und ontologische Grundlagen*, Bonn, 1971², (Kantstudien, Ergänzungshefte 71), 189–225. Cf. also Wundt, *Kant als Metaphysiker* . . . , 93–119.

⁴⁰Especially the *Reflexionen* contained in Kant's copies of Meier's *Auszug* and Baum-

The emphasis on metaphysics is not solely prompted by the metaphysical Kant-interpretation. It also stems from the fact that Kant sees his involvement with philosophy as a philosophical battle on behalf of metaphysics and its claims of knowledge. Even in the preface of KrV, A Kant phrases it in these terms. This involvement was a driving philosophical force behind Kant's work.

From the very beginning Kant's attitude towards metaphysics has been ambivalent. On the one hand his work resonates with a profound skepticism⁴¹; on the other hand Kant frequently states the need for renewal, and voices his confidence in the future of metaphysics.⁴² This ambivalence can be attributed to the problematic relation between metaphysics and mathematics as two competing ways of describing nature. The explanatory value of the metaphysical approach to nature had been challenged by Newtonian physics. Due to the use of mathematics, physics was able to lay claim to a universal validity whereas metaphysics merely became mired down in speculation. This gave rise to the question whether, given the apparent supremacy of mathematical explanation, metaphysics might still serve a purpose, and if so, what its object would be and in what relation it would stand to mathematics. In his early work Kant constantly tries to determine the mutual relation between metaphysics and mathematics.⁴³

In *Gedanken* he does so by examining the point of contention between the Leibnizians and the Cartesians regarding the living forces.⁴⁴ Kant argues that the mathematical conceptions of body and force do not correspond to bodies and forces as they exist in nature. Therefore there is no mathematical proof to explain the living forces in nature.⁴⁵ To fill this explanatory void

garten's *Metaphysica. Reflexionen* are dated by Adickes, cf. AA XIV, xxxv–xlvi. *Reflexionen* from the period until 1770 belong to phase α through κ .

⁴¹Already in *Gedanken*, AA I, 30. Cf. also *Beweisgrund*, AA II 66/1–6, 71/24–25; *Negative Größen*, AA II, 167–169; *Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 275/13–16. Cf. also Norbert Hinske, *Kants Weg zur Transzendentalphilosophie. Der dreißigjährige Kant*, Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln/Mainz: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1970, 115–119.

⁴²*Gedanken*, AA I, 30/32–35; *Träume*, AA II, 367–368.

⁴³See, for example, the complete titles of *Monadologia* and *Negative Größen*, and Hinske, *Kants Weg ...*, 115–119. An extensive overview is offered in Alfred Menzel, 'Die Stellung der Mathematik in Kants vorkritischer Philosophie', *Kant-Studien*, 16 (1911), 139–213.

⁴⁴The development of a philosophical point on the basis of a confrontation between opposite opinions remains a characteristic of Kant's work (cf. the antinomy, and the "Ausgleichung eines auf Mißverstand beruhenden mathematischen Streits", AA VIII, 407–410). This characteristic is discussed in Saner, *Kants Weg vom Krieg ...*, 89–96, 224–232, and Hinske, *Kants Weg ...*, 83–88, 127–133.

⁴⁵Cf. *Gedanken*, AA I, 40/4–6, 70/16–17, 74/32–34, 149/1–3, and Menzel, 'Die Stellung der Mathematik ...', 145–149. The mathematical method is dismissed as an inappropriate,

Kant states that metaphysics also plays an important role in explaining nature, and that the combination of metaphysics and mathematics could yield beneficiary results for both approaches. The respective weaknesses of the two approaches would thus be complemented by the strengths of their respective counterparts.⁴⁶

Even after establishing this mutual dependency it still remains to be determined what the *object* of metaphysics is. Kant therefore prefaces his *Gedanken* by a chapter on metaphysics entitled “Von der Kraft der Körper überhaupt”. By taking the concept of “force” and expressly discussing it in a metaphysical context, Kant is able to thematize the conception of *relation*⁴⁷ within the boundaries of traditional substance ontology. Repugnance (whether logical or real) is also classified under the general heading of “relation”. The metaphysical conception of force thus forms the relevant background for our examination of the theme of repugnance in chapter 4.

2.3 Force and interiority

In the 18th century the reliance on a force in a metaphysical explanation was sure to bring about great controversy. In 17th century mechanics the scholastic, Aristotelian methods of explanation, which depended on internal qualities and capacities, were replaced by mechanistic explanations. In these mechanistic explanations a force was the result of an external movement caused by either an immediate touch or a thrust (impulse) of external origin. Internal principles of purposiveness were considered anathema.⁴⁸ Newton’s appeal to the gravitational force represented, in effect, a reversion to scholastic pseudo-explanations⁴⁹, but due to the mathematical formulation it was possible to discuss force as a principle of movement. Kant, too, views

philosophical method in *Negative Größen* (AA II, 167) and *Deutlichkeit* (AA II, 283), thereby criticising Wolff (*Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 277) and, perhaps, Spinoza. The logical requirements for a philosophical method, the *modus cognoscendi* mentioned at AA I, 60, are presented in *Gedanken* (AA I, 93–98, 151), cf. Menzel, ‘Die Stellung der Mathematik ...’, 143–144, and Hinske, *Kants Weg ...*, 119–123.

⁴⁶*Gedanken*, AA I, 107 and Hinske, *Kants Weg ...*, 42, 115–118. The combination of metaphysics and mathematics is clearly referred to in a phrase such as “aus den wesentlichen und geometrischen Eigenschaften eines Körpers” (AA I, 152).

⁴⁷The Latin term is *respectus*. More discussion on the various meanings of this significant notion of *respectus* is offered in the present and subsequent two chapters.

⁴⁸Cf. E. J. Dijksterhuis, *De mechanisering van het wereldbeeld*, Amsterdam, 1950, part IV, §133–137, 210, 213–215.

⁴⁹Dijksterhuis, *De mechanisering ...*, §292, 298 and 312–313. Kant’s ideas on gravitation are discussed in §4.2 below.

force as an internal principle with which movements can be explained.⁵⁰ The contrast between the interiority (of the force) and the mechanistic exteriority (of movement) is constantly emphasized this way.

In the chapter on metaphysics in the *Gedanken* Kant introduces the notion of an essential force as something that a body possesses even before it possesses extension (AA I, 17). An express distinction is made between this essential force, referred to by Kant as “innerliche Kraft des Körpers” (AA I, 30), and the exteriority that a body “receives” only at a later stage. The contrast is even more clearly demonstrated in Kant’s elaboration on the concept of force in nature as opposed to the concept of force in mathematics and mechanics (AA I, 140). Instead of an impulse of external origin there is an internal “Basis der Activität” (AA I, 141) which maintains the movement and can even increase it. This basis, or “Bestrebung [...] diese Bewegung zu erhalten” (AA I, 141), is referred to by Kant as the “Intension”. Movement is merely the external manifestation of an internal force and intension.⁵¹

With these views on the subject of force, Kant remains in keeping with the tradition of metaphysics that he is familiar with. Baumgarten, whose manual Kant used in his lectures⁵², provides the definition that Kant used as a basis. Force, in the general sense, is the ground which renders accidents inherent in a substance. If this basis is sufficient, Baumgarten refers to it as a force in the strict sense.⁵³ When the intrinsic force of the substance is a sufficient basis to affect change, then this change is an action (*actio*, *actus* or *operatio*).⁵⁴ The possibility to act is a faculty (*facultas*, *vis* or *potentia activa*).⁵⁵ Kant adopts this view, but deviates from Baumgarten by emphasizing that the

⁵⁰He is aware of the fact that he is running the risk of giving a pseudo-explanation. At AA I, 70 he mentions *Entelechie* as an example of a *qualitas occulta*. This *Entelechie*, however, has been misunderstood by all teachers who have followed Aristoteles (AA I, 17; cf. R2330). Cf. also R2107, 3849, 3851 and R3414 which has *Entelechie* as a later addition to *conceptus deceptor*. More detailed discussion of Aristoteles’s entelecheia in relation to motion and force is offered in Friedrich Kaulbach, *Der philosophische Begriff der Bewegung. Studien zu Aristoteles, Leibniz und Kant*, Köln/Graz, 1965, (Münstersche Forschungen Band 16), 1–13.

⁵¹“Die Bewegung ist das äußerliche Phänomen der Kraft” (AA I, 141); cf. ook AA I, 410: “motus est nexus permutati phaenomenon”. Therefore, *vis motrix* (AA I, 18 and 26) is rejected in favour of *vis activa* (AA I, 17–18).

⁵²Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*. Kant called it “dieses nützlichste und gründlichste unter allen Handbüchern seiner Art” (AA I, 503, cf. also AA II, 10, 35, 308).

⁵³Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, §197.

⁵⁴Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, §209–210. A change that is brought about by external force (*per vim alienam*) is called *passio*.

⁵⁵Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, §216. The possibility of *passio* is receptivity (*receptivitas*, *potentia passiva*, *capacitas*).

word “force” is used as an indication of a *relation*, i.e. the relation between substance and accident.⁵⁶ From this it follows that an act is the result or effect of a force.⁵⁷ Gerhardt therefore describes an “action” in the Kantian sense of the word as the relation between cause and effect.⁵⁸

This emphasis on the relational nature of a force provides the opportunity to specify in more detail a number of other metaphysical themes. Within the boundaries of substance metaphysics it is possible, in addition to determining the relation between accident and substance (force), to determine the mutual relation between substances (space) and the mutual relation between accidents (time).⁵⁹ The result of this emphasis on relation is that force, space and time are the three core concepts of metaphysics.⁶⁰ In view of this it becomes clear why, at the beginning of the chapter on metaphysics in *Gedanken*, Kant emphasizes that a force is possessed by a body even before it possesses extension. Spatial conceptions such as “extension” are only conceivable in terms of a theory of space. A metaphysics of the internal or essential relations based on the conception of force precedes this theory. “Internal” is therefore not in and of itself a spatial determination, but rather it refers to the essential or metaphysical aspect. That which is internal does not have any dimensions.

⁵⁶Cf. *Negative Größen*, AA II, 191/35–37. A force is not the *ratio inhaerentiae*, but rather the *respectus* between ground (substance) and accident, cf. R3786: “vis non est accidens, sed respectus substantiae tanquam rationis [resp] erga accidentia.” (commenting on Baumgarten’s *Metaphysica*, §197). Cf. also *Metaphysik Herder*, AA XXVIII-1, 25/6–8 and *Nachträge Herder*, AA XXVIII-2.1, 844–845) and KrV, B250 and *Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie* (1788), AA VIII, 181n.

⁵⁷Cf. R3582–3590.

⁵⁸Volker Gerhardt, ‘Handlung als Verhältnis von Ursache und Wirkung. Zur Entwicklung des Handlungsbegriff bei Kant’, in: G. Prauss, editor, *Handlungstheorie und Transzendentalphilosophie*, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1986, 98–131; and Volker Gerhardt, ‘Handlung und Kausalität. Zum Handlungsbegriff in Kants vorkritischen Schriften’, in: Gerhard Funke and Thomas Seeböhm, editors, *Proceedings of the Sixth International Kant Congress*, Volume II-1, Lanham/Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1989, 19–32.

⁵⁹R3902. Cf. R3785, 4063.

⁶⁰R3716 (AA XVII, 257/5–6 and 259/27–29; R3717 (AA XVII, 260/22). As to the dating of these *Reflexionen*, cf. Josef Schmucker, ‘Kants kritischer Standpunkt zur Zeit der Träume eines Geistersehers im Verhältnis zu dem Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, in: Ingeborg Heidemann and Wolfgang Ritzel, editors, *Beiträge zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft 1781–1781*, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981, 1–36, especially 10–20.

2.4 Space, time and exteriority

The categorical distinction between (temporal-spatial) extension and (non-spatial) interiority is established in the first chapter of *Gedanken* (“Von den Kraft der Körper überhaupt”). When a substance changes the internal state of another substance, there is an outwardly directed force. Based on this, these two substances assume a spatial relation towards each other. Spatial relations and space thus exist where different substances affect each other by means of force.⁶¹ This explains why, in the previous section, movement was referred to as an external phenomenon: movement is displacement in relation to a certain space.

In the *Nova dilucidatio* Kant sees space in a similar way (AA I, 414/10–12 and 23). This relational theory of space corresponds to Leibniz’s theory: space is not absolute and real, but exists only as a relation between two substances.⁶² Kant’s view of space changed over the years. In the *Monadologia* the relational theory of space⁶³ is presented in a metaphysical sense, but also in terms of natural science: sc. as physical space in which matter acts.

In Kant’s 1768 text on space (*Gegenden*) the theory of space is greatly expanded in light of the shortcomings of the mathematical-physical conception of relational space.⁶⁴ Although space remains relational, Kant now questions the environment in which this relation occurs. This environment is an “absolute Weltraum” (AA II, 377) in which relational space is imbedded. With this theory Kant stands midway between Leibniz’s and Newton’s conceptions of space.⁶⁵ Kant succeeds in adopting this stance by introducing an observ-

⁶¹AA I, 19–21, 23. *Respectus* is the common denominator of notions such as “relation”, “connection”, “influence”. On the basis of his conception of spatial relations Kant addresses the issues of possible worlds (sc. it is possible for a substance to have no external relation with our world), and the *influx physicus* (sc. in so far as mind and body have a spatial relation, there may be some sort of influence). Cf. also *Nova dilucidatio*, AA I, 414–416 and Heimsoeth, ‘Metaphysische Motive ...’, 216–217.

⁶²Newton, however, advocated absolute space, cf. Dijksterhuis, *De mechanisering ...*, IV 323 and Friedrich Kaulbach, *Die Metaphysik des Raumes bei Leibniz und Kant*, Köln: Kölner Universitätsverlag, 1960, (Kantstudien, Ergänzungshefte 79), 11–18.

⁶³AA I, 480: “Quia vero spatium non est substantia, sed est quoddam externae substantiarum relationis phaenomenon ...”. Cf. Kaulbach, *Die Metaphysik des Raumes ...*, 79, 81–90; Martin Carrier, ‘Kants Theorie der Materie und ihre Wirkung auf die zeitgenössische Chemie’, *Kant-Studien*, 81 (1990), 170–210, 172–175; *Träume*, AA II, 327.

⁶⁴Cf. AA II, 377/18–21; R3790 and Kaulbach, *Die Metaphysik des Raumes ...*, 92–98.

⁶⁵Cf. Martin Carrier, ‘Kant’s relational theory of absolute space’, *Kant-Studien*, 83 (1992), 399–416; also Kaulbach, *Die Metaphysik des Raumes ...*, 105–107; and Peter Alexander, ‘Incongruential counterparts and absolute space’, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (New Series), LXXXV (1985), 1–21.

ing body⁶⁶, i.e. a human being who is capable of making an observational distinction between different locations within an absolute, surrounding space. This absolute or original space itself is not observed, but is a “Grundbegriff” (AA II, 379, 383) which makes relational space possible. The introduction of an observing body is to be seen in the context of the emphasis Kant placed on the role of experience before 1768. This point will be examined in greater detail later on.

Whereas relations between substances are spatial relations, the relations between accidents are *temporal* relations. This is to be understood as follows. When the state of a substance changes, the substance in itself must be considered immutable, otherwise there would be no *something* to which a change could occur.⁶⁷ Change occurs when a substance is determined in relation to an accident, whereas this substance had previously not been determined in relation to said accident. This determination may be internal or external, but the change of a substance relates to the alternation of accidents. This alternation can only occur consecutively, i.e. in temporal succession. The relation between different accidents within one and the same substance is a *temporal* relation. Change is, in fact, the occurrence of action in time.⁶⁸

Although Kant’s theory of space changes, the categorical distinction between interiority and exteriority is not affected. It is a recurring theme in Kant’s earlier work.⁶⁹ As is shown in the dialogue in the *Nova dilucidatio*, the distinction is particularly important to practical philosophy. This much was already illustrated by Baumgarten’s definition of action as the change in a state by means of an internal force.⁷⁰

⁶⁶AA II, 378–379, cf. Kaulbach, *Die Metaphysik des Raumes ...*, 102–104. This change in the theory of space is known as the subjectivation or idealisation of space and time. “Subject” in this context denotes the human faculty of knowledge.

⁶⁷R3771, 3904, 4059.

⁶⁸AA I, 19; R3941 and 4093.

⁶⁹*Monadologia*, AA I, 481/29–30. In the *Nova dilucidatio internus* plays a role in a moral argument. In *Falsche Spitzfindigkeit* the capacity to judge is called “Vermögen des innern Sinnes” (AA II, 60) and in *Negative Größen* the distinction is made between external, material causes on the one hand, and internal, mental causes on the other (AA II, 191–192). Inner experience in *Deutlichkeit* will be discussed in §4.4 below. In *Träume* (AA II, 321, 324–328) it recurs in the discussion about immaterial beings.

⁷⁰In R3855–3872 this is discussed in relation to spontaneity, freedom and the will.

2.5 Power of thought

Forces are not only the object of (substance-) metaphysics; there is also a special force, sc. the power of thought, by means of which the philosophical discipline of metaphysics itself is developed. The effects of this power are also actions, sc. thoughts. I will now briefly touch upon the effect this has on metaphysics.

Power of thought is referred to as “Erkenntnißkraft” or “Denkungkraft”⁷¹, and as such it is a fundamental faculty. Kant refers to this general faculty as the capacity to judge.⁷² This capacity relates to judgements, as a force or power relates to action.⁷³ Kant defines a judgement as an action by means of which one acquires a clear conception of a thing (AA II, 58). In this sense a judgement is an act of understanding. Additionally Kant distinguishes another faculty, i.e. the faculty of reason with which one is able to deduce.⁷⁴ These are, however, not two separate faculties. Reason as the higher faculty of knowledge is based on the faculty to judge: “Beide bestehen im Vermögen zu urtheilen; wenn man aber mittelbar urtheilt, so schließt man.”⁷⁵

Because the workings of understanding are themselves actions of force, the concept of metaphysics takes on a double meaning. In the *first* place there is metaphysics in the strict sense of substance-metaphysics. In the *second* place there is metaphysics which focuses on actions of force resulting from the power of thought. The study of the principles of the human faculty of judgement is therefore also considered as metaphysics.⁷⁶

Kant affirms at an early stage that everything that results from a certain faculty must be subject to certain rules.⁷⁷ The same applies to the faculty

⁷¹ *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte*, AA I, 355, 357 and *Negative Größen*, AA II, 199. Kant’s study of faculties is in line with trends in German enlightenment philosophy. Kant does not reduce his study to a purely psychological or physiological approach. (Max Wundt, *Die Deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, Hildesheim, 1964, (facsimile of Tübingen 1945), 272–276). Since logical operations are the result of forces (sc. forces of thought), thoughts can be discussed in terms of spatial relations, as is done by Kant in *Orientiren?*.

⁷² AA II, 59/16. Cf. KrV, B106: “. . . nämlich dem Vermögen zu urtheilen (welches eben so viel ist, als das Vermögen zu denken)”.

⁷³ *Falsche Spitzfindigkeit*, AA II, 58/30–32; *Negative Größen* (AA II, 196/32).

⁷⁴ AA II, 59 (“Vernunft”), AA II, 321 (“Vernunftkraft”).

⁷⁵ *Falsche Spitzfindigkeit*, AA II, 59. Cf. R 3190: “Gleich wie die Begriffe, so werden auch die Urtheile verbunden.” (a reflection to Meier, *Auszug*, §353).

⁷⁶ Cf. Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, §1; the complete title of *Nova dilucidatio* and R3716, 3946 and 3952.

⁷⁷ R1562 (a reflection on Meier, *Auszug*, §1). Cf. Kant’s *Logik* (AA IX, 11) and also *Beweisgrund* (AA II, 129/33–34).

or power of thought (*Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 291/6–7). The rules according to which this faculty works are made explicit in logic. We will now first concentrate on repugnance in logic, and in doing so deal with metaphysics in the aforementioned second sense of the word.

Chapter 3

Logical Repugnance

3.1 Principles of metaphysical knowledge 1

In keeping with the German philosophical tradition, the *Nova dilucidatio* is a treatise on the first principles of metaphysical knowledge. Contrary to the rationalistic, Wolffian version of this tradition¹, Kant does not believe in the existence of a single, first and universal principle for metaphysical truths. This is because the first, universal principle is dual in nature, seeing as it must apply to both positive and negative truths (*Nova dilucidatio*, AA I, 388-389 and *Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 294/10). The principle that applies to positive truths is “quicquid est, est”; the principle that applies to negative truths is “quicquid non est, non est”. Together they constitute the principle of identity.

The difference with the traditional view is confirmed by the position that Kant attributes to the principle of contradiction. Although the section in which he introduces both principles is called *de principio contradictionis*, the principle of contradiction is still *secondary* to the principle of identity. The principle of contradiction consists of the definition of *impossible* and reads as follows: “impossibile est, idem simul esse ac non esse”.² This subordination is based on the duality of truth that determines the principle of identity. This way Kant ensures the autonomy and the priority of an ontological domain (being and non-being) in relation to the logical domain of determinations of thought (to which the principle of contradiction applies). The fact that the title of this section is still called “on the principle of contradiction” is an indication of the fact that Kant adopts a critical stance towards the

¹Wundt, *Kant als Metaphysiker* . . . , 122–126.

²At KrV, B189–192 the temporal qualification is criticised. The principle is discussed in greater detail in §5.2 and §6.2 below.

rationalistic movement that attaches the highest importance to this principle.

The formal principle of identity is subsequently supplemented in section 2 with the *ratio determinans*, the principle of determining or sufficient ground. By *ratio* is meant: “quod determinat subiectum respectu praedicati cuiusdam”. By *determinare* is meant: “ponere praedicatum cum exclusione oppositi”. The *ratio determinans* therefore expresses the specific and determined logical relation between subject and predicate. Logical repugnance is mentioned in a more detailed explanation of this relation. In a determination a predicate is posited while at the same time its opposite is excluded. This occurs “vi principii contradictionis” (AA I, 393/27–28), i.e. in virtue of the principle of contradiction.³ This means that the joining of two opposite predicates in one subject is impossible, and that the *ratio determinans* expresses the exact and exclusive relation between these two predicates.

Next, Kant links both principles to each other when he states that nothing is true without a determining ground (AA II, 393). This means that, in light of the duality of truth, a true proposition expresses the logical relation between a subject and a predicate whereby the opposite predicate is simultaneously excluded. In as far as a judgement is true, it expresses, in relation to the subject, the state of balance of all possible predicates, some of which do belong to the subject (by position) and some of which do not (by exclusion). Kant does not employ the phrase “state of balance” in this context, but it seems the appropriate phrase to indicate the result of a determining ground: a typical and unique conjunction of position and exclusion.

A judgement is the logical representation of the (ontological) relation between that which is and that which is not. This ontological relation, that which the subject of the judgement refers to and which we commonly refer to as a “thing” (*res*), is also characterized by a state of balance. After all, in as far as it is, it must be precisely determined as that which it is. This means that that which it is not has been excluded (by a ground of being). In principle this determination is complete (otherwise the thing would not exist, cf. AA II, 399/19–20) and is referred to by Kant as *omnimoda determinatio*.⁴ The relation between position and exclusion on a logical level corresponds to

³Cf. AA I, 394/2 and *Beweisgrund*, AA II, 77: “Diese Repugnantz nenne ich das Formale der Undenklichkeit oder Unmöglichkeit”.

⁴*Omnimoda determinatio* or “durchgängige Bestimmung” is a complete determination and occurs in: AA I, 27/5; *Nova dilucidatio* AA I, 395/19, 396/12, 397/19, 28–29, 409/19; AA II, 32/33 and 72/19 and AA IX, 99/11. Cf. Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, §53, 148. In the *Nova dilucidatio* it is presented in close connection with a conception of God, which is also its context in KrV. In §8.6 below we will encounter it again. Peter Rohs seems to be missing the specific metaphysical background of *Nova dilucidatio*, cf. Peter Rohs, ‘Kants Prinzip der durchgängigen Bestimmung alles Seienden’, *Kant-Studien*, 69 (1978), 170–180.

a similar relation of opposites on an ontological level. As we shall see later on, these relations reappear in the principles of judgement and reasoning.

3.2 Logical principles in judgements and syllogisms

Identical to the way in which he distinguishes between positive and negative truths, Kant also distinguishes between positive and negative judgements (*Falsche Spitzfindigkeit*, AA II, 47 and *Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 294). A true judgement indicates that a specific subject-predicate relation applies to a thing. In this judgement a feature (predicate) is compared to a thing (subject) (*Falsche Spitzfindigkeit*, AA II, 47, 58). As a result, identity and contradiction are, on a logical level, the primary relations. These relations are described by Kant in the form of principles:

Einem jeden Subjecte kommt ein Prädicat zu, welches ihm identisch ist. Dieses ist der *Satz der Identität*. Und da der Satz, welcher das Wesen aller Verneinung ausdrückt: keinem Subjecte kommt ein Prädicat zu, welches ihm widerspricht, der *Satz des Widerspruchs* ist, so ist dieser die erste Formel aller verneinenden Urtheile (AA II, 294, cf. AA II, 60 and R3710).

These principles apply equally to (syllogistic) reasoning. A judgement is an expression of immediate knowledge, and a syllogism is an expression of the relation between the characteristic marks.⁵

The relations between predicate and subject in judgements that Kant refers to are—as phrased in later terms—in fact *analytic* relations, meaning that the predicate is a constituent concept of the subject. The logical rule of identity thus expresses an analytic relation of identity. The logical rule of contradiction expresses a contradictory relation and prevents a predicate from being assigned to a subject that it is in opposition with. It expresses a negative truth (non-identity). Other relations besides analytic and non-identical relations cannot be expressed using these rules. These rules are thus limited in scope as they do not apply to synthetic relations.⁶

⁵*Falsche Spitzfindigkeit*, AA II, 49 and 60. Cf. R3710, 3217, and R3218, and also Meier, *Auszug*, §292, 362, 363. A series of chain-syllogisms can produce a complete concept (*Falsche Spitzfindigkeit*, AA II, 58–59 and R 3309, 3310). Every syllogism or chain of syllogisms contains an indemonstrable proposition or judgement, cf. *Falsche Spitzfindigkeit*, AA II, 60–61; *Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 294–295 and R3119 (cf. Adickes's comment at AA XVI, 667/16–23).

⁶Cf. Wundt, *Kant als Metaphysiker* . . . , 124n1. The logical, analytic relation between concepts must be distinguished from the metaphysical relation between things. Relevant

The *Nova dilucidatio* adds a more detailed specification to the principles of metaphysical knowledge, thus partially offsetting this limitation. The first step in doing so is a differentiation of the principle of determining reason.

3.3 Ground of being and ground of truth

With regard to the principle of determining ground Kant provides a more detailed specification that once more articulates the difference between metaphysics as the study of the principles of human knowledge and metaphysics in the sense of (substance-) ontology. He distinguishes between the *ratio antecedenter determinans* (or: *ratio cur sive ratio essendi vel fiendi*) and the *ratio consequenter determinans* (or: *ratio quod sive cognoscendi*), and he discusses this in relation to Crusius's distinction between *Realgrund* and *Idealgrund*.⁷

In order to ensure that it is possible to gain knowledge of grounds of being, Crusius⁸ made a distinction in which a ground of knowledge can also be a ground of being. This is essential to his theory of truth, according to which truth exists in the relation between something as it is thought and the actual thing.⁹

Kant on the other hand tries to avoid such an identification. In order to ascertain the truth it is sufficient that the logical relation between the subject and the predicate has been determined, and he emphatically refers to the two different forms of determining ground as *ratio existentiae* and *ratio veritatis* (*Nova dilucidatio*, AA I, 394, 396, 398). Kant further develops this distinction and the confinement of the *ratio veritatis* to a ground of knowledge in confrontation with Crusius's principle of certitude of metaphysical knowledge, which reads as follows: what cannot be thought as other than true is true, and what cannot be thought as other than untrue is untrue. (*Logik* §256, 261;

metaphysical aspects and discussion about analyticity in Kant are mentioned in Willem R. de Jong, 'Kant's Analytic Judgments and The Traditional Theory of Concepts', *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 33 (1995), 613–641.

⁷Christian August Crusius, *Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten, wiefern sie den zufälligen entgegen gesetzt werden*, Leipzig, 1745, (facsimile reprint: Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1964), §34–36; and Christian August Crusius, *Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntniß*, Leipzig, 1747, (facsimile reprint: Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1965), §140–142 Cf. Wundt, *Kant als Metaphysiker* ..., 123–124, 128. Kant mentions Crusius distinction in *Nova dilucidatio*, AA I, 396–397, 398–399; *Negative Größen*, AA II, 203 and *Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 293–295. Cf. also R1716, and R1723 (reflecting on Meier, *Auszug*, §15).

⁸Crusius, *Metaphysik*, §37; Crusius, *Logik*, §142.

⁹Crusius, *Metaphysik*, §28 and Wundt, *Die Deutsche Schulphilosophie* ..., 261.

Metaphysik §15 and *Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 295). Together with the (partial) identification of ideal and real ground this principle places such an emphasis on determinations of thought that on this particular point Crusius's view hardly differs from Wolffian rationalism in which reality was absorbed by the determinations of thought.¹⁰

Kant points out the limitations of this strictly logical approach and states that Crusius's principle merely expresses that at a certain point no further ground of knowledge for a judgement can be provided and that this knowledge is thus indemonstrable (*Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 295). Kant's criticism of Crusius's distinction illustrates how adamantly Kant espouses the differences between the ground of being and the ground of knowledge. The copula ("is" or "to be") in a judgement does not express the existence of the subject or the predicate, but merely the logical relation between the two. This does not however determine the existence of the thing that is being referred to (*Beweisgrund*, AA II, 74/18–20). This existence must have been determined a priori, or rather antecedently, and in proposition VIII of the *Nova dilucidatio* Kant claims that all that is contingent cannot be without an antecedently determining ground, which comes down to his later claim that "being" is not a predicate.¹¹ Kant uses this in *Beweisgrund* when he claims that existence must precede every possible further determination. Existence is the *absolute* position of a thing. The logical position, expressed by the copula of the judgement, is however *relative*, i.e. the copula expresses the relation (*respectus logicus*) in which the predicate (feature, characteristic mark) and the subject (thing) relate to each other.¹²

The emphasis on the distinction between the ground of knowledge and the ground of being once more illustrates the limitations of metaphysics. Metaphysics as the study of the principles of human knowledge seems to exclude knowledge of the grounds of being. Moreover, grounds of knowledge are limited to logical (analytic) relations between subject and predicate. Within this framework it is not possible to do justice to other grounds of knowledge (such as experience mentioned at AA I, 392/14). In order to offset these limitations Kant provides two other principles in section 3 of the *Nova*

¹⁰Wundt, *Die Deutsche Schulphilosophie* . . . , 71–73. Elsewhere (at p. 260) Wundt states that in this respect there is a "eigentümliche Steigerung des Idealismus noch über Wolff hinaus (trotz des unleuchbare Realismus)".

¹¹If "being" had been a predicate, then something could merely exist on account of a judgement about it (R3761). Only God is able to make judgements like that (AA II, 74/14). Schmucker draws parallels between *Nova dilucidatio* and Kant's later views, cf. Josef Schmucker, *Die Ontotheologie des vorkritischen Kants*, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1980, (Kantstudien, Ergänzungshefte 112), 65.

¹²*Beweisgrund*, AA II, 72–74; R3724, 3725.

dilucidatio as a complement to the already mentioned principles. These two principles will be discussed in the following section.

3.4 Principles of metaphysical knowledge 2

The *first* principle that Kant adds to the principle of determining ground in section 3 of the *Nova dilucidatio*, is the *principium successionis*. This principle states that change of a substance cannot take place unless this substance is connected to one (or several other) substance(s) (AA I, 410). After all, the ground of change cannot reside in the substance itself, because in as far as it has been determined, the opposite is excluded (given the principle of determining ground). Grounds of possible change, i.e. grounds of an opposite determination can therefore not be internal, and thus must be external. Only in as far as an external relation with *another* substance exists, is the occurrence of change possible.¹³

The previously made distinction between force or interiority on the one hand and exteriority on the other, is of interest here. The fact that change depends on an external relation between substances means that the principle of determining ground takes on a temporal dimension. After all, the succession of determinations takes place in time, and thus Kant claims, in proposition XII of the *Nova dilucidatio* (AA I, 410) that the negation of the *nexus substantiarum* also results in the negation of time and succession.

The principle of determining ground states that a judgement is an expression of the logical relation between ground and effect.¹⁴ The expansion of this principle by means of the principle of succession provides a basis for the possible thematization of those relations other than logico-identical relations. The non-identical external relation to another thing can serve as a *causal* model for the explanation of change (origin, change, decay, etc.) within metaphysics. Hence a causal explanation is not based on solely logical or identical grounds: “Das Verhältniß der Ursache zur Wirkung ist kein Verhältniß der Identität” (R3843).

The *second* principle, the *principium coexistentiae*, states that (finite) substances, due to their actual existence, have no mutual relation, unless they have a common ground of existence on which the mutual relation is based and by which it is maintained. This mutual ground is the divine intellect. The principle is illustrated as follows: the fact that two substances can

¹³The idea of a *causa sui* is hereby rejected, cf. e.g. R3876. Cf. also *Nova dilucidatio*, propositio VI (AA I, 394–395).

¹⁴R3755: “Die Verhältniß des logischen Grundes zur Folge ist ein Urthel.” (cf. also R3756). This relation is not temporal: “ratio et rationatum logicum sunt semper simul” (R3754).

simultaneously exist does not mean that there is an actual relation between the two. If there is a mutual relation, the existence of the two substances must be predetermined. Because a finite substance cannot be the cause (*ratio essendi*) of another substance, the mutual relation must lay in a *ratio antecedenter determinans* that has determined their relation towards each other. It is beyond all doubt that there are relational and causal connections between substances, because: “everything in the universe is found in mutual connection”.¹⁵

These two principles represent a complement to the logical principles; they allow for the thematization of an external, spatial and temporal dimension within metaphysics. Kant does this from a theological perspective.¹⁶ It is this theological perspective from which Kant also addresses real repugnance. Once we take a look at experience in connection with repugnance, the aforementioned dimensions will also be examined.

3.5 Metaphysics and reality

The fundamental logical relations exist in the form of either identity or contradiction. The limitations inherent in the logical expression of identity and contradiction are essentially obviated by the principles of succession and coexistence, which imply an expansion of the strictly logical approach of metaphysics. This expansion adds a spatial and a temporal dimension. The changes that occur with regard to Kant’s ideas of space and time affect the status of the logical principles. This is illustrated when Kant distinguishes other relations in addition to logical relations.

With regard to *respectus*, Kant distinguishes real *respectus* in addition to logical *respectus*, each of which can be subdivided into *nexus* and *oppositio*.¹⁷ Logical nexus and oppositio were already identified as identity and contradiction in previous sections. Real *respectus* however has proven to be somewhat more problematic for Kant. His first description is a negative one: in any case it *cannot* be expressed by means of identity and contradiction. In order to gain a clearer understanding of real *respectus* he distinguishes, in accordance with the view of metaphysics as the study of the principles of

¹⁵Cf. AA I, 413/13. It is also clear from Kant’s explanation towards the end of *Nova dilucidatio* (AA I, 414–416).

¹⁶Cf. Schmucker, *Die Ontotheologie . . .*, 13–49, 304–305 and Martin Moors, ‘Die Bestimmungsgestalt von Kants Gottesidee und das Gemeinschaftsprinzip’, in: Gerhard Funke and Thomas Seeböhm, editors, *Proceedings of the Sixth International Kant Congress*, Volume II/I, Lanham/Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1989, 49–65.

¹⁷R3591, 3753, 3754 and 3756.

human knowledge, between the various faculties of knowledge by means of which knowledge of (real and logical) relations can be obtained.

Logical relations can be *rationally* understood; understanding and reason, i.e. the powers of thought, are sufficient to grasp such relations. Knowledge of real relations however is *empirical* and is based on (sensory) experience.¹⁸ As we have already seen, the copula of a judgement does not indicate the existence or the absolute position of a thing, and the absolute position precedes the understanding of a logical relation. This absolute position must be a *given*, and it is responsible for giving content to our thought. Kant calls this material side of thought the *datum* and the *data*, or “das Materiale”, “das Etwas”, or “das Reale der Möglichkeit” (*Beweisgrund*, AA II, 77–82). Reference to the empirical origin is not sufficient to adopt something as datum (AA II, 80), but it does indicate the different origin of our understanding of real relations (AA II, 83).

The moments of empiricism, data and materiality are to be found on the real side, whereas the opposite moments of rationality, non-givenness (i.e. ‘contrivedness’) and formality are to be found on the logical side. This provides the foundation for the later elaboration on the contrast between receptive sensibility and spontaneous understanding.

The limitations of logical repugnance and identity, and the lack of clarity regarding real *respectus* make it necessary to evaluate the epistemological role of experience in a metaphysical perspective. This will be touched on at a later point (§4.4). For the time being it is important, in keeping with logical repugnance, to establish the meaning of real “respectus”, and “real repugnance” in particular.

¹⁸R3754, 3756, 3957. The problems and issues Kant is dealing with in terms of *respectus* at this stage, are examined in KrV in terms of synthesis (cf. chapter 6 below), cf. Friedrich Kaulbach, ‘Die Entwicklung des Synthesis-Gedankens bei Kant’, in: Heinz Heimsoeth, editor, *Studien zur Kants philosophischer Entwicklung*, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1967, (Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Band 6), 56–92.

Chapter 4

Real Repugnance

4.1 Real repugnance and negative magnitude

The mathematical notion of negative magnitude may be adorning the title of *Negative Größen*, but the real topic of the essay is real repugnance. *Realrepugnantz* is the philosophical notion coined by Kant to indicate a relation between things insofar as these things are or can be related as negative magnitudes. *Negative Größen* consists of three sections, the first of which is devoted to an explanation of the meaning of negative magnitude, as well as an explanation of real repugnancy. In the second section Kant offers examples of occurrences of negative magnitude and real opposition in various philosophical areas. Section three, the extent of which equals the extent of both preceding sections taken together, contains considerations in preparation for the further application of negative magnitude and real opposition in philosophy.

Real repugnance is different from logical opposition and can therefore not be understood on the basis of identity and contradiction.¹ In his *Beweisgrund* (AA II, 86) Kant defines real repugnance as something that occurs “wenn etwas als ein Grund die Folge von etwas anderm durch eine reale Entgegensetzung vernichtet”. Expanding upon this definition Kant formulates the following rules in *Negative Größen* (AA II, 175, 177): “Die Realrepugnantz findet nur statt, in so fern zwei Dinge als positive Gründe eins die Folge des andern aufhebt” and “Allenthalben, wo ein positiver Grund ist und die Folge ist gleichwohl Zero, da ist ein Realentgegensetzung”.²

¹*Beweisgrund*, AA II, 86; *Negative Größen*, AA II, 171, 202–203; R3719–3720, R3754 and 3756.

²Kant employs a wide range of descriptions to indicate real repugnance, cf. AA II, 86/19, 175/7, 33, 36, 176/5, 177/28–29, 193/25–26, and 196/16. For definitions cf. R3719 and 3720.

It is necessary that both opposing determinations are able to be united in one subject. In such a case the (temporal or spatial) opposition is called an *actual* opposition. As an example Kant mentions a ship that travels distances in different directions as a result of the morning and evening winds. If, on the other hand, both determinations cannot be united in one subject (because they belong to different subjects), and if they are nonetheless really opposed, Kant uses the term *potential* opposition (either spatially or coexistently determined). As examples he mentions two bodies moving away from each other, or one person's desire compared to another's aversion (AA II, 176n, 193–194). In both types of opposition the determinations are real and opposed, as they (are able to) result in a zero-state when brought into connection with each other: “Auf solche Weise sind Dinge, deren eins als die Negative des andern betrachtet wird, beide, für sich betrachtet, positiv, allein in einem Subjecte verbunden, ist die Folge davon das Zero” (AA II, 176).

In order to clarify the concept of real repugnance Kant uses the mathematical concept of negative magnitude:

Eine Größe ist in Ansehung einer andern negativ, in so fern sie mit ihr nicht anders als durch die Entgegensetzung kann zusammen genommen werden, nämlich so, daß eine in der andern, so viel ihr gleich ist, aufhebt. (AA II, 174/7–13)

Kant even refers to a simple accounting problem that he uses in this context as an example of the real opposition of mathematical magnitudes (AA II, 172). The example concerns a person who owes 100 *Reichstahler*, and who at the same time is owed 100 *Reichstahler*. Debits and credits, when combined, result in nothingness, i.e. a “relative nothing” (“ein verhältnißmäßiges Nichts”) which is of a completely different nature compared to the consequence of a logical contradiction. The latter is nothing at all, “gar nichts (*nihil negativum irrepraesentabile*)”. The former is still something (*cogitabile, repraesentabile*) and is also referred to as *nihil negativum repraesentabile*³ or as Zero = 0.

In case of a real opposition both moments are related just as mathematical magnitudes are related in the example of debits and credits; they are opposed, and yet related, and the consequence of this opposition is nothing in the sense of a *nihil repraesentabile*, also referred to as: *nihil privativum*, “Beraubung (*privatio*)”, “Mangel, Abwesenheit”.⁴ The negation as a result of a real opposition is distinct from the *privatio* in the sense of “lack” as it is understood throughout the history of philosophy. The latter is referred to by

³*Negative Größen*, AA II, 171. Cf. R3711, 3720, 3754, 3990 and KrV, B348.

⁴*Negative Größen*, AA II, 172, 177. Cf. R3740, 3754, 3873, 4043.

Kant as “Mangel (*defectus, absentia*)”.⁵

The exact formulation of the conception of real opposition depends on the various types of negation that Kant distinguishes.⁶ Logical opposition is expressed by means of copula negation and results in nothing at all, an impossibility. Real opposition, expressed by means of a predicative, or a (sub)contrary negation, results in a relative or privative nothing.

The philosophical areas to which the concepts of negative magnitude and real repugnance can be applied are physics, moral philosophy, psychology (i.e. the study of the actions of the soul and the faculties of desire and aversion) and natural science. Examples with regard to physics are the forces of attraction and repulsion, as well as their reciprocal relation, which can be characterized as a negative correlation. Another important field of application for real opposition is morality. Characteristics of virtue, vice and negligence are phrased in terms of real repugnance. Set against the background of the theodicy for instance, this provides the possibility of viewing evil in the world as something real, and not merely as a lack (*privatio boni*). Thus there is a basis with which to counter evil. In the field of psychology this application revolves around the specification of the relations between desire, aversion, indifference and balance (equilibrium). Similarly, real repugnance also applies to the actions of the soul, otherwise we would never be able to think of something else after first having thought about something in particular (cf. §1.1). Natural phenomena such as cold and heat, electricity and magnetism are also addressed in terms of real repugnance.

The fact that Kant uses the concept of “force” as a central theme in his metaphysics provides the advantage that seemingly different kinds of events can be understood as the actions of force. In as far as an event is the resultant of an action of force, there is no difference between moral action and a physical event. They do differ to the extent that their causes (can) differ.⁷ This also illustrates that developments in metaphysics can be successful without having to rely on a mathematical method. Mathematics

⁵*Negative Größen*, AA II, 178. Cf. R3526, 3997. Cf. also “Mangel” in *Orientiren?* (AA VIII, 139n).

⁶It may be true that “Kant offers no elaborate theory of negation” (de Jong, ‘Kant’s Analytic Judgments . . .’, §9), but Kant’s views on negation, expressed in *Negative Größen* and in KrV, make it possible to reconstruct a fairly sophisticated and original theory of negation. Cf. also Heinz Heimsoeth, ‘Chr. Wolffs Ontologie und die Prinzipienforschung I. Kants. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Kategorienlehre’, in: *Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants I. Metaphysische Ursprünge und ontologische Grundlagen*, Bonn, 1971², (Kantstudien, Ergänzungshefte 71), 1–92, 10–12, 55–63.

⁷*Negative Größen*, AA II, 191/37–192/5. Moral actions are motivated by an inner law, cf. inner law, consciousness of a positive law, inner moral feeling at AA II, 182–183.

has no bearing here except for Kant's use of the mathematical conception of negative magnitude within the area of philosophy.

According to Heimsoeth⁸ the exact reasons for Kant to develop the theme of repugnance are of a theological and cosmotheological nature. Kant's treatment of the theodicy focuses on the question regarding the difference between realities, in order to compare the existing world to possibly better worlds. Subsequently the question arises how the composite whole of realities (in the world) relates to the highest degree of reality in the sense of an *ens realissimum*.

The first of these questions is dealt with in *Optimismus*. Realities as such do not differ from each other, because they are determined by solely positive characteristics.⁹ One reality is distinct from another reality in so far as the former possesses (or lacks) a characteristic that the latter reality lacks (or possesses). The lack or absence of a characteristic is never in itself a characteristic¹⁰, but rather a quantitative limitation of reality:

Demnach unterscheiden sich Realität und Realität von einander durch nichts als durch die einer von beiden anhängende Negationen, Abwesenheiten, Schranken, das ist nicht in Ansehung ihrer Beschaffenheit (*qualitate*), sondern Größe (*gradu*). (*Optimismus*, AA II, 31).

This quantitative and gradual distinction between realities in *Optimismus* forms the basis for the elaboration of real repugnance in *Beweisgrund* and *Negative Größen*. The difference between realities can now be considered as a negative relation between magnitudes. In *Optimismus* Kant further concludes that our world is the best of all limited worlds (after all, there is still evil in the world) and that there is such a thing as a highest possible degree of reality, sc. in God. This brings us to what Heimsoeth called the theological motivation for the introduction of real repugnance. The notion of real repugnance prevents the reality of our world from being identified with God. Were this to occur, it would result in the possibility of real oppositions occurring in God. The result of this, a negation or defect, would however

⁸Heimsoeth, 'Chr. Wolffs Ontologie ...', 59–60; Heimsoeth, 'Metaphysische Motive ...', 209; and Heinz Heimsoeth, 'Zum kosmologischen Ursprung der Kantischen Freiheitsantinomie', in: *Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants II. Methodenbegriffe der Erfahrungswissenschaften und Gegensätzlichkeiten spekulativer Weltkonzeption*, Bonn, 1970, (Kantstudien, Ergänzungshefte 100), 248–270, 269.

⁹*Optimismus*, AA II, 31/7–8 and *Beweisgrund*, AA II, 86/3–4.

¹⁰*Optimismus*, AA II, 31/32–33 and *Beweisgrund*, AA II, 87/8–9. Cf. R3778 and 3901. About reality and negation cf. also *Orientiren?* (AA VIII, 137n–138n).

contradict the conception of God as the most real being.¹¹ Real repugnance is therefore characteristic of a limited reality. Consequently the result of *Optimismus* remains valid. Kant answers the question of the relation between God and our world by claiming that the *ens realissimum* relates to every possible reality, in the sense that the data for all that is possible can be found in the *ens realissimum* either as a determination or as a consequence of this *ens*. A state of real repugnance, too, must thus be considered the result of the most real being. (*Beweisgrund*, AA II, 85/17–20 and 86/24–25).

Such considerations about God, the world and their mutual relation are meant to serve as a counterbalance to Spinozism. A Spinozistic identification of God with the world and of reality with perfection would exclude the possibility of a relation and a mutual influence between God and the world, meaning, in effect, that the world would be unable to change.¹² Real repugnance therefore serves not just to explain the occurrence of changes in the world, but also to refute a Spinozistic outlook.

Just as logical *respectus* could be subdivided into logical *nexus* and *oppositio*, so too is real *respectus* subdivided into real connection and real opposition. The latter should be viewed in the light of the qualitative distinction between realities and the relation to the *ens realissimum* in the following manner. Every connection (synthesis) is either a connection in the sequence (of states), or a connection such as exists between a part and a whole. Kant refers to the former as the *subordination* of ground and effect and to the latter as the *coordination* of part and whole.¹³

Both types of connection represent the opposite of real opposition, but can still serve to facilitate a more detailed explanation of real repugnance. A state of real repugnance, as we saw before, can be considered the *result* of the *ens realissimum*. As such, each of the repugnant moments in such a state is indirectly included in a subordination of relations. Similarly, an actual, real opposition (*oppositio actualis*) is a state in which the opposite determinations are combined in one subject and are related to each other as ground and effect. Real determinations can also be *potentially* opposed in as

¹¹*Beweisgrund*, AA II, 86/18–21, *Negative Größen*, AA II, 200/34–35.

¹²Cf. references to Heimsoeth in note 8 above. Around 1765 Kant denies Spinozistic options for the relation between God and the world on account of his criticism of the *causa sui* and of the idea of one substance (cf. R3781, 3907, 3924 and R3803, 4094). Nauen tries to establish possible influence of *Optimismus* on the development of German Spinozism, cf. Franz Gabriel Nauen, ‘Kant as an Inadvertent Precursor of 18th Century Neospinozism. On Optimism (1759)’, *Kant-Studien*, 83 (1992), 268–279.

¹³R3717, 3925 and 3968. This distinction is frequently made in the *Reflexionen*, it recurs in the *Dissertation*, and MS (AA VI, 316). Cf. also Moors, ‘Die Bestimmungsgestalt ...’, 53–59.

far as they could lead to a state of real repugnance when joined in one single subject. The potential opposition can only be thematized when the whole of realities is considered. Kant refers to such a whole as *omnitude realis* (R3890, 4024). This background illustrates the two propositions formulated by Kant towards the end of *Negative Größen* (AA II, 194, 197; cf. R4002).

Particularly in the second proposition there are a number of themes that converge. The sum of all real grounds in the universe equals zero. In the explanation Kant adds that the world is merely something in so far as it is based on the *will* of something else (in this case God).¹⁴ Only in relation to something else are the world, the universe (and all possible realities) something positive. The natural changes in the world do nothing to either increase or decrease the whole of positive reality (as claimed in the first proposition). An increase or a decrease would require a supernatural or unnatural act. One could say that the world, in as far as it is nothing, can be considered as a big barrel full of potential, real oppositions.

The combination of the theme of real (subordinated and coordinated) connection and that of real repugnance provides a clear picture of the relation between God and the world. The world is mutable, but the evil aspects of it cannot be attributed to God. Although He is, by His will, the origin or the creator of the world, the distance he maintains in relation to the mutable world gives man the freedom to adopt a practical or moral position in the world. Real repugnance thus contributes to the field of cosmotheology, but the question of how real repugnance itself is to be explained remains.

This question focuses on another question, i.e. what is the real connection between cause and effect, or as Kant puts it: “wie soll ich es verstehen, daß, weil Etwas ist, etwas anders sei?” (AA II, 202) and “wie darum, weil etwas ist, etwas anders aufgehoben werde” (ibid. 203). These questions explicitly address the problem of causality. Although Kant, at this point in his development, is able to formulate this as a philosophical issue, he is unable to provide a solution (*Negative Größen*, AA II, 203/1–5). He is merely able to give a negative answer by strictly distinguishing between the real relation of cause and effect and the analytic logical relation of ground and consequence based on identity and contradiction (AA II, 202/3–5). A positive answer would not be explicitly formulated until the second half of the 1760’s, when Kant stated that real connections come to us in *experience*.¹⁵ The question regarding an explanation of real repugnance thus leads to the

¹⁴The first ground of a succession of subordinated relations is a free act of the will of God (AA II, 197).

¹⁵Cf. §3.5 above and §4.4 below; *Träume*, AA II, 370/11–13 and R4021.

question regarding the statute of experience in relation to rational knowledge.

This development of the question can be characterized as the subjectification of metaphysics¹⁶ and can be briefly explained as follows. As a result of the appeal to logical principles, the answer is confined to rational knowledge. Subsequently the question arises how (metaphysical) knowledge of non-rational or synthetic relations is possible. The provisional answer is that this is possible on the basis of experience, but this leads to the question of how experience is possible. The Transcendental Logic in KrV answers this question with the logification of the form of experience.

According to Heimsoeth the introduction of real repugnance is based on the actual experience of the (real) opposition itself, which in turn is based on a *Fundamentalfaktum* from Newton's natural philosophy, i.e. force and counterforce.¹⁷ Consequently, in the next two sections we will focus on the role of the Newtonian concept of force and counterforce within Kant's model of metaphysics. In §4.4 we will resume our focus on the role of experience.

4.2 Attraction

Earlier on brief mention was made of how the (re-)introduction of forces in (natural) philosophy was controversial in comparison to 17th century mechanics, because this seemed to represent the re-introduction of hidden qualities. With regard to the force of attraction Newton dismissed any criticism along these lines.¹⁸ Perhaps the cause of this force will one day be discovered, but nevertheless the existence of a force is indisputable because we have ascertained it through experience¹⁹ and it can be mathematically formulated. As a systematic description of an experience, the force of attraction is not a hidden quality, nor is it a random hypothesis (Dijksterhuis, *De mechanisering* . . . , IV 314). Through his mathematical formulation of an experience Newton distances himself from metaphysics as the study of internal forces (Dijksterhuis, *De mechanisering* . . . , IV 324).

In doing so the problem arises of the *actio in distans* and the related problem of empty space. The dismissal of force as an internal principle implies that force would only exert its influence on another body across a distance by

¹⁶For example, cf. R3946, 3952, 3970, 3988.

¹⁷Heimsoeth, 'Chr. Wolffs Ontologie . . .', 57, 60–61, and Heimsoeth, *Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants II* . . . , 120.

¹⁸Dijksterhuis, *De mechanisering* . . . , IV 316, 326–328.

¹⁹Dijksterhuis, *De mechanisering* . . . , IV 315. Cf. Helmut Holzhey, *Kants Erfahrungsbe-griff. Quellengeschichtliche und bedeutungsanalytische Untersuchungen*, Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1970, 79–82.

means of the transference of an impulse via the interlaying particles. In this case one cannot assume that space is empty (Dijksterhuis, *De mechanisering* . . . , IV 204–205, 324). Newton’s view with regard to the *actio in distans* and empty space is ambiguous at best (Dijksterhuis, *De mechanisering* . . . , IV 325), but in general he dismisses the interiority of forces, empty space and the action of force across distance as metaphysical and hypothetical. He explains any unanswered questions on this subject by placing the actions of force in the absolute space of God’s omnipresence. By doing so the (im)material action of force across distance is guaranteed, thus dismissing the question whether space is empty or not. In any case the force need not be internal.²⁰

Kant emphatically appeals to Newton when introducing the force of attraction in his *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte*. Similar to Newton, Kant maintains three moments that are of importance and that guarantee the explanatory value of the force of attraction. These are *experience*, the explanation thereof by means of a *force*, and the *mathematical formulation* to guarantee its universal character. Contrary to Newton, Kant acknowledges the metaphysical tenor of the assumption that forces are internal principles. He therefore speaks of an “essential force of attraction” (AA I, 230, 264, 335, 467) thus risking being accused of having resorted to a pseudo-explanation.²¹ Attraction is first referred to as a force in *Die Frage*, and is later mentioned on several occasions in the *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte*, as well as in many other works.

The experience of attraction is a defining moment in the forming of a theory of force. “Experience” is not the *terminus technicus* we find in KrV. Kant also refers to it as “Beobachtungen”²² or “phenomena”.²³ A certain, indisputable experience is important, because this is both the basis (phenomenon that is to be explained), as well as a final test required to determine whether the existence of a force can and may be assumed. In his *Neue Anmerkungen*, Kant keeps searching for a “Bestätigung aus der Erfahrung” of his statements (AA I, 493, 494, 496, 498). In *Träume* it is

²⁰As to *actio in distans*, attraction, and repulsion, cf. Karl J. Fink, ‘Actio in distans, repulsion, attraction. The origin of an eighteenth century fiction’, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*, XXV (1981), 69–87.

²¹Kant is aware of this and expresses his doubts regarding the explanatory value of attraction, cf., for example, R3160 (to Meier, *Auszug*, §338 about *qualitates occultae*): “Wenn die zu erklärende Sache zur Ursache genommen wird. vis plastica ...” (cf. Adickes’s addition at AA XVI, 688/21–22) and R3417.

²²For example in AA I, 244/32. Cf. Holzhey, *Kants Erfahrungsbegriff* . . . , 134n4 and the complete title of *Beobachtungen*.

²³“Schwere”, attraction or gravitation is called an “ausgemachtes Phänomen der Natur” (AA I, 244). Cf. also Holzhey, *Kants Erfahrungsbegriff* . . . , 136

mentioned that concepts such as cause, force, and action only have validity in as far as they have been experienced.²⁴ Elsewhere constant emphasis is placed on the relation between experience and assumptions (*Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 275/17–18; *Träume*, AA II, 358–359). The appeal to phenomena and experience is necessary in order to provide a solid basis for hypothetical or metaphysical assumptions (both in the pejorative sense of the word).²⁵

Through the appeal to the force of attraction, specific experiences, phenomena or observations are explained in a way that transcends the concrete level of experience. The reference to a force gives the experience legitimacy. On the other hand the experience constitutes the *ratio cognoscendi* of this force. Without such a *ratio* the appeal to a force would lack explanatory value. In this sense, explanation and experience rely on each other and are inextricably linked.

Thirdly, as a means of legitimizing his appeal to a force, Kant emphasizes the mathematical form in which the force of attraction can be universally and systematically formulated. The mathematical form is referred to by Kant on many occasions, and often in conjunction with experience.²⁶ The mathematical formulation renders the metaphysical hypothesis in a form that eliminates all doubt as to its explanatory value. Thus it exemplifies the fruitful way in which Kant utilizes mathematics in the service of (limited) metaphysics.

In terms of the *Nova dilucidatio* it is fair to say that an appeal to experience provides metaphysics with *rationes cognoscendi*. For example, experience (*experientia*, AA I, 392/14) is the ground of knowledge for evil in the world. Purely ontological *rationes essendi* are not always within the scope of metaphysics (of force). One can also not refer to forces as underlying grounds without running the risk of making an appeal to *qualitates occultae*. The place of experience in conjunction with the *ratio cognoscendi* also

²⁴ *Träume* (AA II, 370/11–13 and 20–22). Schmucker considers emphasis on experience to be a critique of a speculative approach in moral philosophy (cf. Schmucker, ‘Kants kritischer Standpunkt ...’, 4–5).

²⁵ Newton’s exclamation “Hypotheses non fingo!” (Dijksterhuis, *De mechanisering* ..., IV 314, 319) clearly expresses the pejorative sense of “hypothesis”. Kant employs the pejorative sense in *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte*, AA I, 234/12; *Träume*, AA II, 333/30 and 341/11. If a hypothesis is related to experience there is no objection to using hypotheses, cf. *Beweisgrund* AA II, 139/17, 145/5; *Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 275/10; *Träume*, AA II, 371/8. This positive though limited appreciation of hypotheses is present in KrV, B797–799 (“Die Disziplin der reinen Vernunft in Ansehung der Hypothesen”). At B798–799 attraction and repulsion, in relation to experience, are mentioned in the context of hypotheses.

²⁶ *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte*, AA I, 225/35, 230/29, 234/33, 243–244, 296/31; *Nova dilucidatio*, AA I, 415; *Fortgesetzte Betrachtung*, AA I, 466, 468; *Beweisgrund*, AA II, 139; *Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 275; *Träume*, AA II, 335.

indicates that within metaphysics first and foremost the mutual relation of experience and understanding must be made explicit. As we have seen, Kant's development in the 1760's headed in this direction.

Because attraction is related to a mathematical formulation and to experience, this force can be maintained as a true force in metaphysics. At the same time there remains room within metaphysics for theories on empty space and the *actio in distans*, making Kant "more metaphysical" on this subject than Newton. These theories already appeared in *Gedanken* (AA I, 29) and are subsequently referred to on many occasions.²⁷

Characteristic of these theories is Kant's insistence on the *actio in distans* for the benefit of cosmogony. Because Kant does not rely on substantial forces he also does not need God's omnipresence to guarantee this type of action. The next step would be acknowledgement of empty space, because interlaying particles are no longer necessary for the transference of impulses. An ancillary advantage would be that it would not be possible to fully determine movements the way it is possible in a space filled with particles. Still, Kant does not unequivocally argue in favour of, or against empty space. He goes no further than to say that empty space is not impossible ("nicht widerlegt", AA II, 288/8).

Kant expresses his ambivalence towards empty space by claiming that space is relatively empty (AA I, 262n). Although there is interlaying matter in the form of finely dispersed particles, these particles do not affect the actions between the larger bodies. On the other hand, these particles do represent the basis for the introduction of another original force: the force of repulsion.

4.3 Repulsion

Together with the force of attraction Kant repeatedly mentions the force of repulsion in his *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte*, as well as in subsequent works. Both forces are equally original and universal (AA I, 234–235). Although repulsion is not mathematically formulated, and its universal character is not thus guaranteed, it does reveal itself in a number of phenomena, thus rendering it an "unstreitiges Phänomenon der Natur" (AA I, 265/5). These phenomena are: the finest "Auflösung der Materie, wie z. E. bei den Dünsten" (AA I, 235/1–2), the "Elasticität der Dünste", the "Ausflüsse starkkriechender Körper und der Ausbreitung aller geistigen Materien" (AA I, 265/3–4).

²⁷AA I, 229, 262, 306, 335, 338, 339, 340, 342, 345; and AA II, 121, 142, 144, 145, 147. Cf. MAN, AA IV, 511–512 and 543–544.

In *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte* Kant describes the genesis, the structure and the workings of the universe as the results of the influence exerted by repulsion and attraction on the haze of dispersed primal matter. Attraction in random clusters of primal matter, and the opposite actions in the form of the repulsion of nebulae cause a steady movement of the heavenly bodies, preventing total dispersal of all matter on the one hand and total coagulation on the other. Together with the assumption of an extraordinarily huge central body (AA I, 310–312) this leads to the description of the universe as a dynamic-mechanical unity.

Kant remedies any undesirable naturalistic consequences of this model by considering the primal matter, its characteristics and the forces as consequences of God's existence (AA I, 310). He considers the systematic unity of the whole as something conceived in God's mind (AA I, 331–334 and *Beweisgrund*, AA II, 151–154).

Although it is necessary to assume the action of both forces, only the force of attraction is sufficiently (i.e. systematically) explained. Before we come to the deduction of the force of repulsion in the next section, we will first examine the exact relation between the two forces.

In the preface of the *Monadologia* Kant states that, in relation to an external entity, a (moving) force has either a repelling (*repellens*) effect or an attracting (*trahens*) effect. Furthermore there is a specific, mutual relation between both forces, because if only one of these forces were at work, the result would be either total dispersal, or complete cohesion without extension. The discussion concerning the correlation between both forces is therefore related to the discussion concerning space.

The relational space between substances has already been previously discussed, and now the focus is on the space that is occupied by substances (monads) themselves.²⁸ The force with which monads occupy a space is their *impenetrabilitas* (AA I, 482). This force prevents other entities with which they come into contact from occupying their space, and is also referred to as the force of repulsion.

The exact dimensions of the space that is occupied by the monad (*volumen, limes extensionis*) cannot be solely determined by this one force, because the action of merely this force would lead to total dispersal. Only in conjunction with the other internal force, i.e. attraction, are the exact dimensions determined (AA I, 483). The spatial dimensions of a substance can now be understood as the plane on which the actions of both internal

²⁸AA I, 480. As regards problems concerning divisibility of space and monads, cf. propositions VI and VII. Cf. Menzel, 'Die Stellung der Mathematik ...', 155–157.

forces occur in equal but opposite measure. The actual existence of an element or substance can thus be analyzed as the state of balance between two antagonistic forces.

This state of balance or rest pertains to the internal relation of the forces. It also pertains to the external relation if the relation between bodies is considered, and especially in the case of contact between these bodies (*contactus*, AA I, 483). A moving force can move either in an attracting manner or in a repelling manner. Contact occurs when during the approach of two bodies towards each other the force of impenetrability is perceived (*cum sentitur vis impenetrabilitatis h.e. repulsionis*, AA I, 483/28–29). Thus contact is defined as the workings of action (approach) and reaction (repulsion) exerted by different elements on each other.²⁹ Is attraction not also experienced only during the impediment of its action, i.e. as soon as pressure, collision or an impulse is experienced? Kant's explanation on the *notio contactus* will be further examined in the following section.

With this internal relation between the forces (volume) and the external relation between different monads (contact, co-existence) the presentation of the force of repulsion for the benefit of cosmogony has been metaphysically explained, but not yet sufficiently deduced. We will now take a look at the deduction of the force of repulsion and the role that contact plays therein.

4.4 Repulsion, metaphysics and inner experience

According to Heimsoeth the introduction of real repugnance was based on the experience of opposition, which can be traced back to a “Fundamentalfaktum” from Newton's natural philosophy: the actions of force and counterforce. However, a reference to such a fact does not suffice when trying to establish a deduction of the force of repulsion, and thus indirectly of real repugnance. Other commentators have noticed the lack of such a deduction, but their reconstructions are insufficient.³⁰ The following deduction will make it possible

²⁹Cf. *Nova dilucidatio*, AA I, 415/5–16; *Neuer Lehrbegriff*, AA II, 19/30–31, 23/30–31; *Negative Größen*, AA II, 179–180, 198–199; *Träume*, AA II, 322–323.

³⁰Heimsoeth makes an appeal to later writings and MAN (Heimsoeth, ‘Chr. Wolffs Ontologie ...’, 57; and Heinz Heimsoeth, ‘Kants Erfahrung mit den Erfahrungswissenschaften’, in: *Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants II. Methodenbegriffe der Erfahrungswissenschaften und Gegensätzlichkeiten spekulativer Weltkonzeption*, Bonn, 1970, (Kantstudien, Ergänzungshefte 100), 1–85, 28–29). Böhme & Böhme have developed the psychologistic thesis that material repulsion between bodies in nature is based on a physical experience, which is actually a repressed inner experience. Their thesis is based on an unjust identification of “internal” with “personal”, “mental”, and “mine”. In their approach the Kantian metaphysical connotations of these notions are neglected (Hartmut Böhme and Gernot

to explain the thematization of real repugnance, and will cross-reference several subjects that were previously examined. Kant's emphasis on experience will be the focal point throughout this process.

With this emphasis Kant expressly distances himself from rationalists who lay a stronger claim to metaphysics than they are able to substantiate.³¹ The appeal to experience therefore also shows that the deduction takes place in the context of methodological considerations. Following on Newton's scientific method Kant presents the method of inner experience for metaphysics and he applies it to our understanding of the nature of bodies (*Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 286–290). He formulates his methodical guideline as follows:

suchet durch sichere innere Erfahrung, d.i. ein unmittelbares augenscheinliches Bewußtsein, diejenige Merkmale auf, die gewiß im Begriffe von irgend einer allgemeinen Beschaffenheit liegen, und ob ihr gleich das ganze Wesen der Sache nicht kennet, so könnt ihr euch doch derselben sicher bedienen, um vieles in dem Dinge daraus herzuleiten.³²

What is most noticeable is how this method again has its limitations (“ob ihr gleich”). We will discuss this method and its relevance for the force of repulsion by using Holzhey's study. Holzhey emphasizes the correlation with the *external* experience of Newton's physics³³, but at the same time he ascertains that external experience has bodies as its object, whereas inner experience revolves around characteristics that are inherent in the concept of a thing. According to Holzhey this appeal to inner experience (in conjunction with the *Einleitung* in *Deutlichkeit*) firstly means that Kant recognizes no authority other than the workings of one's own cognitive abilities and one's own insight.³⁴

Böhme, *Das Andere der Vernunft. Zur Entwicklung von Rationalitätsstrukturen am Beispiel Kants*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983). Kaulbach does not address the metaphysical background either and refers to the comparatively late *Träume, Gegenden und Dissertation* (Friedrich Kaulbach, ‘Leibbewusstsein und Welterfahrung beim frühen und späten Kant’, *Kantstudien*, 54 (1963), 464–490, especially 465–474).

³¹ *Gedanken* §19; *Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 288; Holzhey, *Kants Erfahrungsbegriff* . . . , 134–135.

³² *Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 286. Kant compares his method to Newton's mathematical method, which is not suited for philosophy. The difference between both methods as presented by Kant (*Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 278, 289, 290) is discussed in detail in Menzel, ‘Die Stellung der Mathematik . . .’, 172–183.

³³ Cf. Holzhey, *Kants Erfahrungsbegriff* . . . , 138, 143 (with a reference by Holzhey to Kaulbach, ‘Die Entwicklung des Synthesis . . .’, 65). Cf. Heimsoeth, ‘Kants Erfahrung . . .’, 36. He is quoting the relevant description from *Deutlichkeit* omitting the phrase “sichere innere Erfahrung”.

³⁴ Holzhey, *Kants Erfahrungsbegriff* . . . , 140. Kant had expressed this unambiguously in

The second point of interest is the claim that one should not hinge on dogmatic or mathematical definitions, but rather on an analysis of concepts. After all, concepts come to one in a state of “immediate apparent consciousness” and in as far as they come to one in such a state, the resulting experience is also certain. In this experience the *Merkmale*, the characteristics which are inherent in a specific concept, can be known. The interiority of experience is predicated on a consciousness in which something is immediately imagined and as such is apparent and certain.

However, this emphasis on immediate and apparent consciousness also provides a too limited view of inner experience. It can be more aptly explained in terms of the object of inner experience and the underlying metaphysics of force. As we have seen in chapter 2, the difference between what is inner or external is determined by the difference between the substantial and the relational-substantial actions of force. The “inner” aspect of experience must be viewed in this light, as it concerns an experience in which there is no (spatial) relation to another force or substance, but rather merely the relation of the object to the faculty from which it originated.

This is illustrated in §2.5 above and in *Falsche Spitzfindigkeit* (AA II, 57–61). The faculty from which concepts originate, is the capacity to judge. As for the force that enables these judgements, Kant carefully hypothesizes “daß diese Kraft oder Fähigkeit nichts anders sei als das Vermögen des innern Sinnes, d.i. seine eigene Vorstellungen zum Objecte seiner Gedanken zu machen.” (AA II, 60). This force is internal, as it applies to nothing other than its own conceptions. As a result, our thought is provided with objects that are immediate (not mediated by something external) and self-evident. inner experience is thus an activity of thought. It is the result of an action in which a conception is made the object of a thought and can be conceived of in experience. The most crucial elements of inner experience are thus, firstly, the spontaneous moment (of action) that results in a conception and secondly the fact that this conception can be made the object of thought (which can possibly result in a new conception). This reflexivity of the capacity of thought is crucial in the construction of inner experience.

The example that Kant provides in order to illustrate the method concerns the discussion of the *actio in distans*, and represents the completion of what was said about the force of repulsion in the *Monadologia*.³⁵ As a starting point he states “daß die meisten *Newtonianer* noch weiter als *Newton* gehen

the introduction to *Gedanken* (Vorrede V and VII). It is an encouragement to think, instead of to reproduce what others have thought. The latter only yields historical knowledge, while rational knowledge is what a philosopher is supposed to be after (AA II, 306).

³⁵Cf. *Falsche Spitzfindigkeit*, AA II, 58/27–30.

und behaupten, da die Körper einander auch in der Entfernung unmittelbar (oder, wie sie es nennen, durch den leeren Raum) anziehen.” (AA II, 288/3–5; cf. *Gedanken*, AA I, 164). Kant seems to be suggesting that these Newtonians are correct in their assertion. Although it has not conclusively been proven, it has also not been refuted in terms of metaphysics.³⁶ Opponents of the idea of *actio in distans* claim that immediate, mutual presence is the same as contact. When the action of bodies is immediate and mutual they must come into contact, and hence, action cannot occur both immediately and *in distans*.

Kant, on the other hand, argues that *actio in distans* is not metaphysically impossible. He claims that bodies that are at a distance from each other do not touch. Next we must ask ourselves what constitutes “to touch”. Seemingly (“durch das Urtheil der Augen”) I might suspect that two bodies touch, but I can be sure only after observing a certain resistance of impenetrability. This observed resistance originates from feeling. Using the conception of “touch”

“werde ich inne, daß, [...] ich [...] aus dem Widerstande der Undurchdringlichkeit eines andern Körpers urtheile, daß ich ihn berühre. Denn ich finde, daß dieser Begriff ursprünglich aus dem Gefühl entspringt” (AA II, 288/11–14).

This analysis of the conception of “touch” illustrates that it is possible for action to occur *in distans*, provided that this action does not occur by means of touch, but rather by means of another force. Opponents of this theory should in turn demonstrate that this is not possible or that the only possible action is the action by means of touch or impenetrability.

On this point Kant argues in favour of a possible *actio in distans* (of attraction) by tracing the force of repulsion back to and basing it on the *sensible experience of impenetrability*. This is repeated in *Träume* (AA II, 322–323), where the general method suggested for metaphysics is directly applied to the forces of attraction and repulsion. Inner experience is therefore not a symptom of repression (like Böhme & Böhme would have it), but rather the opposite: a revelation, i.e. a metaphysical analysis, the unfolding and clarification of the content of a conception. As a metaphysical method, such analysis is in contrast with the mathematical method.

It can be concluded that Kant compensates for the absence of a deduction of the force of repulsion by means of a metaphysical unlocking of the (physical)

³⁶The impossibility of *actio in distans* cannot be proven. In *Träume* (AA II, 351–352) this negative aspect of knowledge is mentioned explicitly. This proof strategy plays a significant role in KrV in the context of the polemical employment of reason.

experience of impenetrability. This “empirical deduction” (inner analysis of an external fact) suffices as a deduction, but of equal importance is the fact that this deduction also demonstrates the dynamic relation between repulsion and attraction. At the beginning of the second section of *Negative Größen* (AA II, 179) this relation was indicated as the relation between negative magnitudes, but with this empirical deduction Kant now has an argumentative basis with which to conceive of the relation between both forces as a real opposition. Both forces are of a similar nature and can therefore assume a state of rest when they are in real opposition to each other (as was also discussed at the beginning of the second section of *Negative Größen*).

4.5 Conclusion: fundamental relations

Kant has offered a very short and precise description and explanation of real opposition. Because it is concise, and particularly because it derives its meaning from a metaphysical context, this conception can be used in a variety of philosophical areas. In all of these areas the basic, or fundamental relations are structured in accordance with the pattern of real opposition. Even the relation between attraction and repulsion is evaluated in accordance with this pattern. Once the force of attraction has been described and explained, there has to be a real and opposite force (given the pattern of real opposition), even though this real opposite is lacking the explanation that equals the mathematical formulation of attraction. The metaphysical explanation of (inner) experience fills this explanatory gap, and it also highlights importance of metaphysics in Kant’s approach of philosophy.

Kant’s initial stance towards metaphysics is one of ambivalence; he has reservations regarding its possibilities, but at the same time he acknowledges the need for renewal. His own attempts at renewal are rationalistically oriented but these do not lead to an one-sidedly mathematical approach of philosophy. Particularly his treatment of the concepts of negative magnitude and real repugnance illustrate how it is possible for mathematics to be of use to metaphysics.

Kant’s interpretation of metaphysics revolves around the conception of force. He *subsequently* links this metaphysics of force to the more traditional substance ontology in which “force” indicates the special relation between substance and accident. The workings of the human faculty of knowledge are also viewed to be actions of force in this context; as a result, the study of the principles of human knowledge can also be considered a part of metaphysics. Because a strictly logical elaboration of metaphysics in this sense would

involve certain limitations, Kant also reserves a role for experience within the sphere of metaphysics. This was of great importance, in that it gave rise to a (metaphysical) theory of action, as well as to the formulation of problems regarding causality and synthesis. This subsequently makes it possible to metaphysically thematize and explain not only logical but also real relations. It is however essential to explicitly highlight the mutual relation between experience on the one hand, and understanding/reason on the other hand. This eventually occurs, by means of *Gegenden*, in KrV.

Within metaphysics, as interpreted in the aforementioned sense, a number of fundamental oppositions apply. These fundamental oppositions, or relations, are fundamental relations, and the appeal to a force always plays a significant role within each of the relations. The appeal to a force represents the limit in terms of what is (either rationally or empirically) cognizable. Beyond this limit lies the domain of irrationality, inconceivability, or ignorance.³⁷

Parallel to the ontological opposition between being and non-being, Kant presents the opposition between positive and negative truths. The epistemological principle that applies to these truths (the principle of identity) applies as a dual principle and is based on the principle of contradiction (logical repugnance). In terms of determination, a truth expresses the state of balance between the position and the exclusion (of predicates). A characteristic aspect of real repugnance is the fact that the opposition is in principle possible as a state of balance (between opposing parts, although in actuality this state is not required). On this real level, attraction and repulsion are viewed as fundamental relations, or fundamental forces.³⁸

As we saw before, in deducing the force of repulsion Kant appealed to an analysis of experience. As a consequence this force cannot automatically be held as a fundamental force. However, in the metaphysical explanation of an experience, the experience itself is not questioned. The experience of repulsion is founding, but cannot be founded by further (rational) argument. As such the experience that is metaphysically made explicit is of a fundamental character, and is comparable to the fundamental force. Kant draws a similar conclusion towards the end of the *Negative Größen* with regards to real repugnance.³⁹

³⁷These are privative negations indicating the defects of knowledge, cf. *Träume*, AA II, 322/25–27, 323/6, 327/16, 358/32 and AA VIII, 139n.

³⁸Attraction is explicitly referred to in this way in *Beweisgrund* (AA II, 137–138) and *Träume* (AA II, 371). As to “fundamental forces” cf. Heimsoeth, *Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants II* . . . , 143–150.

³⁹Cf. *Neuer Lehrbegriff*, AA II, 20/16; *Negative Größen*, AA II, 178/20–22, 203/1–10;

The fundamental relations are thematized against the background of a conception of God, in view of which the real relations are (identical) determinations or (repugnant) consequences of God. Later on, in KrV, the metaphysical question is asked how such (repugnant) relations are *possible*. The consequence of the answer to this question is that the conception of God in KrV acquires the status of an ideal.

To paraphrase the famous phrase in *Träume* (AA II, 367/21–368/2), the task of metaphysics is as yet limited to the study of the limitations of human reason. In this regard the acknowledgement of fundamental relations is a provisional milestone, even though the metaphysical way of thinking in terms of fundamental relations offers a limited explanation. Ultimately this is predicated on the distinction between “being” and “thinking”, as Kant articulates it in a critical discussion with Crusius, and as is still mentioned in KrV.

An important advantage of this distinction is that the possibility of free action is not ruled out a priori. On the contrary, as briefly indicated at the beginning of this chapter, in the regression of consecutive grounds the first (necessary) ground is to be found in the exercise of free will (whether or not that of God). At this stage in Kant’s development this limited claim to metaphysical knowledge is already directly related to the field of practical philosophy, as was illustrated in the dialogue featured in the *Nova dilucidatio*. This is also illustrated in the “metaphysical dream”⁴⁰ in which the fundamental relations are transposed to the domain of practical philosophy.

Building on the distinction between the faculty of knowledge and feeling (*Deutlichkeit*, AA II, 299), Kant, after a brief remark about the relation between particular and universal human reason, makes an attempt in *Träume*⁴¹ to understand the relation between “Eigenheit” and “Gemeinnützigkeit” as a “conflict between two forces”. Based on this, one can understand how personal will depends on universal will. Kant describes the moral feeling as “diese in uns empfundene Nötigung unseres Willens zur Einstimmung mit dem allgemeinen Willen”. Kant illustrates this by means of an explicit comparison to Newton’s gravity (AA II, 335). As a result systematic relations (actions) on a practical level (i.e. within the domain of free will) also appear to be attractive and repugnant.⁴² The relation between practical philosophy

Träume, AA II, 322/25–27, 323/29. 335/15, 358/18, 370/11–12 and 371/7–11; MAN, AA IV, 513.

⁴⁰Cf. Kant’s letter to Mendelssohn, april 8, 1766 (AA X, 69–73).

⁴¹AA II, 334–337. Cf. ook *Beobachtungen*, AA II, 215–219 and Holzhey, *Kants Erfahrungsbegriff* . . . , 193–196.

⁴²Kant refers to Newton, but relies on Rousseau, cf. Josef Schmucker, *Die Ursprünge*

and metaphysics, which Saner succinctly referred to with the term “political thought”, might reside in the fact that the relations in both areas are the same even though the things to which they apply are different.

It is as yet unclear how the relation between metaphysics and practical philosophy should exactly be understood.⁴³ Questions about the critical status of practical philosophy and the primacy of theoretical and practical philosophy aside, it can be said that in both domains actions are understood based on the same opposite fundamental relations. Both in nature and on a practical level the relations of attraction and repugnance provide the fundamental pattern. On a logical level the same applies to the relation between identity and contradiction. In these areas the most feasible explanation is given with reference to a force, so that each of these areas can be said to have its own metaphysics: metaphysics as the study of the principles of knowledge, metaphysics of nature, and practical metaphysics.

In conclusion it can be stated that the study of the meanings of repugnance has shed light on a system of typically metaphysical subjects in Kant’s earlier work, in which the specific relation between metaphysics and practical philosophy is implied. Further study on the subject of repugnance (with special attention to “relation”, “force”, “synthesis”, and experience) in the *Dissertation* and KrV will serve as a central guideline for a more detailed determination of the effect of the critical development on the relation between metaphysics and practical philosophy. Not only can this contribute to a systematic interpretation of KrV, it can also explain the typically metaphysical tenor and background of Kant’s philosophy.

der Ethik Kants in seinen vorkritischen Schriften und Reflexionen, Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain KG, 1961, (Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung, Band XXIII), 161–173.

⁴³Cf. Willem Perreijn, *Kants ethiek tussen a priori en ervaring*, Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1993, (dissertation Tilburg 1993), 48–63, and 186–207.

Chapter 5

The Dissertation of 1770

5.1 The dissertation of 1770

In the present chapter we will examine our topic of real repugnance in the context of Kant's *Dissertation* of 1770 which was written in four months time to obtain the position of professor of logic and metaphysics at the university of Königsberg. The *Dissertation* was the last work that was published by Kant before the publication of KrV eleven years later. This fact, as well as the philosophical content of the *Dissertation* have posed serious problems to readers of Kant's work who want to determine the position of the *Dissertation* in Kant's philosophical development. On the one hand, the *Dissertation* contains the doctrine of the subjectivity of space and time in a form that clearly anticipates the Transcendental Aesthetic of KrV. Yet, on the other hand, the *Dissertation* presents the doctrine of the *usus intellectus realis* which definitely points in an uncritical direction.

As regards the position of the *Dissertation* in Kant's philosophical *Entwicklungsgeschichte* there are three interrelated issues at stake: what is the importance of the antinomy for Kant's development; in what way is the antinomy related to the subjectivity of space and time (and to the transcendental deduction); and to what extent does the *Dissertation* reflect Kant's philosophical standpoint anno 1770? I do not intend to answer these questions *in extenso*, for it is not my aim to settle the matter of Kant's *Entwicklungsgeschichte* with respect to these issues.¹ I will merely give brief

¹Synoptic overviews and discussion of the *Forschungslage* on this point are offered by Kreimendahl, *Kant—Der Durchbruch . . .*, chapter II and by Baumanns, *Kants Philosophie der Erkenntnis . . .*, chapter I. Much earlier Tonelli emphasized the point of the *separation* between sensibility and understanding which is relevant with respect to the subjectivity of space and time (cf. Giorgio Tonelli, 'Die Umwälzung von 1769 bei Kant', *Kant-Studien*, 54 (1963), 369–375).

information on the issues of the antinomy and the subjectivity of space and time which are relevant to the *Dissertation* and to real repugnance. In the context of *sectio* I (about the notion of the world in general) attention will be drawn to the antinomy. The subjectivity of space and time is an issue in *sectio* III about the principles of the form of the sensible world. Some of the results from these *sectiones* will turn out to be relevant for Kant's methodological considerations in *sectio* V.²

The contents of the *Dissertation* do not necessarily reflect Kant's philosophical position at the time.³ It was written on the specific occasion of his new academic position and it had to meet the requirement for his inauguration. On the other hand, it does contain the doctrine of the subjectivity of space and time which is a significant element in Kant's critical metaphysics. Since this doctrine represents "the great light of 1769"⁴ the *Dissertation* does represent Kant's current philosophical views in this particular respect.

This typical feature of the *Dissertation* is relevant in relation to the question about the importance of the antinomy for Kant's philosophical development. Although the composition of KrV may suggest something different, the antinomy and antinomical thought constitute some of the most original stages in Kant's philosophical development. A remarkable amount of reflections, which, according to Adickes, date back to the year 1769, indicate that Kant constructed antinomies. According to R3976 the antinomy is even a necessary result of a subjective law of reason:

Es ist nach dem subiectiven Gesetz der Vernunft nothwendig,
eine erste handlung anzunehmen, wodurch das übrige alles folge;
es ist aber eben so wohl nothwendig, einen Grund überhaupt von
ieder handlung und also kein erstes anzunehmen. (R3976)

Although such explicit references to the antinomy do not occur in the *Dissertation*, there are several implicit indications of antinomical thought (e.g. in §1; the notion of *dissensus*; the first antinomy in §2⁵).

²The *Dissertation* consists of 30 sections (§1–30) which are almost equally distributed over five *sectiones* (I–V). *Sectio* V, containing §23–30, is quite extended in comparison with the previous *sectiones*. The sections in *sectio* IV are comparatively short.

³Josef Schmucker, 'Zur entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung der Inauguraldissertation von 1770', in: *Akten des 4. internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, Volume I, Mainz, 1974, 263–282, 264–269 and Kreimendahl, *Kant—Der Durchbruch ...*, 216, 224–225.

⁴R5037: "Das Jahr 69 gab mir großes Licht". Cf. Josef Schmucker, 'Was entzündete in Kant das große Licht von 1769?' *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 58 (1976), 393–434, 393 and Kreimendahl, *Kant—Der Durchbruch ...*, 195–196.

⁵Baumanns, *Kants Philosophie der Erkenntnis ...*, 46.

Thus, the *Dissertation* does not represent an unequivocally independent stage in Kant's development. It contains the new doctrine of space and time explicitly, although the issue that had been bothering Kant shortly before (antinomy) is only present in an implicit manner. Moreover, the *Dissertation* shows signs of philosophical "delay", as Kreimendahl calls it.⁶

Apart from the historical question about the position of the *Dissertation* in Kant's oeuvre the development of the antinomy and the introduction of the subjectivity of space and time are also philosophically relevant insofar as both issues are interrelated or even interdependent. From a systematic point of view the theory of space and time as presented in the *Dissertation* (and later on in KrV) offers a solution to the antinomy. Kreimendahl argues that Kant's discovery of the antinomy in the late 1760's (presumably motivated by reading Hume's *Treatise*) caused him to develop a solution in the form of the new theory of space and time in 1769.⁷ He also argues that, notwithstanding the apparent absence of this systematic relation between both issues in the *Dissertation*, the antinomy is the real topic of the *Dissertation*. Others oppose the claim that the antinomy (in the sense of KrV) existed at all at this moment, and maintain that the antinomy in its mature form could only be conceived after the subjectivity of space and time had been discovered.

Considering the fact that there is no explicit reference in the *Dissertation* to the systematic relation between the antinomy and the new theory of space and time we will not elaborate on this point, nor on the question of Humean influence. However, if we bear in mind the importance that Kant himself⁸ attached to the antinomy we will address the antinomy, or antinomical thought in the *Dissertation*, as far as it is related to real opposition (see §5.4 below).

5.2 Logical opposition in the *Dissertation*

If Kant had used any Latin equivalent of the notion of real repugnancy in the *Dissertation* he would have offered a direct starting point for our investigation. Unfortunately, terms such as *repugnantia realis*, or *oppositio realis* are absent. In the absence of such direct indications we must ask whether there are any indirect clues indicating the presence of something like real opposition in the *Dissertation*. Presumably, the notions of *reluctantia* and *repugnantia* in §1 of the *Dissertation* are somehow related to our topic,

⁶Cf. "Progressive und retardierende Momente in der Dissertation" in: Kreimendahl, *Kant—Der Durchbruch . . .*, 224–232.

⁷Kreimendahl, *Kant—Der Durchbruch . . .*, 5.

⁸Cf. his letter to Garve (1798) in AA XII, 257.

but in accordance with the pattern offered in *Negative Größen* we will start by looking for its counterpart, sc. logical opposition.

Logical opposition is mentioned in the general sense of contradiction⁹ and it also occurs in the more specific context of the principle of contradiction.¹⁰ This principle plays a significant part in Kant's discussion of the second species of subreptic axioms in the methodological and final *sectio* of the *Dissertation*. This second class of subreptic axioms is discussed in §28 and it contains an axiom affecting the cognition of quantity, and an axiom affecting the cognition of qualities in general. He notes that the latter axiom arises from the conversion of the principle of contradiction, which in this case is presented as *Quicquid simul est ac non est, est impossibile*. Changing subject and predicate in this principle yields the subreptic axiom which states that *omne impossibile simul est ac non est, s. involvit contradictionem* (and also: *Quicquid est impossibile, sibi contradicit*). In this case sensitive cognition (*involvere contradictionem*) predicates something generally about an object of reason (*omne impossibile*) and consequently, a concept of the intellect relating to the possibile or impossibile is subjected to the conditions of sensitive cognition (sc. relations of time).¹¹ The conversion in itself does not constitute a subreption; it merely specifies the conditions under which something is sensitively cognisable. The subreption arises if these (subjective) conditions of sensitive cognition are mistaken for general, intellectual cognition of objects (§25). In terms of §4 one could say that in case of this subreption the subjective conditions of knowledge of things as they appear are mistaken for intellectual knowledge of things as they are, or even that they are mistaken for the objective grounds of things as they are.

Kant's general formula of this second species of subreptic axioms in §26 (AA II, 413/24–26) may help to clarify his analysis of the principle of contradiction in §28. This formula states that the sensitive condition of knowledge is regarded as the condition of the possibility of the object. A concept of the understanding, which in this case relates to the (im)possible, cannot be subjected to conditions of sensitive cognition in a general way. Understanding only notices an impossibility when a contradiction occurs. If it does not occur, i.e. if this condition is not satisfied, understanding cannot make a judgement about impossibility. Thus formulated these restraints

⁹Cf. *contradictio* §1, n2 (AA II, 388/25); §28 (AA II, 416/18, 26, 29, 37); and also *repugnantia* §28 (AA II, 416/32).

¹⁰Cf. *principium contradictionis*, §5 (AA II, 393/21); §14 (AA II, 401/14; 402/5); §23 (AA 411/3–4); §28 (AA II, 416/11).

¹¹Cf. *Dissertation* §25 for an explication about the interrelations between subject–predicate and concept of understanding–condition of sensitive cognition.

are (subjective) conditions of judgements. However, if these conditions of judgements are treated as objective, the absence of a contradiction is mistaken for the objective possibility of something. As a result we would end up with yet another principle: *Quicquid non involvit contradictionem, ideo sit possibile*.¹²

Kant's example towards the end of §28 of this kind of argumentation is very informative because it is perfectly in line with his earlier remarks regarding forces and *qualitates occultae*. Moreover this example echoes the observations, doubts and questions that had been made seven years earlier in the final section of *Negative Größen*. In his example (§28) Kant refers to the invention of forces by minds inclined to chimaera. *Absque obstaculo repugnantiae*, i.e. in the absence of contradiction, they invent forces at pleasure.¹³ Since a force is a relation between something (substance A) and something else (accidens B) its very possibility does not rest on the identity of cause and caused or substance and accident. Its impossibility, therefore, does not solely depend on contradiction either¹⁴, and the absence of such contradiction, does not prove its possibility, like architectonic minds would have it. A force cannot be accepted as possible, unless it has been given in experience.

¹²This is not the conversion of the principle of contradiction, but rather its negative formulation. Thus Kant has presented three seemingly identical principles involving contradiction:

1. Quicquid simul est ac non est, est impossibile. (principle of contradiction);
2. Omne impossibile simul est ac non est, s. involvit contradictionem. (conversion of 1);
3. Quicquid non involvit contradictionem, ideo sit possibile. (internal negation of 1).

Kant's point is that these three are not equivalent and that they cannot be reduced to one formula. On the contrary, if they are not properly distinguished, it is impossible to recognise subreptions. The following principle, derived from 2 by internal negation, would complete the list:

4. Omne possibile non involvit contradictionem (internal negation of 2).

¹³*Repugnantia* in this case means "contradiction". According to Pimpinella, however, this occurrence of *repugnantia* represents a case of *Realrepugnantz*, cf. Pietro Pimpinella, 'Reluctantia subiectiva und repugnantia obiectiva in der Inauguraldissertation Kants', *Aufklärung*, 5 (1990), 57–79, 75. This claim is not substantiated, and it is incompatible with his claim on the same page that there is an analogy between *Realrepugnantz* and *reluctantia subiectiva*. Regarding the invention of forces in relation to contradiction and experience cf. KrV B347, and §6.6 below.

¹⁴In *Negative Größen* this point was made more explicitly, when Kant insisted on the fact that the logical relation between ground and effect was based on the rule of identity, whereas the real relation between ground and effect could not be understood in the same manner.

Contradiction and the principle of contradiction play a significant role in Kant's discussion of this specific subreptic axiom, which is only a part of more general methodological considerations in the final *sectio* of the *Dissertation* (§23–30). The main methodological prescription is presented in §24: one must take care not to let principles of sensitive cognition transgress their limits and affect what is intellectual. Although this entire final *sectio* is supposed to present the methodology for metaphysics, Kant had devoted the major part of §1 to similar methodological considerations. Apparently, it was necessary to add a methodological comment as soon as he had presented the central notion of his study. In our next section we will examine this methodological comment from §1, especially because it contains the references to *reluctantia subiectiva* and *repugnantia obiectiva*.

5.3 *Reluctantia subiectiva* and *repugnantia obiectiva*

As has been noted, there are no explicit references to real repugnancy in the *Dissertation*. Also the explicit philosophical doubts regarding cause and effect Kant had expressed in *Negative Größen* in the context of real repugnancy are not mentioned in the *Dissertation*. This is not surprising. Kant pursued other objectives in his *Dissertation* and although the context of real repugnancy recurs in its methodological *sectio* an explicit reference is absent, presumably since an adequate response to the doubts regarding cause and effect is still lacking.

The notion itself may be absent, the issue of real repugnancy has not entirely disappeared. I will argue that it is present in Kant's discussion of the relation between the sensitive and intellectual (and rational) faculty of cognition, especially in his discussion of the case of discord between both faculties (*reluctantia subiectiva*, *Nichtübereinstimmung*). Again, the context of this case is the methodological exposition in §1. So logical opposition as well as a typical case of real repugnancy are discussed in a methodological context.¹⁵

Contrary to the general description of an important part of methodology in §23, i.e. *contagium sensitivae cognitionis cum intellectuali*, the main methodological consideration of §1 seems to be suggesting just the opposite: a conclusion on the part of sensitive cognition must not be mistaken for intellectual knowledge.¹⁶ The general description in §24 on its turn seems to be

¹⁵With respect to the significance of Kant's methodological considerations cf. Hinske, *Kants Weg* . . . , 119–123; and Pimpinella, 'Reluctantia subiectiva . . . ', 60–61.

¹⁶As regards the translation of the phrase from §23 the English translators of the *Dissertation* note that "Kant must mean: *nempe intellectualis cognitionis cum sensitiva*

in line with the methodological considerations in §1. Against the background of §1, however, a *contagium sensitivae cognitionis cum intellectuali* occurs in an expression like “the impossibility to represent”. In this case the intellectual notion is linked to and is easily mixed up with something that can only be determined in accordance with the conditions of sensitive cognition (intuitive representation *in concreto*). Grier offers a way out of this confusion: “Kant’s point seems to be that insofar as the conditions of the intellect and sensuality are conflated, certain ‘hybrid’ principles are produced that presume to yield knowledge about objects generally, without taking into account whether the objects in question are being considered as *phaenomena* or *noumena*.”¹⁷ Kreimendahl points out that the description of infection as presented in §23 is also present in his lectures on logic.¹⁸ This consideration is presented as an example of the method of metaphysics.

Despite the suggestion contained in the title of §1 (sc. *De notione mundi generatim*) the notion of the world seems more like a by-product of the definitions of “*analysis*” and “*synthesis*”. In case of a substantial composite analysis does not come to an end until a simple part (*simplex*) is reached. Synthesis, on the other hand, does not come to an end until a whole (*totum*) is reached which is not a part. The concept of the world is added as an example of the notion “a whole which is not a part”. In the exposition following these definitions Kant discusses analysis and synthesis in relation to the two-fold genesis of concepts out of the nature of our mind.

Given the parts, one can either *conceive* the composition of these parts by means of an abstract concept of understanding, or one can *represent* the concept (of something composite) *in concreto* by means of a distinct intuition. In the former case the composition is based on the synthetic nature of the general concept (or idea of understanding). In the latter case the composition is based on a genetic synthesis, i.e. on a successive addition of part to part, which is only possible under the condition of time.¹⁹

Then Kant explains the notion of *totum* in greater detail. Whereas a composite merely requires a multitude of parts, a whole (*totum*) requires the totality of parts. However, synthesis in case of a totality can only be carried out if it can be done in a finite period of time. The case of the infinite

contagium” (cf. Immanuel Kant. *Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770*, 407nx).

¹⁷Michelle Grier, *Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 60–61.

¹⁸Kreimendahl, Kant—*Der Durchbruch* . . . , 246, especially note 121.

¹⁹This concludes Kant’s presentation of conceptual synthesis (on the part of understanding) and intuitive synthesis (on the part of the sensitive faculty of cognition). He also presents a case of analysis.

(*infinitum*), however, shows that the synthetic progression from its parts to the whole has no limit. Since this synthetic progression cannot be completed within a finite period of time the infinite cannot be represented in accordance with the laws of intuitive cognition, i.e. represented under the condition of time. Hence, it is impossible to represent the infinite in its totality in accordance with the requirements of intuitive cognition.²⁰

Once Kant has developed his argument along this line, the final methodological point he is trying to make is quite simple. It consists of a conclusion and a warning. Kant's conclusion in view of methodology is that abstract ideas received from the understanding very often cannot be converted into intuitions so as to be represented *in concreto*. Thus, the concept of the infinite—by virtue of the nature of its origin—cannot be represented *in concreto*. However, if it is impossible to represent an object of pure reason²¹ in accordance with the laws of intuition, it does not follow that this object itself is impossible. Hence, the concept of the infinite should not be dismissed, simply because its concrete representation is impossible. The warning is aimed at those who easily confuse what is impossible to represent (*irrepraesentabile*) with what is just impossible (*impossibile*).

The mind's inability to represent abstract ideas *in concreto* is also described in terms of a subjective reluctance (*reluctantia subiectiva*), which indicates an incongruity at a subjective level (i.e. the level of mental, cognitive faculties). If one fails to acknowledge the subjective character of this incongruity, one may easily be inclined to take the (subjective) limits of the human mind for limits of the very essence of things. In that case a subjective reluctance is mistaken for an objective inconsistency (*repugnantia obiectiva*). The examples of *reluctantia* and *repugnantia* help Kant to introduce the distinction between “subjective” and “objective” in his methodology which will be useful in *sectio V* of the *Dissertation*.²²

Notwithstanding the similarity between the notions of *repugnantia obiec-*

²⁰The case of impossible analysis, on the other hand, is based on the notion of *quantum continuum*: the regression from this whole to the parts has no limits either.

²¹Cf. *obiectum rationis purae* (AA II, 389/3). Presumably Kant has the *quantum continuum* and the *infinitum* in mind.

²²Because the ideas of space and time, as formal principles of the sensible world, are characterised as “subjective conditions”, and because the form of the intelligible world has an objective ground, the distinction between “subjective” and “objective” may seem to correspond to the distinction between sensibility and understanding; anything that is related to, or derived from sensibility is subjective and anything related to or derived from understanding is objective. This is, however, not the case. In §30, for example, the laws of intellectual knowledge are also counted as subjective conditions. In KrV we find the same ambiguity.

tiva and (real) repugnancy, these notions are not synonymous. In fact, in the methodological context of §1 *repugnantia obiectiva* is the technical term for logical opposition.²³ *Reluctantia subiectiva*, on the other hand, indicates a case of real opposition.²⁴ “Subjective reluctance” is a quite specific description of the origin of the incongruity between what is unrepresentable and what is impossible. Kant also refers to this reluctance by the more general term of *dissensus* (discord²⁵) between the sensitive and intellectual faculty. I will argue that in the *Dissertation* the issue of real repugnancy turns up again in the form of *dissensus*. Not only does Kant’s discussion of *dissensus* show remarkable similarities with his discussion of real repugnancy in *Negative Größen*, but *dissensus* also indicates a kind of relation and pattern that is typical for real repugnancy.

Subjective reluctance, as a specific case of *dissensus*, is introduced in the same way as real opposition in *Negative Größen*. It is presented in close connection with, but at the same time as something quite different from logical opposition (*repugnantia obiectiva*). We cannot understand what this reluctance is about, if we don’t understand its logical counterpart. Apart from this superficial similarity there is a more systematic correspondence if we focus on the meaning of *dissensus* itself.

Dissensus between the sensitive and intellectual faculties indicates the incongruity or discord between what can be thought in accordance with the laws of the intellect on the one hand, and what can be represented *in concreto* in accordance with the laws of intuitive cognition on the other hand. Surely, the nature of this discord is not logical. Both moments involved in this relation are not logically opposed. They do not function in a mutually exclusive, autonomous and contradictory way. On the contrary, the mind may be incapable of representing abstract ideas, notwithstanding the fact that it is aimed at doing so. If the mind itself intends to bridge the gap between both faculties, what exactly is the nature of their interrelation?

Firstly, there is a relation between understanding and sensibility in the sense that sensitive cognitions are subordinated to other sensitive cognitions by the *usus intellectus logicus* in accordance with the principle of contradiction and the laws of logic (§5). Once Kant has mentioned this relation, the remainder of §5 is devoted to the warning against mistaking sensitive cognitions for intellectual cognitions once they have been subjected to the logical operations of understanding. The logical operation, however, does

²³Pimpinella, ‘*Reluctantia subiectiva* ...’, 73, 74–76.

²⁴Pimpinella, ‘*Reluctantia subiectiva* ...’, 75.

²⁵In the context of real repugnancy I prefer “discord” instead of the expression “lack of accord”, which is the phrase adopted by the English translators of the *Dissertation*.

not alter the origin of these cognitions, no matter how extensive this use may have been. The logical use of understanding is a clear indication of an interdependent relation between the faculties.

Secondly, the least one could say is that both faculties are related whenever and insofar as a kind of cognition affects the opposed kind of cognition.²⁶ Kant's main example in this respect is the affection of the intellectual by what is originally sensitive. Kant's methodological efforts in *sectio* V offer an analytic exposition of the systematic errors in this respect.²⁷ However erroneous a relation of this kind may be, the error as such is still something in the same sense as the result of real opposition is something. An error is not something *impossibile*, or a *nihil negativum*.

The least we may conclude from this is that both faculties are somehow related, and that dissensus does not point to the exclusive separation of both. Kant's warnings in view of this relation are directed against not distinguishing them properly, and against assuming a wrong interrelation. Section V as well as the elenctic purpose of the concepts of understanding propagated in §9 are meant to preserve the distinction.

Apart from the logical use of understanding, and the erroneous ways both faculties may be linked, there are other, rather indirect indications of relations between both faculties. The human mind is not capable of intellectual intuition since our intuition is bound to a formal ground (space and time) which is the condition of sensitive cognition (§10). In the beginning of §10, however, symbolic cognition is presented as an alternative to provide for our lack of intellectual intuition. Presumably, symbolic cognition is capable of bridging the gap between sensitivity and understanding. In addition, there is a link between understanding and experience (§5), in so far as experience is reflective cognition resulting from the comparison of appearances in accordance with the logical use of understanding.

The evidence presented in support of the claim that *dissensus* has a structure that corresponds to the pattern of real repugnancy may be circumstantial, but at least it shows the problematic interrelation between the elements involved in this discord. It points out the intuitive shortcomings of

²⁶The case of according cognitive faculties seems to be suggested in §1 of the *Dissertation*: concrete representation of something abstract and intellectual.

²⁷The methodological considerations in §1, however, are less systematic and they seem to be directed against errors which are due to inattention. The example of "impossible representation" could also be interpreted to represent a case of the affection of sensitive cognition by something that originates in the intellect. The notion of impossibility is abstracted from laws inherent in the mind and it is based on the nature of understanding (§8). To apply this notion, which is intended for objective application, to a subjective state of mind.

our mind in case of abstract notions and it demonstrates that there is a systemacy upon which erroneous interrelations are based. Most importantly, this problematic character also seems to stress the need to adjust both cognitive functions so as to guarantee optimal results: no errors, real knowledge. This need for adjustment, as well as the reality of errors, together with the link between *reluctantia subiectiva* and logical opposition, and the link between sensitive cognition and the logical use of understanding, are characteristic of *dissensus*, but, what is more, each point shows similarity to the characteristics of real opposition. Finally, *dissensus* and real opposition share to a large extent the same context; in the *Dissertation* the context is methodological²⁸, which is also the context of considerable parts of the discussion in *Negative Größen*.

In the discussion about Kant's philosophical development the question about the position of the *Dissertation* in his oeuvre plays a significant role. In this respect the question about the function of the antinomy at this stage of his thought is of special importance. In the following section we will not, however, try to answer this question, but we will rather limit the discussion to the relation between *dissensus* and the antinomy, because this relation is what's relevant in the context of real opposition.

5.4 *Dissensus* and antinomy

According to Hinske *dissensus* represents the second stage in the development of what he calls the *Antinomienproblematik*.²⁹ This stage is followed by the critical stage; the antinomy within reason itself. Hinske offers the following descriptions of *dissensus*: “‘dissensus’ bestimmter Gesetze”, and “‘dissensus’ [...], das Neben- und Gegeneinander von verschiedenen Gesetzen der menschlichen Erkenntnis”.³⁰ Hinske's suggestion that discord relates to cognitive laws may have been prompted by the need to present this stage as the immediate precursor of the critical conception of the antinomy. Thus, *dissensus* only seems to be a rudimentary stage of the antinomy in the sense of a “Widerstreit der Gesetze (Antinomie) der Vernunft” (KrV, B434). Kant's own formulation in the *Dissertation*, however, points out that *dissensus* relates to the cognitive faculties (“dissensus inter facultatem sensitivam et intellectualem”, AA II, 389).

²⁸The distinction according to §8 belongs to a propaedeutic science which is preparatory to metaphysics proper (cf. also §23).

²⁹Hinske, *Kants Weg* ..., 109.

³⁰Hinske, *Kants Weg* ..., 108, 109.

Schmucker criticised Hinske for comparing *dissensus* with the antinomy.³¹ According to him, *dissensus* is not another word for the antinomy, but it is rather the fundamental principle for the solution of the antinomy.³² This is also Kreimendahl's view on *dissensus* and in addition to the claim that discord is the key to the solution, he maintains that the antinomy is even the guiding theme ("Leitthema") of the *Dissertation*.³³ Problems in connection with the latter claim are discussed in great detail.³⁴ Nevertheless, Kreimendahl's far-reaching, and sometimes controversial³⁵ conclusions are focussed on the discussion about the antinomy. It is important not to be distracted in this direction. We should rather focus our attention on *dissensus* itself if we want to examine its precise nature. This examination must not primarily be carried out in the somewhat anachronistic context of the antinomy, but rather from a *methodological* perspective on the matter. Not only is this perspective typical for the way Kant himself deals with the matter in the *Dissertation*, but it also offers a view that makes it possible to include KrV in the discussion without running the risk of falling into the trap of anachronism. It is not the antinomy that links the *Dissertation* directly to KrV, but it is the methodological context that connects both works, as well as it connects both issues.

From the previous section it is clear that the framework of the *Dissertation* is methodological; beginning (§1) and end (§23–30) contain major methodological considerations. *Dissensus* is introduced in this methodological context, since it constitutes the basic element of the methodology as it is presented in this final part of the *Dissertation* (§23–30).³⁶ The main

³¹Schmucker, 'Zur entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung ...', 275. Nevertheless, Schmucker does not pay attention to Hinske's insufficient reading of *dissensus*. Elsewhere he referred to *dissensus* as "Nichtübereinstimmung zwischen der intellektuellen und der sinnlichen Erkenntnis" (cf. Schmucker, 'Was entzündete in Kant ...', 425, italics WvdK).

³²Schmucker, 'Zur entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung ...', 275 Cf. Kreimendahl, *Kant—Der Durchbruch ...*, 233.

³³Kreimendahl, *Kant—Der Durchbruch ...*, 241.

³⁴Kreimendahl, *Kant—Der Durchbruch ...*, 241–252.

³⁵Kreimendahl's starting point, a Humean impuls of the development of the antinomy problem, as well as the claim is strongly criticised by Brandt in his review of Kreimendahl's study (cf. Reinhard Brandt, 'Review of: L. Kreimendahl, *Kant—der Durchbruch von 1769*, Köln 1990', *Kant-Studien*, 83 (1992), 100–111).

³⁶Especially §23 is interesting in relation to Hinske's claim that *dissensus* does not show the typical feature of the critical antinomy; a conflict (of laws) within reason itself. Hinske may be right, but on the other hand Kant shows remarkable awareness of the self-referential problem that is involved in his project of gaining knowledge (methodology) about knowledge (metaphysics). Towards the end of §23 this project is depicted as a

methodological warning—not to let the principles of sensitive cognition affect the intellectual—is based on this *dissensus* and on the recognition that this discord must be upheld in order to be able to make progress in the field of metaphysics. Neglect of this discord entails error, a *vitium subreptionis*, or even an *axioma subreptionis*. The subsequent analysis of the different subreptic axioms offers various descriptions of the basic mistake: mistaking the condition of sensitive cognition for something objective (§25) and intellectual (§24n); mistaking the subjective conditions of judgement for objective conditions (§28); the transfer of subjective conditions to objects. The suggestion in these descriptions that subjective conditions are conditions of sensibility by definition is not right. In the final §30 Kant points out that there are also mistakes that are based on subjective grounds in the sense of the laws of intellectual cognition. On this account, Kant’s methodology is aimed at observing the incongruity of both faculties in order not to mistake something subjective for something that is objective.

The corresponding methodological considerations in KrV are presented in the introduction of the Transcendental Dialectic. Dialectic, according to Kant, must not be understood in the sense of the organon of logic (as the ancients would have it, KrV, B85-86), in which case it would be a logic of illusion, but rather as a critique of dialectical illusion. This illusion is the result of some kind of error, and since neither the senses by themselves, nor understanding by itself can fall into error, it follows

daß der Irrtum nur durch den unbemerkten Einfluß der Sinnlichkeit auf den Verstand bewirkt werde, wodurch es geschieht, daß die subjektiven Gründe des Urteils mit den objektiven zusammenfließen, und diese von ihrer Bestimmung abweichend machen³⁷


In dialectical illusion something subjective is presented under the guise of

“Sisyphean task”. In the title of KrV this awareness is reflected in a more promising and self-assured way.

³⁷KrV, B350. Kant continues this text by comparing this influence and the resulting deviation to forces exerted on a body in motion. This body would continue to move in a straight line and in the same direction, but if influenced in another direction it would be directed into curvilinear motion. In line with this analogy erroneous judgement is the diagonal between the two lines representing the actions of sensibility and understanding. The graphic representation of this comparison shows judgement J, determined by objective grounds o to move into direction o, but influenced by subjective grounds s which cause it to be deviated into an erroneous direction e (at moment t, to be precise).

something objective.³⁸ This conflation of subjective and objective grounds is the distinctive mark of illusion in several other of Kant's statements about the issue.³⁹

There is a great similarity between these statements, the terms in which they are put on the one hand, and the phrases in the *Dissertation* about errors in metaphysics on the other.⁴⁰ What is more, in both cases error



There would be no deviation if *s* would point in the same direction as *o*, or if it would point in the opposite direction of *o* (in the latter case the length of *s* should not exceed the length of *o*).

³⁸Again there seems to be a suggestion that “subjective” refers to the influence from the part of sensibility only, but some subjective grounds are to be found in reason: “Der transzendente Schein dagegen hört gleichwohl nicht auf [...]. Die Ursache davon ist diese: daß in unserer Vernunft (subjektiv als ein menschliches Erkenntnisvermögens betrachtet) Grundregeln und Maximen ihres Gebrauch liegen ... gehalten wird.” (KrV, B353). There also seem to be two accounts of illusion: illusion as the result of the conflation of the subjective and the objective, and illusion as the result of sensibility's influence on understanding. Grier offers an evaluation of two different accounts of the source of illusion: sensibility on the one hand, and reason on the other (Grier, *Kant's Doctrine* ..., 102–117). She argues that both accounts do not have to be incompatible. I think the account of illusion in terms of mistaking the subjective for something objective offers an approach that makes it possible to discuss (in the context of the Transcendental Dialectic) both kinds of illusion.

³⁹For example: “Denn wir haben es mit einer natürlichen und unvermeidlichen Illusion zu tun, die selbst auf subjektiven Grundsätzen beruht, und sie als objektive unterschiebt” (KrV, B354); “Man kann alle *Schein* darin setzen: daß die *subjektive* Bedingung des Denkens vor die Erkenntnis des *Objekts* gehalten wird.” (KrB, A396); and in the context of the apagogic method of proof Kant maintains that this method is only permitted in those sciences “wo es unmöglich ist, das Subjektive unserer Vorstellungen dem Objektiven, nämlich der Erkenntnis desjenigen, was am Gegenstande ist, *unterzuschieben*.” (KrV, B819). Several times this conflation is also referred to as “(transzendente) Subreption” (KrV, A402, B537, 611, 647, 820).

⁴⁰Cf. for example “Irrtum” (error, AA II, 389/1); “Blendwerk” (KrV, B88, A384, B352, 354, 739) and *praestigiae* (AA II, 412/5 and 413/20); “subjektive Gründe des Urteils” (KrV, B350) and *subjectivas iudicandi conditiones* (AA II, 416/29–30). The similarity between Kant's position in the *Dissertation* and the introduction of the Transcendental Dialectic is also mentioned in Grier, *Kant's Doctrine* ..., 105–106.

is presented as something that is natural, inevitable, and inherent to the employment of our cognitive faculties.⁴¹ In both cases Kant's efforts are aimed at identifying the source of error in order to prevent error.⁴² In both cases Kant's analysis of illusion and error depends on a systematic analysis of judgement and an evaluation of argumentative structures. In this methodological context the critical antinomy enters on the scene in full regalia. It is this context that connects *dissensus* and the antinomy. The latter is only one variety of the several kinds of error that, according to Kant, are based on the neglect of *dissensus*, and on the syllogistic structure of dialectical reasoning (KrV, B377–389).

In chapter 7 and 8 we will examine the relation between real opposition and the antinomy more closely. The neglect of *dissensus* entails a situation that is comparable to antinomical thought. Although real repugnance is not mentioned *expressis verbis*, the issue turns up in a methodological context in the discussion of this *dissensus* between conflicting faculties of knowledge. Real opposition provides a viable pattern to establish and maintain the relation of *dissensus* between both opposing faculties. As long as this *dissensus* is preserved, the functioning of either faculty is protected against interference by the functioning of the opposing faculty.

⁴¹It is not just bunglers and sophists (KrV, B354), and the incautious (AA II, 389/9) that are prone to errors and illusory knowledge. Kant recognises in the *Dissertation* (AA II, 411/24) and in KrV (B354) that some illusions have a systematic basis in our mind.

⁴²Cf. “sollicite cavendum esse, ne . . .” (AA II, 411/29); “alle Warnungen der Kritik” (KrV, B352); “und zugleich zu verhüten” (KrV, B354) and “das Negative der Unterweisung” (KrV, B737).

Chapter 6

Real Repugnance in KrV

6.1 Real repugnance in KrV?

In 1763 Kant concluded his essay on negative magnitude announcing to publish at some time in the future his thoughts and considerations regarding the nature of our knowledge of cause and effect. With the publication of KrV this promise is fulfilled. Yet, there is very little *prima facie* evidence in KrV that real repugnance was a moving force in its development. It seems strange that KrV, being an answer to questions raised in *Negative Größen*, contains very few and seemingly casual references to real repugnance. The emphatic introduction in *Negative Größen* contrasts sharply with the fact that it is barely mentioned in KrV. The reason for this is twofold. The nature of the problem seems to have altered in the course of Kant's philosophical endeavours; real opposition has become part of a larger, more encompassing project, which caused it to disappear from view. Secondly, as has been shown in the previous chapter, real opposition in so far as it remained present at all, sc. as a *pattern*, played a role in a methodological context. Despite the unmistakingly methodological tenor of KrV Kant's main line of thought seems to be concerned with the exposition of his philosophical point. Therefore, references to real opposition and allusions to the pattern in a methodological context may have been pushed into the background. If the argument in the previous chapter is followed, and the significance of real opposition is mainly methodological, it is not surprising that the notion and issue of real opposition are not put in the forefront of KrV. Let us first have a look at the extent to which the notion of real opposition as well as closely related expressions are still present in KrV.

The notion *Realrepugnantz* itself does not occur in KrV. We find, however, the German synonym “reale Widerstreit” at B329, and “kein Widerstreit

zwischen den Realitäten” at B320, and we find a related phrase like “realiter entgegengesetzt” (B291n). At B288 the question that Kant had formulated towards the end of *Negative Größen*¹ is repeated in practically the same words:

Wie [...] darum, weil etwas ist, etwas anderes sein müsse, mithin wie etwas überhaupt Ursache sein könne [...], läßt sich gar nicht aus bloßen Begriffen einsehen.”

The latter part of this phrase also echoes the points Kant had made back in 1763:

Ich lasse mich auch durch die Wörter Ursache und Wirkung, Kraft und Handlung nicht abspeisen. (AA II, 203)

Reference to concepts, such as effect, cause, force and action, are of little avail, if we want an explanation of the relation between a concept and a thing (sc. an effect, or a state that is caused by something else). In terms of KrV: we always need an exhibition of the objective reality of a pure concept of understanding (e.g. “cause” at KrV, B288).

Apparently, there are just a few random references to real opposition. If we have a closer look at the exact position of the references in KrV we find that two of them (sc. “realiter entgegengesetzt” and the question “Wie darum, weil etwas ist . . .”) occur in the “General note on the system of the principles” which is entirely a B-addition (B288–294). The other references mentioned occur in the final part of the Transcendental Analytic consisting of the chapter on phaenomena and noumena and the appendix on the amphiboly.² The following list shows in which part of KrV explicit references to real opposition and closely related phrases occur:

- “Allgemeine Anmerkung zum System . . .” (KrV, B288–294):

¹Cf. AA II, 202: “wie soll ich es verstehen, daß, weil Etwas ist, etwas anders sei?”. At AA II, 203 Kant also asked: “wie darum, weil etwas ist, etwas anders aufgehoben werde”.

²Malter and Hess discuss the question to what part of KrV exactly the appendix belongs. For Malter it is an indispensable, conclusive part of the Transcendental Analytic that deals with the employment of understanding. It is not the transition to the Transcendental Dialectic (Rudolf Malter, ‘Reflexionsbegriffe. Gedanken zu einer schwierigen Begriffsgattung und zu einem unausgeführten Lehrstück der Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, *Philosophia naturalis*, 19 (1982), 125–150, 126–127, 131–132). Hess maintains that the appendix, located on the breaking point between Analytic and Dialectic, is of crucial importance to the Transcendental Logic as a whole (Heinz-Jürgen Hess, ‘Zu Kants Leibniz-Kritik in der ‘Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe’’, in: Ingeborg Heidemann and Wolfgang Ritzel, editors, *Beiträge zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft 1781–1981*, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981, 200–232, 205).

- “Wie [...] darum, weil etwas ist [...]” (KrV, B288);
- “nicht realiter [...] entgegengesetzt” (KrV, B290n).
- “Von der Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe ...” (KrV, B316–324):
 - “zwischen den Realitäten kein Widerstreit” (KrV, B320).
- “Anmerkung zur Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe” (KrV, B324–346):
 - “der reale Widerstreit” (KrV, B329);
 - “den [Widerstreit] des wechselseitigen Abbruchs [...], da ein Realgrund die Wirkung des andern aufhebt” (KrV, B330);
 - “Bedingungen [...], die einen Widerstreit, der freilich nicht logisch ist, nämlich aus lauter Positivem ein Zero = 0 möglich machen” (KrV, B338).
- “Tafel des Nichts” (KrV, B346–349):
 - “nihil privativum” (KrV, B347);
 - “nihil negativum” (KrV, B348).

The *nihil privativum/negativum* mentioned in the “Tafel des Nichts” are listed here to indicate that the context of occurrences of real opposition in KrV is the same as in *Negative Größen*: the specification of different kinds of nothing. The *nihil privativum* in the table conforms to the traditional use of the term, sc. “*Mangel (defectus, absentia)*” (AA II, 177–178). It is not a reference to real opposition and the *nihil privativum, repraesentabile* (AA II, 172). The *nihil negativum* does correspond to the *nihil negativum irrepraesentabile* in *Negative Größen* (AA, II, 171). In the final two sections of this chapter we will see in what sense the issue of real opposition is still present in this Kantian view on nothing.

From this list it is clear that real opposition did not disappear from Kant’s view altogether. It even reappears in the B-addition called “General Note ...”. Apparently, references to real opposition were considered to be the appropriate means to formulate an additional, concluding section about the system of the principles. It does not occur *expressis verbis* in the section on phaenomena and noumena, which was thoroughly revised in the B-edition, but it occupies a prominent position in the sections on the amphiboly and the remainder of the Transcendental Analytic (sc. KrV, B336–349). Presumably, real opposition is particularly relevant once the Analytic is coming to an end, and the Transcendental Dialectic is about to begin. Its significance relates to

the transition from true, objectively real knowledge to illusory knowledge of reason.

Following Kant's approach in *Negative Größen* we will make the examination of logical opposition and the principle of contradiction in the next section to be the benchmark for our assessment of real repugnance in KrV. As we shall see in the course of this examination the questions in relation to real opposition are dealt with in the larger, critical context of the synthetic nature of knowledge. Once this context has been presented in the sections on synthesis and original synthesis, we will discuss the occurrences of real repugnance in KrV and try to ascertain the critical significance of real opposition.

6.2 Logical opposition

In line with Kant's discussion in *Negative Größen* logical opposition in KrV is presented, together with the principle of contradiction, against the background of a theory of judgement.³ Non-contradiction is a universal, albeit negative condition of all our judgements (i.e. if the content of our knowledge expressed in judgements is not taken into consideration). A self-contradictory judgement is null and void (KrV, B189). Correspondingly, the principle of contradiction is a universal, albeit negative criterion of truth (of knowledge in general, i.e. irrespective of the content). Knowledge containing a contradiction is completely cancelled and invalidated.⁴

The principle also allows of a positive use: it is the universal and com-

³Logical opposition refers to a relation between predicate and thing, or to a relation between judgements. According to Michael Wolff each case can be reduced to the other. His discussion of logical opposition is based on Kant's description of the analytical opposition (KrV, B532), and it is presented in close connection to dialectical and real opposition, cf. Wolff, *Der Begriff des Widerspruchs. Eine Studie . . .*, 40–44.

⁴“Der Satz nun: Keinem Dinge kommt ein Prädikat zu, welches ihm widerspricht, heißt der Satz der Widerspruch und ist ein [...] negatives Kriterium aller Wahrheit, gehört aber auch darum bloß in die Logik, weil er von Erkenntnissen bloß als Erkenntnissen überhaupt unangesehen ihres Inhalts gilt, und sagt: daß der Widerspruch sie gänzlich vernichte und aufhebe.” (KrV, B190). Notwithstanding this close link between principle and concept of contradiction, the fact remains that contradiction qua principle is different from the concept. Wolff offers an evaluation of the concept, and inevitably has to deal with the principle as well. His analysis that the formulation of the principle itself is an analytical judgement, is relevant with respect to understanding the Kantian conceptions of formal and transcendental logic, cf. Michael Wolff, ‘Der Begriff des Widerspruchs in der ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’. Zum Verhältnis von formaler und transzendentaler Logik’, in: Burkhard Tuschling, editor, *Probleme der ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’*, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984, (Klaus Reich zum 75.Geburtstag/Kant-Tagung Marburg 1981), 178–202.

pletely sufficient principle of all analytic knowledge. The truth of any analytic judgement, whether it be affirmative or negative, can always be adequately known in accordance with the principle of contradiction (KrV, B190). The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements determines the applicability of contradiction as a criterion of truth in the process of generating knowledge. This distinction was important enough to be the subject of a separate section in the introduction of KrV (B10–14).

The distinction is based on two possible relations between subject term and predicate term in a judgement. Either the predicate term is contained in the subject term, or it is not. In the former case the judgement is analytic (e.g. “Alle Körper sind ausgedehnt.”), in the latter it is synthetic, like in “Alle Körper sind schwer.” (or the judgement is false).⁵

On account of the analytic relation between subject term and predicate term, the principle of contradiction suffices to acknowledge the truth or falsehood of an analytic judgement, or, as Kant puts it in the introduction, to become conscious of the necessity of the judgement.⁶ Application of the principle of contradiction is not exclusively restricted to analytic judgement. A synthetic judgement can also be discerned in accordance with the principle of contradiction, but only if another synthetic judgement is presupposed (KrV, B14); its synthetic nature remains unaccounted for.⁷ Hence, there must be something else (than non-contradiction) to account for the relation between subject term and predicate term in a synthetic judgement. In many cases it is experience that performs this role:

Es ist also die Erfahrung, worauf sich die Möglichkeit der Synthesis des Prädikats der Schwere mit dem Begriffe des Körpers gründet, weil beide [...] als Teil eines Ganzen, nämlich der Erfahrung [...] zu einander [...] gehören. (KrV, B12)

This appeal to experience, however, does not answer two important questions. What constitutes experience as a synthetic whole, and how do we account for synthetic judgements, which have no source in experience? All our knowledge may begin with experience, but it is not true that it all arises out of experience (KrV, B1). Some of our knowledge is independent of experience, and in that case it is a priori knowledge (KrV, B2–3). Especially synthetic knowledge a priori cannot be accounted for with the help of an appeal to experience, nor

⁵KrV, B10–11.

⁶Cf. KrV, B12. At KrV, B532 the opposition between contradictories is called an “analytical opposition”.

⁷In other words, the principle of contradiction applies to analytic relations between terms contained in different synthetic judgements.

with the help of the principle of contradiction. The general problem of KrV, therefore, is the question “How are a priori synthetic judgements possible?” (KrV, B19), which is in fact a more technical way of putting the second question just mentioned. We will come back to both of these questions later on.

Taking logical opposition, and the function of the principle of contradiction as our guidelines, we can see that the specific issue of real opposition has been replaced by the more general question about a priori synthesis.⁸ Kant’s intentions in KrV are still unmistakably rational, since necessity and universality (KrV, B3) are the conditions for answering this question. This claim to rationality is also reflected in the title of KrV. Yet, Kant knows how to avert the danger of a hyper rational or rationalistic perspective by limiting the applicability of the principle of contradiction, and by allowing experience a significant role in the genesis of knowledge. The uncritical use of contradiction Kant had condemned in §28 of the *Dissertation* (see §5.2 above) is repeated at KrV, B270 and B347.⁹

The shift in attention from real opposition to synthesis, in relation to a methodological significance of the pattern of real repugnance are the subjects of the next two sections.

6.3 Synthesis

The initial question “How am I to understand the fact that, because something is, something else is?” (AA II, 202) has turned into a specific instance of the question about the possibility of a priori synthesis (of judgements). Likewise, questions into the synthetic nature of concepts such as “cause” and “effect” have become part of this philosophical project. An answer to the question of a priori synthesis in KrV has to take into account the fact that in the *Dissertation* Kant had proclaimed the separation between sensibility and

⁸As has been noted *Realrepugnanz* has disappeared. *Verknüpfung*, *Verbindung*, *Beziehung*, *Verhältniß* (AA II, 202–203) have been replaced by *Synthesis*, and sometimes *Verbindung* (KrV, B129) and *Verhältniß* (KrV, B193).

⁹Cf. KrV, B270: “eine besondere Grundkraft unseres Gemüts [...] oder [...] ein Vermögen desselben, mit andern Menschen in Gemeinschaft der Gedanken zu stehen [...] das sind Begriffe, deren Möglichkeit ganz grundlos ist, weil sie nicht auf Erfahrung und deren bekannte Gesetze gegründet werden kann, und ohne sie eine willkürliche Gedankenverbindung ist, die, ob sie zwar keinen Widerspruch enthält, doch kein Anspruch auf objektive Realität [...] machen kann.” KrV, B347: “ein Begriff ohne Gegenstand, wie die Noumena [...] oder wie etwa gewisse neue Grundkräfte, die man sich denkt, zwar ohne Widerspruch, aber auch ohne Beispiel aus der Erfahrung gedacht werden”. Cf. also B624n where the same point is made in the context of God’s existence.

understanding. Therefore, he has to identify a synthetic moment in either faculty. The matter is complicated since Kant also assigns (like he had done before) a significant role to experience, which represents, in terms of KrV, the synthetic a posteriori. This position of experience is easier to understand once we have addressed the synthetic aspects of both faculties. In line with the construction of KrV we will first turn to the Transcendental Aesthetic to identify a priori synthesis on the part of sensibility.

It is important to make a reservation with respect to the use of “synthesis” in the context of sensibility. Synthesis is primarily an act of the understanding.¹⁰ Synthesis, in the sense of a connection of a manifold, always requires the spontaneity of understanding (KrV, B102–103). Sensibility, as the receptive faculty of our mind, cannot be spontaneous by definition. Yet, according to the conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic¹¹ space and time also represent two factors that are required for the solution of the synthetic a priori.

The specific characteristics of space (and time) are presented in what Kant calls a metaphysical exposition (KrV, B38–40) and a transcendental exposition (KrV, B40–41). The former is a clear representation of what belongs to a concept insofar as it contains what is exhibited by the concept, as something that is given a priori (KrV, B38). The transcendental exposition is the explanation of a concept as a principle from which the possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge can be understood (KrV, B40).

In the metaphysical exposition Kant argues 1) that space is not an empirical concept, but a pure representation since outer appearance and experience are dependent on a representation of space (and it is not the representation that is dependent on outer appearance); 2) that space is a necessary, a priori representation which is the condition of the possibility of (outer) appearances (since it is not possible to represent the absence of space, whereas we can quite well think of the absence of objects in space); 3) that space is not a concept, but a single, pure intuition (if we speak of several spaces, we mean that they are parts of the same unique space; space is essentially one); and 4) that space is an infinite given magnitude.

In the transcendental exposition Kant maintains that the possibility of

¹⁰Cf. KrV, B102–103, 130; and Hansgeorg Hoppe, *Synthesis bei Kant. Das Problem der Verbindung von Vorstellungen und ihrer Gegenstandsbeziehung in der 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft'*, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1983, (Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, Band 19), 113–114. Because synthesis is something intellectual Kaulbach limited his exposition of the idea of synthesis to understanding and transcendental apperception, cf. Kaulbach, ‘Die Entwicklung des Synthesis ...’, 84–89.

¹¹KrV, B73, which is the last page of a B-addition (sc. B66–73) to the Aesthetic.

geometry, as synthetic a priori knowledge, is only intelligible if we assume that it is conditioned by the a priori subjective form of intuition (i.e. space). On the basis of both these expositions Kant concludes that space is not a property of things in themselves, nor does it represent things in their mutual relations, but space is nothing but the subjective condition of sensibility, that necessarily and a priori precedes all intuitions of objects.

This answers Kant's questions from the beginning of the metaphysical exposition, which are quite similar to those raised in the *Dissertation*.¹² As regards time Kant follows a similar line of argument and he comes to similar conclusions (KrV, B46–53).

The a priori synthetic moment with respect to sensibility is located in the synthetic nature of space and time as subjective, a priori conditions. Kant has also repeatedly stressed that space and time are pure intuitions, not concepts. Still, he also refers to the *concepts* of space and time several times.¹³ The intuitive character is relevant as long as the question about the (a priori) origin of knowledge and experience is considered. Kant's references to the *concepts* of space and time are made in the context of a critique of knowledge. The concepts of space and time belong to the (meta-) language that is needed to present the results of Kant's analysis of the origins of knowledge, i.e. they are part of the vocabulary of transcendental philosophy or transcendental knowledge.¹⁴

What about synthesis in case of understanding? Compared to the negative characterisation of understanding in the *Dissertation* (§3) Kant presents a clearly positive notion of understanding in KrV.¹⁵ It is the power, or the capacity of producing representations, it is the spontaneity of knowledge (KrV,

¹²KrV, B37–38: “Was sind nun Raum und Zeit? Sind es wirkliche Wesen? Sind es zwar nur Bestimmungen, oder auch Verhältnisse der Dinge, aber doch solche, welche ihnen auch an sich zukommen würden, wenn sie auch nicht angeschaut würden, oder sind sie solche, die nur an der Form der Anschauung allein haften, und mithin an der subjektiven Beschaffenheit unseres Gemüts”. The latter option (“oder sind sie ...?”) is rhetorical. Compare this to the refutation of options in §15 of the *Dissertation*: “Spatium non est aliquid obiectivi et realis, nec substantia, nec accidens, nec relatio; sed subiectivum et ideale et a natura mentis stabili lege proficiscens veluti schema omnia omnino externe sensa sibi coordinandi.”

¹³Cf. KrV, B38: “wollen wir zuerst den Begriff des Raumes erörtern”; B39: “der allgemeine Begriff von Räumen überhaupt”; B120: “die Begriffe des Raumes und der Zeit” (cf. also B121–122); B195 “der Raum und die Zeit, so rein diese Begriffe auch von allem Empirischen sind”.

¹⁴Cf. KrV, B80–81.

¹⁵Although the negative explanation of understanding is still mentioned at B92: “Der Verstand wurde oben bloß negativ erklärt: durch ein nichtsinnliches Erkenntnisvermögen. [...] Also ist der Verstand kein Vermögen der Anschauung.”

B75). Understanding is capable of gaining knowledge of objects by means of concepts (whereas sensibility is only capable of receiving representations, KrV, B74–75). Concepts are grounded in the spontaneity of thought, and, more specifically, in functions. A function is “the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation”.¹⁶ This bringing together of various elements (which are not related analytically) is the specific feature of understanding and is called “synthesis”. As has been noted above, synthesis in this sense is something that belongs primarily to understanding. Synthesis is provided by the understanding but the object of synthesis is supplied by sensibility: sc. a spatio-temporal manifold of sensibility:

die Spontaneität unseres Denkens erfordert es, daß dieses Man-
nigfaltige zuerst auf gewisse Weise durchgegangen, aufgenommen,
und verbunden werde, um daraus eine Erkenntnis zu machen.
Diese Handlung nenne ich Synthesis.¹⁷

On the basis of the various logical functions of understanding in judgements (KrV, B95–101) Kant deduces specific forms of synthesis. This synthesis is pure, insofar as the underlying manifold is given a priori, as in case of the spatio-temporal manifold. Pure synthesis of the a priori manifold does not yield knowledge. The understanding requires that this synthesis is given unity, is brought to concepts (B104–105). This unity is based on the same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgement (in accordance with the logical function of understanding), but in this case understanding supplies contents to its judgements because the manifold of intuition is represented as a synthetic, conceptual unity. The representations of this synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition are called “pure concepts of the understanding” (KrV, B105) or “all originally pure concepts of synthesis” (KrV, B106).

The synthetic aspects in both faculties have been identified: space and time are a priori intuitions, pure and subjective forms of sensibility; the pure concepts of understanding provide conceptual unity to a manifold stemming from sensibility. Not surprisingly, “cause” and “effect” are such concepts.

¹⁶KrV, B93. This spontaneous, and active aspect is characteristic of understanding. Correspondingly, the proper function of understanding, sc. thinking, is described in terms of *Handlung* (action, act), cf. also KrV, B81: “Begriffe [...] als Handlungen des reinen Denkens”. Thinking itself is also described in terms of “action”: “Das Denken ist die Handlung, gegebene Anschauung auf einen Gegenstand zu beziehen.” (B304). Gerhardt merely deals with *actio/Handlung* in the context of causality and with respect to moral actions. He does not address the actions of our cognitive faculties at a transcendental level. Cf. Gerhardt, ‘Handlung als Verhältnis ...’.

¹⁷KrV, B102. Cf. KrV, B145.

The initial questions in *Negative Größen* about the explanatory value of these concepts have been answered now that these concepts turn out to be both pure, and a priori as well as synthetic in nature.

6.4 Original synthesis

Once Kant has identified the synthetic moments in both faculties, he has *ipso facto* made the beginning of the answer to another question that has remained implicit. Is there any interrelation or connection between both faculties once their separation has been proclaimed? Due to the (logically) negative characterisation of understanding in the *Dissertation* (§3) it was difficult to see how both could be connected again. Kant made a suggestion when he maintained that the *usus intellectus logicus* also applies to sensitive knowledge, but the result of this *usus* always remains sensitive and the representation of things as they are, is always intellectual.¹⁸ According to KrV, however, the synthetic moments of both faculties seem to be connected as matter and form (of experience). Yet, the precise interrelation between the “zwei Stämme der menschlichen Erkenntnis” (KrV, B29), or the “zwei Grundquellen des Gemüts” (KrV, B74) remains unknown to us (KrV, B29). A systematic account of their interrelation, however, is offered in the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding.

Kant may have identified synthetic moments in either faculty, sc. space, time and concepts, it is not clear what all of these moments have in common. He tries to clarify this point, by means of a critical explanation of the possibility of synthesis, or combination in general (*Verbindung überhaupt*, B129). This explanation marks the beginning of section 2 of the deduction of pure concepts at KrV, B129. “Synthesis” is the general title that indicates the combination of a manifold. Combination is always an act of understanding.¹⁹ The combination of the manifold of intuition cannot come to us through the senses, because this manifold originates in the receptivity of our mind. Combination, on the other hand, is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of representation.²⁰ Even the combination of a conceptual manifold requires some act of understanding that precedes any conceptual unity. At this point (KrV, B131) Kant will not allow the reader to make a mistake here. The

¹⁸Moreover, the separation did not affect the possibility of access to real knowledge, which was warranted by the *usus intellectus realis*.

¹⁹*Verstandeshandlung* or *Actus seiner* [sc. des Subjekts] *Selbsttätigkeit*. (KrV, B130).

²⁰“ein Actus der Spontaneität der Vorstellungskraft” (KrV, B130). Cf. B104: “Die Synthesis überhaupt ist [...] die bloße Wirkung der Einbildungskraft, einer blinden, obgleich unentbehrlichen Funktion der Seele”.

category of unity, presented at B106, is not what grounds combination, and it is not this synthesis in general he is looking for. Any category itself presupposes unity, because it is grounded upon a logical function in which combination is already thought. So there must be an a priori unity preceding any concept of combination:

Die Kategorie setzt also schon Verbindung voraus. Also müssen wir diese Einheit [...] noch höher suchen, nämlich in demjenigen, was selbst den Grund der Einheit verschiedener Begriffe in Urteilen, mithin der Möglichkeit des Verstandes [...] enthält. (KrV, B131)

The title of the next section of KrV gives a clear indication of the nature of this a priori ground of unity: the original-synthetic unity of apperception (KrV, B131, 135, 136). The representation of this unity is introduced right at the beginning of the section, sc. “Das: *Ich denke*”. The unity is also referred to as “original combination” (KrV, B133), “pure apperception”, “original apperception” (all KrV, B132), or “self-consciousness generating the representation *I think*”²¹.

Kant stresses the specific quality of this original-synthetic unity by adding the qualification that this unity is the “*transcendental* unity of consciousness” (KrV, B132). Descriptions of this unity belong to the meta-language of transcendental philosophy. The original unity is from a different, sc. a higher order than all other kinds of unity that are dependent on it. It is not just some higher order that this unity belongs to; it is the highest, the supreme point from which all employment of understanding, all logic and transcendental philosophy is dependent (in the literal sense of the word):

so ist die synthetisch Einheit der Apperzeption der höchste Punkt, an dem man allen Verstandesgebrauch, selbst die ganze Logik, und, nach ihr, die Tranzendentalphilosophie, heften muß, ja dieses Vermögen ist der Verstand selbst (KrV, B134n).

So synthesis at the level of sensibility, as well as synthesis on the part of understanding presuppose a unity or synthesis from which they are dependent, and without which their a priori synthetic nature cannot be understood.

²¹KrV, B132. Cf. B137: “den Actus der Apperzeption, *Ich denke*” Later on, in the Transcendental Dialectic (KrV, B399, 406), the “I think” is referred to as a concept, or rather judgement, which should be counted as belonging to the table of categories, since it is the “vehicle of all concepts in general and therefore also of the transcendental concepts” and which serves to introduce all our thoughts as belonging to consciousness.

This grounding unity is the original-synthetic unity of apperception, and it is precisely the point where both faculties meet.²²

Locating this common ground of both faculties, however, is merely the result of yet another issue that Kant intended to solve by means of the transcendental deduction, an issue that had been bothering him for a long time²³: the relation between representation and object. In fact, it is the first issue that is addressed in the beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic (KrV, B33) and it is a recurrent theme throughout the Transcendental Analytic.²⁴ Kant's critical terms to refer to this relation are *objektive Gültigkeit*, and *objektive Realität*.²⁵ The relation between representation and object, or between knowledge and object, is objectively valid, if the relation is necessary and universal (i.e. a priori). Kant criticises Hume and Locke for an empirical derivation (induction) of universality.²⁶ Hume's approach can only show what different cases of repeated association have in common but this derivation would only yield comparative universality, and subjective necessity. In his alternative approach to the problem, sc. a transcendental deduction, Kant intends to expose the a priori foundations of experience. In what way does the deduction prove objective validity, or, in other words, in what way does the original unity of apperception warrant the objective validity of knowledge?

As to the relation between object and representation Kant maintains that all thought must directly or indirectly relate to intuitions (KrV, B33). However, there is only one case in which there is an immediate link between the two: when the faculty of representation is affected by an object, the result of which is called *Empfindung* (sensation; KrV, B34). An intuition that is related to an object through sensation is called *empirische Anschauung* (empirical intuition). The (undetermined) object of empirical intuition is called *Erscheinung* (appearance) (KrV, B34).

At KrV, B124 the same question is approached from another, more systematic perspective: there are only two cases in which (synthetic) representation and object are necessarily related. Either the object must make

²²Baumanns, *Kants Philosophie der Erkenntnis* . . . , chapter ii (especially 75–78).

²³Cf. his letter to Marcus Herz (february 21st, 1772): “auf welchem Grunde beruhet die Beziehung desjenigen, was man in uns Vorstellung nennt, auf den Gegenstand?” (AA X, 130).

²⁴At KrV, B124 Kant presents the argument about the connection between synthetic representation and object in practically the same arrangement as he did in the letter to Herz just mentioned.

²⁵Cf. KrV, B44, 51–53, 117, 141, 194, 197, A128. Bxxviii mentions the equivalence of *objektive Gültigkeit* and *reale Möglichkeit*.

²⁶Hume is mentioned in this context at KrV, B5 and 127; Locke at B127 and 882. The problem of empirical derivation is also discussed at KrV, A111.

the representation possible (in which case the relation is empirical), or the representation must make the object possible.²⁷ In the latter case

ist doch die Vorstellung in Ansehung des Gegenstandes alsdenn
a priori bestimmend, wenn durch sie allein es möglich ist, etwas
als einen Gegenstand zu erkennen. (KrV, B125)

This general description of the a priori determinant relation also applies to the specific conditions of knowledge: intuition (through which the object is given) and concept (through which it is thought). Knowledge is objectively valid if the object of knowledge conforms to the a priori conditions of intuition and concept (i.e. space, time, pure concepts) and to the a priori condition of experience as a systematic whole (i.e. original apperception). This makes Kant's solution to the question of objective validity quite simple; a relation is objectively valid insofar as the object has been made possible by the (a priori) representation. According to this approach there is nothing in the object that has not been determined by the representation. Likewise, the objective validity of the categories, which is the main concern of the deduction, is based on the fact that they are a priori determinant of experience. They are objectively valid insofar as they make experience possible: "Die *Möglichkeit der Erfahrung* ist also das, was allen unsern Erkenntnissen a priori objektive Realität gibt." (KrV, B195).²⁸

Now that we have identified the synthetic moments (pertaining to sensibility, understanding, original apperception), in connection to the question of objective validity, we are able to address the questions that were asked in §6.2:

²⁷Cf. also KrV, B166: "Nun sind nur zwei Wege, auf welchen eine *nothwendige* Übereinstimmung der Erfahrung mit den Begriffen von ihren Gegenständen gedacht werden kann: entweder die Erfahrung macht diese Begriffe, oder diese Begriffe machen die Erfahrung möglich."

²⁸In the B-introduction at Bxvi and Bxxii Kant labelled his methodology in this respect a *Umänderung der Denkart*. "Hitherto", he states at Bxv "it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects." Kant, however, makes the assumption that objects must conform to our knowledge, which is precisely the assumption underlying his analysis of objective validity. This *Umänderung* is commonly referred to as Kant's Copernican Revolution in metaphysics, since Copernicus proposed a similar change of perspective in cosmology. Kant himself mentions "revolution" twice, but only in relation to geometry/mathematics and natural science (KrV, Bxvi, xxii). He wants his own proposal to be regarded as a hypothesis (KrV, Bxxii). The analogy between the Copernican and Kantian change in perspective is complicated. Copernicus assumed a sun-centered planetary system instead of a firmament revolving around the earth. The result of Kant's hypothesis, however, is anthropocentric; objects must be directed towards us. "Revolution" in this context is ambiguous, since the *revolutiones* in the title of Copernicus's *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* refer to planetary orbits.

“What constitutes experience as a synthetic whole?” and “How are a priori synthetic judgements possible?”. On the basis of synthesis and objective validity it is not difficult to understand Kant’s own phrases in answer to these questions. Kant concluded the B-deduction with a “Brief outline of this deduction” (KrV, B168–169), which is brief indeed, as compared to the “Summary representation . . .” that concluded the A-deduction (KrV, A128–130). The brief outline states that the deduction is

die Darstellung der reinen Verstandesbegriffe [...] als Prinzipien der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung, dieser aber, als *Bestimmung* der Erscheinungen in Raum und Zeit *überhaupt*,—endlich dieser aus dem Prinzip der *ursprünglichen* synthetischen Einheit der Apperzeption, als der Form des Verstandes in Beziehung auf Raum und Zeit, als ursprüngliche Formen der Sinnlichkeit.

Sometimes one may want to blame Kant for too much wordiness, but in this outline there is no redundancy at all. It contains the necessary and sufficient notions to define the deduction. The concentrated style and accumulation of technical terms make it sound like a spell. It is necessary to follow the grammatical structure of this staccato formula very closely in order to decipher its meaning. This main structure is: “The deduction is the exposition of A as B, of B as C, and finally of C as D”. Thus, the deduction is the exposition of the pure concepts of understanding as principles of the possibility of experience. Subsequently, it is the exposition of (the possibility of) experience²⁹ as the determination of appearances in space and time in general. Finally, it is the exposition of this determination, following from the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception, as the form of understanding in relation to space and time (being the original forms of sensibility).

Most importantly, the original synthetic unity is presented as the point where the form of understanding is related to the forms of sensibility. In the A-deduction this interrelation is also mentioned (“dieses Verhältnis des Verstandes zur Sinnlichkeit”, KrV, A128). After the separation of sensibility and understanding in the *Dissertation* and the beginning of KrV, the transcendental deduction has offered an account of the systematic connection between both faculties. What had been separated before, has been linked together again. This account itself, however, does not represent knowledge

²⁹In Kemp Smith’s translation the first occurrence of *dieser* is taken to be referring to *Prinzipien*: “the principles being here taken as the *determination* of appearances in space and time *in general*”. Pure concepts as principles of experience are not the determination of appearances; they are rather determinant with regard to experience.

in the regular sense of the word; it is transcendental knowledge (KrV, B25, 80). It is by no means an objectively valid representation of something; “I think” does not express self-knowledge.

The same elements, arranged in a sophisticated way, are used in the formulation of the highest principle of all synthetic judgements (KrV, B193–198). According to §6.2 experience grounded the possibility of the synthesis between two concepts (subject and predicate) that were not analytically related. In the section on the highest principle Kant maintains that a third something³⁰ is necessary to account for the synthesis of two concepts. This third something is the possibility of experience. This possibility is based upon the various kinds of a priori synthesis of a manifold (space, time, concept, apperception). And thus:

Auf solche Weise sind synthetische Urteile a priori möglich, wenn wir die formalen Bedingungen der Anschauung a priori, die Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, und die notwendige Einheit derselben in einer transzendentalen Apperzeption, auf ein mögliches Erfahrungserkenntnis überhaupt beziehen (KrV, B197)

Thus we can say, Kant concludes this passage, that the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are also conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and therefore, they (the conditions of the possibility of experience) have objective validity in a synthetic a priori judgement.³¹

As a consequence of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements, i.e. the possibility of experience, the critical conception of “thing” (*Gegenstand*, *Objekt*, *Sache*) has become very specific. In the context of syntheticity and experience the meaning of “thing” has been limited to “object of possible experience”. The objective validity of our knowledge is warranted only for objects that have been made possible by the a priori conditions of that very same knowledge: sc. objects in the sense of “appearance”. These are objects insofar as they have conformed to the constitution of our faculties (as a result of Kant’s *Umänderung der Denkart*). It makes sense, however, to allow for other objects as well. This argument is presented in the B-introduction (KrV, Bxxiv–xxx).

³⁰Cf. KrV, B194: “so ist ein Drittes nötig”; cf. also “ein Drittes” (B177); “kein Drittes” (B195); “das Dritte” (B315); “ein drittes [...] Erkenntnis” (B760); “ein Drittes, nämlich mögliches Erfahrung” (B794).

³¹Cf. KrV, A111 and B799 for almost identical formulations. The quotation and Kant’s conclusion are the explanation of the principle of all synthetic judgements: “ein jeder Gegenstand steht unter den nothwendigen Bedingungen der synthetischen Einheit des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung in einer möglichen Erfahrung.” (KrV, B197).

In this part of the introduction Kant maintains that at first glance the result of the *Critique* is merely *negative*: speculative reason cannot go beyond the limits of sensibility, and its use is limited to the objects of experience. Speculative reason also has the tendency to apply the principles beyond the domain of sensibility, thereby stretching its limits and threatening the (pure) practical employment of reason. If we are convinced that there is an absolutely necessary practical use of reason, then *Critique* may well have a positive value insofar as it removes all obstacles that stand in the way of the latter employment of reason. *Critique* must protect practical reason from speculative opposition. Bearing in mind Kant's confession "Ich mußte also das *Wissen* aufheben, um zum *Glauben* Platz zu bekommen" (KrV, Bxxx), his defense of practical reason may not come as a surprise. What is striking though, is the fact that the nature of critique and the connection between practical and speculative reason is described in the language of *Negative Größen*, i.e. the terminology of real opposition. Note such phrases as "ein Hindernis aufheben",³² "vernichten", "wider Gegenwirkung sichern" and "nicht in Widerspruch" in the following quotation:

Daher ist eine Kritik, welche die erstere [sc. speculativer Gebrauch der Vernunft] einschränkt, so fern zwar *negativ*, aber, indem sie dadurch zugleich ein Hindernis, welches den letzteren Gebrauch [sc. praktischer Gebrauch der Vernunft] einschränkt, oder gar zu vernichten droht, aufhebt, in der Tat von *positivem* und sehr wichtigem Nutzen, so bald man überzeugt wird, daß es einen schlechterdings notwendigen praktischen Gebrauch (den moralischen) der Vernunft gebe, in welchem sie sich unvermeidlich über die Grenzen der Sinnlichkeit erweitert, dazu sie zwar von der spekulativen keiner Beihülfe bedarf, dennoch aber wider ihre Gegenwirkung gesichert sein muß, um nicht in Widerspruch mit sich selbst zu geraten. (KrV, Bxxv)

A critical relation between the speculative and the practical employment of reason is a relation that is structured according to the pattern of real opposition. This pattern rules out—by definition—the possibility of self-contradiction. Critique must keep employment of both kinds of reason in balance. Each has to be protected against influences from the other part. Neither speculative, nor practical reason can prevail, for this would inevitably

³²As to "Hindernis" cf. also MS, AA VI, 231 (introduction to *Rechtslehre* §D): "Der Widerstand, der dem Hindernisse einer Wirkung entgegengesetzt wird, ist eine Beförderung dieser Wirkung und stimmt mit ihr zusammen."

result in a contradiction. The critical equilibrium, on the other hand, seems to be a stable compound of something positive and negative.

It is in this context of critique, practical and speculative reason that Kant invokes the twofold sense of “object”: namely as appearance and as thing in itself (KrV, Bxxvii). Possible knowledge may be limited to objects as appearances, this does not exclude the possibility that things in themselves can be the object of our thought: “*denken* kann ich, was ich ich will, wenn ich mir nur nicht selbst widerspreche” (KrV, Bxxvin). Objects as things in themselves are the objects of the practical employment of reason.³³ Kant’s examples are freedom, God and the immortality of the soul (KrV, Bxxix–xxx).

Judging by Kant’s own terminology, real opposition seems to be reappearing in the context of the twofold sense of “object”, the interdependence of speculative and practical reason, and the nature of critique. In the next section we will examine this point in greater detail. For now, it is important to note that once the philosophical problem of the synthetic a priori (and of real opposition) has been solved, real opposition turns up again in the form of a pattern of thought that is used to understand, to structure, and even to adjust different kinds of opposition that Kant is confronted with in the course of developing his critical answer regarding the synthetic a priori. Kant’s terminology may be circumstantial evidence in this respect, but there are more indications pointing directly in this direction. When we look at the steps that were taken in the present and previous section we can see that there are two, or rather three points where real opposition functions as a pattern of thought to structure opposed elements.

Firstly, in KrV sensibility and understanding are related in such a way that they are not mutually exclusive, as would have been the case if they had been related as contradictories. Each faculty functions in its own right, but each is also dependent on the other. Neither faculty can function properly if it is not related to the other. They are necessarily related:

Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind. Daher ist es ebenso notwendig, seine Begriffe sinnlich zu machen (d.i. ihnen den Gegenstand in der Anschauung beizufügen), als, seine Anschauungen sich verständlich zu machen (d.i. sie unter Begriffe zu bringen).³⁴

³³This explains why Kant mentioned the case of a representation making possible the existence of an object by means of the will at KrV, B125.

³⁴Cf. KrV, B75. Cf. also KrV, B314: “Verstand und Sinnlichkeit können bei uns nur in Verbindung Gegenstände bestimmen. Wenn wir sie trennen, so haben wir Anschauungen ohne Begriffe, oder Begriffe ohne Anschauungen”.

Secondly, they may be mutually dependent, but they remain separate faculties. Their interconnection, qua connection, is of a different order. It is the highest point, the original synthetic unity from which both are dependent. This unity bears the marks of a real opposition. It is a unity made up of two positive (“real”) moments that are opposed. They are not opposed as contradictories, because the result of their opposition is not an impossibility, but something real (sc. possible experience).

Thirdly, once it has been acknowledged that possible experience is the proper domain of speculative reason critical reason has *ipso facto* determined the proper field of practical reason. These different functions of reason are related as negative magnitudes: they are real and opposed. Again, their interrelation is arranged according to the pattern of real opposition. The functioning of either kind of reason annihilates the proper functioning of the other. Critique intends to prevent this annihilation. It is there to make sure that either kind of employment can function properly without damaging the proper function of the opposite kind of employment. Critique keeps them balanced.

So the right employment of speculative reason is restricted to what is possible within the limits of sensibility. The right employment of practical reason only begins beyond these same limits. Practical reason must be safeguarded against non-sensible aspirations from the part of speculative reason. Speculative reason on the other hand, must be protected against non-moral aspirations from the part of practical reason. This interrelation between speculative and practical reason seems to be a fine example of the second rule of real repugnance (cf. AA II, 177): “Allenthalben, wo ein positiver Grund ist und die Folge ist gleichwohl Zero, da ist eine Realentgegensetzung”. There is a positive ground, sc. the speculative pursuit of reason into the realm of the super-sensible. There is also a negative, i.e. an opposite striving of practical reason. Critique functions as a restraint to both kinds of employment. The result of this restraint is a “balance of powers”, a state of affairs that is both the foundation of metaphysics as a science, as well as the basis of a moral philosophy that is not grafted onto experience.

The point of unity between sensibility and understanding (original synthesis), as well as the critical interrelation between speculative and practical reason show remarkable resemblances with real opposition. Real opposition offers the pattern that is needed to structure the interrelation of opposite and non-contradictory elements so as to yield a real effect.

6.5 Real repugnance in KrV

In §6.1 above we concluded that real opposition had not disappeared from Kant's view altogether. It occurs in the chapter about phaenomena and noumena, in the appendix on the amphiboly and it even reappears in the B-addition to the system of principles. Hence, explicit references to real repugnancy only occur in the final stages of the Transcendental Analytic. This remarkable situation will be the topic of the present section. What is the significance of the occurrence and reappearance of real repugnancy at this stage of KrV?

The B-text of the "General Note ..." (KrV, B288–294) consists of four paragraphs. There are two short concluding paragraphs, the first of which maintains that the note is noteworthy in view of both the refutation of idealism and the limits of the possibility of self-knowledge. The final paragraph consists of a conclusion about the principles of pure understanding (sc. that they are nothing but the a priori principles of the possibility of experience) that resembles the principle of synthetic judgements at KrV, B197. The major part of the note is divided into two equally sized paragraphs that have comparable opening words: "Es ist etwas sehr Bemerkungswürdiges" (KrV, B288), and "Noch merkwürdiger aber ist" (KrV, B291). What is so remarkable, or noteworthy?

In the first place it is remarkable that we always need an intuition to show the objective reality of a pure concept of understanding. This means that concepts alone never suffice to understand something about objects. How something can be a cause, cannot be understood on the basis of concepts only. In this context, as has been mentioned earlier in §6.1, Kant relies on the example and terminology of real opposition.

Secondly, what is even more remarkable, we always need *outer* intuitions to demonstrate the objective reality (KrV, B291). If we want to demonstrate the objective reality of the concept of causality, we need an intuitive representation of alteration. The intuition of the movement of a point in space is a representation that would qualify for this purpose. The possibility of alteration or change (i.e. the possibility of something being a cause) can only be understood, if there is a corresponding intuition of alteration. Understanding alone can never comprehend the possibility of alteration. The case of causality is only one example that is discussed in this paragraph. Inherence and community, the other two categories from the class of *Relation*, are also discussed. With reference to the latter category, Leibniz is criticised for the fact that he only employed reason in his attempt to understand the possibility of community. Community between substances, however, cannot

be understood on the basis of their existence only. Understanding this community requires something more, and that is why, according to Kant, Leibniz had to resort to divine mediating intervention. Kant himself invokes the condition outer intuition: possible community of substances (as appearances) can be conceived under the a priori condition of outer relations, i.e. under the condition of outer intuition or representation in space.

Kant's critique of Leibniz at this point (KrV, B293) explains why Kant's remarks in the "General Note ..." are "noteworthy" at all. Rationalistic philosophers, perhaps even adherents of a critique of pure reason would not expect sensible intuition to play a decisive role in this respect. What is noteworthy for readers of KrV is the fact that the "General Note ..." seems to be the first explicit text in KrV where the necessary relation between concept and intuition is argued for. Prior to KrV, B288 there are several instances where Kant mentions the relation and interdependency between concept and intuition (e.g. KrV, B74–75). He does not, however, mention supporting arguments so explicitly until the B-addition of the "General Note ...".³⁵

Two other explicit references to real opposition occur in the third, and closing chapter of the Transcendental Analytic: "Von dem Grunde der Unterscheidung aller Gegenstände überhaupt in phaenomena and noumena", more specifically in the appendix about the amphiboly and the note to the amphiboly. The occurrence of opposition between realities at KrV, B320–321 needs to be quoted almost in its entirety, for it contains an important argument and it is instructing to see that Kant makes his point in the language of *Negative Größen*:

Wenn Realität nur durch den reinen Verstand vorgestellt wird (realitas noumenon), so läßt sich zwischen den Realitäten kein Widerstreit denken, d.i. ein solches Verhältnis, da sie in einem Subjekt verbunden einander ihre Folge aufheben, und $3 - 3 = 0$ sei. Dagegen kann das Reale in der Erscheinung (realitas phaenomenon) unter einander allerdings im Widerstreit sein, [...] wie zwei bewegende Kräfte in derselben geraden Linie, [...] oder auch ein Vergnügen, was dem Schmerze die Waage hält.

Once Kant has started to mention real opposition, the example of opposed

³⁵This is the claim of Brook & McRobert (cf. Andrew Brook and Jennifer McRobert, 'Kant's Attack on the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection', (1998) (URL: <http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoBroo.htm>)). In their view, however, the "General Note ..." only represents an "obscure anticipation" of the actual argument at KrV, B320–321.

forces, as well as the example of pleasure counterbalancing pain follows as a matter of course. More importantly, this appeal to real opposition contains a somewhat hidden argument. If reality is presented by pure understanding only, real opposition would be unconceivable. The implicit assumption underlying this statement is that real opposition must be conceivable. Apparently, the “facticity” of real repugnancy cannot be neglected. Therefore, reality must be presented in a phenomenal sense, i.e. as appearance. Real repugnance is the testcase to remind us that a purely logical, or rationalistic approach to knowledge is not sufficient, experience must be taken into account.³⁶

Likewise, real opposition is invoked in the note to the amphiboly (sc. at KrV, B328–330). Again, Kant makes an extensive appeal to cases of real opposition (in nature, in case of forces, and in case of good and evil) in order to expose the shortcomings of rationalism (“the Leibnizian-Wolffian system” at KrV, B329), and in order to point out the necessity of the sensible conditions of knowledge.

So for the third time in a row Leibniz is the object of Kant’s criticism as soon as real opposition is mentioned. A philosophical system that could not stand the test of a proper account of real opposition was, in Kant’s view, defective. In the note to the amphiboly this point is made in the context of an elaborate critique of Leibniz’s “intellectual system of the world” (KrV, B326). The fundamental mistake of this system was, that is was just that: an intellectual system that could not properly account for the conditions of sensible intuition. Consequently, there is in this intellectual system no distinction between things in themselves and appearances. In Kant’s words:

Leibniz nam die Erscheinungen als Dinge an sich selbst, mithin für Intelligibilia, d.i. Gegenstände des reinen Verstandes (KrV, B320)

This observation is repeated several times in the appendix on the amphiboly.

Kant devoted the major part of the appendix to a critique of Leibniz’s philosophy. In fact, critique of Leibniz seems to be the guiding thread, since it has been initiated in the “General note . . .” at B293, but what is the purpose of such an extensive critique of Leibniz at this point of KrV? Kant’s critique deals with very few details of the Leibnizian-Wolffian system, it does not refer to any bibliographic source and it is not systematically constructed but rather follows Kant’s own classification of the concepts

³⁶Kant’s appeal to real opposition, forces, and pain and pleasure, at this point is even called a *decisive* argument for the need of sensible intuitions, cf. Brook and McRobert, ‘Kant’s Attack . . .’.

of reflection.³⁷ This has caused Parkinson³⁸ to disqualify parts of Kant's critique as misinterpretations of Leibniz. However, the question whether Kant's account of Leibniz's philosophy is accurate or not seems to be missing the point. It is not Kant's intention to discuss and ascertain the achievements of rationalistic philosophy. Leibniz is more like the right sparring partner to test the strength of his own critical approach to knowledge. Hess concludes that Kant's critique of Leibniz has "die Funktion eines Negativ-Beispiels oder einer Kontraposition [...] um an ihr die eigene philosophische Position um so deutlicher hervortreten zu lassen".³⁹ Kant offers a reconstruction of Leibniz's philosophy so as to be able to present his own critical philosophy as the solution to problems that are inherent to a rationalistic philosophy. It goes without saying that this reconstruction is not always accurate, but accuracy and adequate interpretation are not what Kant is aiming at in the first place. Rather, the reconstruction is meant to be the straw man of Kant's own argument, even at the cost of misinterpretation. It is no coincidence that Kant chose Leibniz as his adversary in this respect. It offered exactly the right opportunity to make his own point. Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy was still a dominant current in Kant's time. If critical philosophy could remedy the flaws of rationalism, he would have gained a significant strategic advantage, sc. superiority over mainstream philosophy. Moreover, it offered Kant the opportunity to get even with part of his own philosophical background.

Kant's critique of Leibniz was primarily aimed at drawing attention to the crucial issue of his own critical approach. What did he criticise Leibniz for and what is this crucial issue that needs emphasis at this point of KrV? As is clear in the quotation above, Kant blamed Leibniz for taking appearances for things in themselves. Elsewhere he blamed Leibniz for regarding appearances as representations of things in themselves (KrV, B326), and for "intellectualising appearances" (KrV, B327), and for a disregard of the

³⁷A systematic analysis of these concepts themselves seems to be overshadowed by Kant's polemical intention, cf. Peter Reuter, *Kants Theorie der Reflexionsbegriffe. Eine Untersuchung zum Amphiboliekapitel der Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1989, (Epistemata: Reihe Philosophie, Band 56; also dissertation Bonn 1988), 148. The notion of reflection in the broader context of Kant's work is treated in Max Liedtke, 'Der Begriff der Reflexion bei Kant', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 48 (1966), 207–216. Malter's attempt (Malter, 'Reflexionsbegriffe ...') is a significant contribution to this systematic analysis. The main thesis of his contribution is that the concepts of reflection are relevant in view of the concrete formation of judgements, especially as far as the subjective side of this formation is concerned.

³⁸G. H. R. Parkinson, 'Kant as a Critic of Leibniz. The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection', *Revue internationale de philosophie*, 35 (1981), 302–314.

³⁹Hess, 'Zu Kants Leibniz-Kritik ...', 222.

sensitive origin of part of our knowledge (KrV, B336). In the “Note to the amphiboly . . .” this kind of mistake is called “transcendental amphiboly”: the confounding of the object of pure understanding with appearance (KrV, B326). So Leibniz is blamed for having committed transcendental amphiboly. In other words, he failed to acknowledge the twofold sense of “object” that we discussed in §6.4. Mistakes like this can be remedied by transcendental reflection and the explanation of this state of mind seems to be the main purpose of the entire appendix. Yet, most of what is said about (the concepts of) reflection, amphiboly and Leibniz serves to emphasise some of Kant’s own critical results gained thus far, and it serves to draw some conclusions that need to be presented at this point of KrV.

The main, critical result that needs to be emphasised at this point of KrV is the twofold sense of “object”. It enables Kant to underline closely related issues (the separation as well as the separate functioning of sensibility and understanding; the primary importance of sensibility), but it also enables him to define or demarcate the scope of the operations of sensibility and understanding.⁴⁰ In other words, by means of the two senses of “object” he can find a conclusive answer to the question regarding the cognitive possibilities of understanding and sensibility; understanding can only be used empirically. If we follow this line, it is also clear why real opposition reappears in these final, and seemingly quite different parts of the Transcendental Analytic. The two different senses of “object” in relation to the possible uses of understanding constitute the issue that all concluding parts have in common.

In the “General Note . . .” Kant maintained that the applicability of pure concepts of understanding is necessarily dependent on corresponding outer intuitions. The phaenomena chapter presents an extensive evaluation of the distinction between appearance (*Erscheinung*, phaenomenon) and thing in itself (*Ding an sich*, noumenon).⁴¹ In the appendix Kant discusses the amphiboly, which is a “confounding of an object of pure understanding with appearance” (KrV, B326), and which is a result of a confusion of the empirical with the transcendental employment of reason (KrV, B316). The appendix

⁴⁰Cf. KrV, B296–298 where Kant describes the determination of the limits of understanding in terms of self-determination.

⁴¹KrV, A248–249: “Erscheinungen, so fern sie als Gegenstände nach der Einheit der Kategorien gedacht werden, heißen Phaenomena. Wenn ich aber Dinge annehme, die bloß Gegenstände des Verstandes sind, [. . .] so würden dergleichen Dinge Noumena (intelligibilia) heißen.” Cf. KrV, B 310: “Der Begriff eines *Noumenon*, d.i. eines Dinges, welches gar nicht als Gegenstand der Sinne, sondern als ein Ding an sich selbst (lediglich durch einen reinen Verstand) gedacht werden soll, ist gar nicht widersprechend.”

concludes with a summarising exposition about the noumenon. Once the meanings of “object” and “noumenon” have been explained, Kant concludes the Transcendental Analytic with the table of nothing which completes the exposition about “object” in terms of the “Gegenstand überhaupt [...] unausgemacht, ob er etwas oder nichts sei” (KrV, B346).

On the basis of this general point of view we will now try to evaluate the closing parts of the Transcendental Analytic in greater detail in order to understand the significance and consequences of occurrences of real repugnance in KrV, B288–349. In the “General Note ...” the occurrence of real repugnance marks the point that the employment of understanding with regard to objectively valid knowledge is always dependent on (outer) intuition. Understanding is necessarily related to sensibility. Kant’s critique of Leibniz is initiated at this point in the B-edition of KrV (KrV, B293).

The phaenomena chapter (KrV, B294–315), that does not contain direct references to real opposition, discusses the possibility of the employment of understanding that is not dependent on outer intuitions but rather on non-sensible, i.e. intellectual intuitions. Kant denies this possibility of transcendental employment of understanding; our faculty of knowledge is not capable of intellectual intuition, and therefore our knowledge is limited to things as they appear, not as they are in themselves. Kant’s phrase to indicate this limited applicability of understanding is that transcendental employment of (concepts of) understanding is not admitted, because there is only an empirical employment of understanding. This had already been shown in previous parts of the Transcendental Analytic: the most the understanding can achieve a priori is to anticipate the form of a possible experience in general (KrV, B303).

According to the title of the appendix on the amphiboly, a confusion of the empirical with the transcendental employment is the cause of amphiboly.⁴² Kant’s critique of Leibniz in the Appendix and the following “Note ...” showed that the confusion is caused once appearances are mistaken for things in themselves. More in particular, this mistake is presented as the result of an approach in which the necessary relation between understanding and sensibility is neglected and objects are only treated as objects for the understanding. Transcendental reflection is presented as the means to

⁴²The B-revision of the phaenomena chapter contains an announcement of this confusion: “Gleich anfangs aber zeigt sich hier eine Zweideutigkeit, welche großen Mißverstand veranlassen kann: daß, da der Verstand, wenn er einen Gegenstand in einer Beziehung bloß Phänomen nennt, er sich zugleich außer dieser Beziehung noch eine Vorstellung von einem *Gegenstande an sich selbst* macht ...” (KrV, B307–308).

avoid this.⁴³ Insofar as the critique of Leibniz, in line with the results of the phaenomena chapter, implies only a limited, empirical employment of understanding, the purpose of the twofold sense of “object” seems to be lost. There is no point in making a distinction between appearance and thing in itself, if you only need appearances for your theory of knowledge, and if understanding is not allowed to deal with its objects as things in themselves. Doesn’t that make the latter kind of object redundant altogether? The phaenomena chapter as well as the second part of the “Note . . .” (KrV, B336–346) contains the answer to this question, that will be addressed in the next section.

If we summarise the arguments I have been putting forward thus far, we can see that it is not just a lucky coincidence that real repugnance turns up at this point in KrV. Reference to real opposition enables Kant to stress and discuss the main achievements of the previous parts of KrV, but it also enables him to do something more; bringing those achievements to a conclusion.

Firstly, in the “General note . . .” the necessary relation between pure concept and outer intuition is argued for in the immediate context of the issue of real repugnance. In the phaenomena chapter Kant maintains that there is only an empirical employment of understanding. Understanding and its concepts can only be used in relation to what has been given under the conditions of sensibility.

Secondly, instances of real opposition in the texts on the amphiboly are brought forward to indicate serious shortcomings of a dogmatic-rationalistic approach (resulting from the confusion of the empirical with the transcendental employment of reason). A theory that fails to acknowledge real opposition, i.e. a theory that fails to account for experience, has *ipso facto* failed to recognise the distinction between objects of sensibility (appearances) and objects of understanding (things in themselves). This failure causes either the intellectualisation of appearances, or the sensification of concepts (KrV, B327), but in both cases sensibility and understanding are not sufficiently distinguished.

6.6 The noumenon as a limiting concept

As a consequence of the fact that understanding has no transcendental employment, Kant maintains that understanding—independent of the subjective

⁴³KrV, B319: “Die transzendente Überlegung ist eine Pflicht, von der sich niemand lossagen kann, wenn er a priori etwas über Dinge urteilen will.”, cf. KrV, B317, 325–326.

conditions of sensible intuition—has no determinate or determinable object (KrV, B304). One could argue that in the absence of sensible intuition it might be possible to supply understanding with another kind of intuition lest thoughts would remain empty. On the basis of non-sensible intuition the transcendental employment of understanding would still be an option. Unfortunately, there is no evidence whatsoever, that humans are capable of non-sensible, intellectual intuition.⁴⁴ Hence, noumena in the sense of things in themselves, and as objects of understanding have to be rejected. This seems to be confirming the conjecture in the previous section; it does not make sense to maintain the twofold sense of “object”, if the noumenon is rejected at a later stage. In Kant’s view, however, the concept of a noumenon is not redundant. The reason for this is quite simple. According to Kant the term noumenon has two meanings, a positive and negative one. It is the noumenon in the positive sense that cannot be allowed. On the other hand, the negative meaning of the noumenon⁴⁵, is something that is not only admissible⁴⁶, but even inevitable and indispensable.⁴⁷ It seems as if Kant has found a scholastic answer to the threat that the twofold sense of “object” is meaningless. Just add another distinction that has an element which is invulnerable to the objections raised. So if the noumenon is redundant in our theory of knowledge, we simply have to distinguish between the noumenon insofar as it is redundant (noumenon in the positive sense) and the noumenon insofar as it is not redundant, but useful and even indispensable. The introduction of the noumenon in the negative sense, however, has an important systematic function. It is the exposition of this function that seems to be Kant’s main critical objective towards the end of the Transcendental Analytic.

With the conception of the noumenon in the negative sense Kant takes a crucial step in the process of answering two questions that were raised in the first paragraph of the phaenomena chapter (KrV, B295): can we be satisfied with the critical results of the Transcendental Analytic, and, secondly, by

⁴⁴KrV, B304: “Durch eine reine Kategorie nun, in welcher von aller Bedingung der sinnlichen Anschauung, als der einzigen, die uns möglich ist, abstrahiert wird ...”; KrV, A252: “daß die sinnliche Anschauung die einzige mögliche Anschauung [...] *vor uns* sei”.

⁴⁵KrV, B307: “ein Ding [...], *so fern es nicht Objekt unserer sinnlichen Anschauung* ist, [...] ist [...] ein Noumenon im *negativen* Verstande.”

⁴⁶KrV, B342: “so müssen Noumena in dieser bloß negativen Bedeutung allerdings zugelassen werden”.

⁴⁷KrV, B311: “Der Begriff eines Noumeni, bloß problematisch genommen, bleibt [...] nicht allein zulässig, sondern [...] unvermeidlich”. (B344: “Der Begriff des Noumenon ist [...] die unvermeidlich mit der Einschränkung unserer Sinnlichkeit zusammenhängende Aufgabe”.

what title do we possess this domain of critical knowledge (a title that must protect us against hostile claims)? It is obvious that we can and shall never be satisfied if the outcome of the Transcendental Analytic is all there is to know. Right from the very first sentence of KrV Kant has made clear that human reason is burdened by questions which it is not able to ignore, but which it is also not able to answer.⁴⁸ Understanding will also unavoidably and constantly try to overstep the limits of its own domain (sc. of empirical employment). If we cannot help doing this, is there a safe and legitimate way of doing it? The title by which we possess our land of truth (KrV, B294) is the principle that the a priori inventory of understanding can only be employed in view of possible experience, i.e. in relation to sensible intuitions. Notwithstanding its a priori nature, understanding cannot transcend the limits of sensibility, cannot expand knowledge beyond the domain of possible experience, and yet, as we have just seen, it constantly tries to do so. With a negative conception of the noumenon Kant has introduced a notion that can meet with both of these seemingly opposed requirements (limitation and transgression).

Firstly, the negative conception of the noumenon leaves room for understanding to venture beyond the limits of possible experience, although the results of this operation are not to be counted as knowledge (but rather as belief, for instance). The transcendental employment of reason, however, is still ruled out, since noumena in a positive sense are not allowed.

Secondly, the empirical employment has gained substantial support, once the second sense of “object” (sc. thing in itself) has received a more specific interpretation in terms of the negative noumenon. The noumenon in the negative sense seems to have important relevance in addition to what has been achieved thus far. Right after the distinction between a noumenon in the negative and positive sense, Kant maintains (at KrV, B307) that:

Die Lehre von der Sinnlichkeit ist nun zugleich die Lehre von den Noumenen im negativen Verstande, d.i. von Dingen, die der Verstand sich ohne diese Beziehung auf unsere Anschauungsart, mithin nicht bloß als Erscheinungen, sondern als Dinge an sich selbst denken muß

At KrV, B310–311 Kant refers to the fact that the concept of a noumenon is merely a limiting concept (*Grenzbegriff*), intended to curb the pretensions of sensibility; it is bound up with the limitation of sensibility. This undifferenti-

⁴⁸KrV, Avii. Cf. also KrV, B296: “so scheint es uns doch nicht genug, sich bloß dasjenige vortragen zu lassen, was wahr ist, sondern, was man zu wissen begehrt.”

ated use of the term “noumenon”⁴⁹ is pointing out the exact position and function of the noumenon. This noumenon is marking the point of contact between sensibility and understanding, in an effort to restrain the application of either faculty within its proper limits. The examples of Leibniz and Locke at KrV, B327 show what happens when either understanding or sensibility is not restrained. On Kant’s part there is no hidden agenda in this respect. He has no secret intentions of pushing back the frontiers either of sensibility, or of understanding. The construction of the noumenon in the negative sense enables understanding to determine the limits of its own employment (KrV, B297) and without it, this employment would have to remain restricted to an empirical employment only. In this case understanding could never be assured of its claims and possessions and sooner or later it would become prey to mistakes and illusions (KrV, B297).

Kant considers this noumenon once again in the final part of the “Note ...”, sc. KrV, B336–346, which is identical to the text in KrV, A280–289.⁵⁰ Towards the end, immediately preceding the “Table of nothing”, the significant points are mentioned again, but some further qualifications are added. We cannot extend the sphere of our objects of thought beyond the conditions of sensibility, and therefore noumena are no objects, but rather *problematic* concepts of objects. What is also problematic is the understanding for which, and the intuition by means of which such a noumenon can be objective. Because objects beyond the field of sensibility cannot be given to our understanding, the latter faculty may be allowed to extend further than the field of sensibility and possible experience, but only in a problematic way (KrV, B310). Thus, the concept of a noumenon is a task (*Aufgabe*)⁵¹ unavoidably bound up with the limitation of sensibility.

Kant explains in greater detail what he means by “problematic concept”. A problematic concept like “noumenon” is

⁴⁹Differentiation did not occur until the B-addition (B307), whereas the undifferentiated use was already present in KrV, A255 (=B310–311).

⁵⁰This part of KrV, B was not altered, although the precise distinction between the positive and negative sense of the noumenon (KrV, B307), which is a revision of the ambiguous A-text (KrV, A252), would have been sufficient reason to be more precise with respect to noumena in a purely negative sense (KrV, B342=A286). As objects of non-sensible intuition they would rather have to be identified, according B307, as noumena in the positive sense, cf. Marcus Willaschek, ‘Phaenomena/Noumena und die Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe’, in: G. Mohr and M. Willaschek, editors, *Immanuel Kant. Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998, (Klassiker Auslegen, Band 17/18), 325–351, 336–337. The purpose of this negative noumenon (in the sense of the object of non-sensible intuition (KrV, B342), however, is in line with the preceding B-revision.

⁵¹KrV, B344. Further on in KrV this is described in terms of “transcendental idea” and “concept of reason”.

die Vorstellung eines Dinges, von dem wir weder sagen können,
daß es möglich, noch daß es unmöglich sei⁵²

This characteristic was mentioned earlier in the first edition of KrV when the noumenon was described as an empty thought that nonetheless does not contain a contradiction (KrV, A252–253). One could easily be tempted to draw all kinds of conclusions from this absence of contradiction; something is possible as long as there is no contradiction involved. Kant had rejected exactly this approach in the *Dissertation*.⁵³ The Transcendental Analytic has provided sufficient arguments for him to maintain that contradiction is relevant in case of analytic judgements but as far as synthetic judgements are concerned objective reality is warranted only in case of phaenomena, not in the case of noumena.

The noumenon in this negative sense, together with the references to fundamental forces and the lack of contradiction which have become commonplace in this respect, is mentioned once again in the final pages of the Transcendental Analytic, sc. the “Table of nothing”. More precisely, Kant mentions both the noumenon in the negative sense (which is not impossible), as well as the noumenon in the positive sense (which is not possible) as examples of “nothing”, an empty concept without object (KrV, B348). The concept is empty, because it is lacking a corresponding intuition, and consequently it is lacking objective reality: in terms of knowledge it is nothing. It cannot be reckoned among possibilities, although it must not be declared impossible either. For the latter reason it may still be an *ens rationis*, which is the phrase Kant added to this description of the noumenon (KrV, B347–348).⁵⁴

The limiting function of this noumenon, as well as the fact that it is nothing in a certain respect explains why the table of nothing concludes this part of the Analytic. The specification of the different senses of “nothing”

⁵²KrV, B343. The fact that something is not impossible, leaves room to think about certain things in a practical perspective. In this context “noumenon” (KrV, B569) and “problem” (KrV, B830) are mentioned in relation to transcendental freedom. It is no coincidence that these expressions turn up again in KpV, A4 (“nur problematisch, als nicht unmöglich”), cf. also KpV, A55, 95).

⁵³We discussed this in §5.2 (p. 71) and §6.2 (p.88) above.

⁵⁴Interestingly, not every such noumenon is to be counted among the *entia rationis* either. New fundamental forces, for example, may be invented without any contradiction, but if they are not supported by any example of experience they are not to be counted as possible. Note that Kant’s argument about fundamental forces, contradiction and experience is the same as the one he presented in §28 of the *Dissertation* (cf. p. 71 above). At KrV, B302 the confounding of the logical possibility of a concept with the transcendental possibility of a thing is explained in terms of a *vitium subreptionis* (“unterschieben”) reminding us of the *Dissertation* as well.

has a limiting function.⁵⁵ This overview of “nothing” is a result of Kant’s introductory remark. According to Kant, the division between what is possible and what is not possible, which is the customary beginning of transcendental philosophy, presupposes a concept to be divided: the concept of an object in general (taken problematically), undecided whether it is something or nothing (KrV, B343, 347). While possibility and impossibility are categories, Kant has focussed his attention on the object in general. In the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic it has been decided in what sense the object in general can be said to represent something. In the table of nothing Kant shows in what sense the object can be said to be nothing. It shows which cases of synthesis between concept and intuition fail if there is not something objective involved. Every failure amounts to nothing. A noumenon in the negative sense seems to be the only kind of nothing that makes sense. It cannot be reckoned among the possibilities (of experience), but it cannot be reckoned among the impossibilities either. It belongs to a different order, and therefore, as an object of reason, it may prove to be useful in the remainder of KrV. A noumenon in this sense offers an escape from the limitations imposed on sensibility and understanding which may be relevant in view of the practical employment of reason.

6.7 Nothing is left

Real repugnance may have prompted Kant’s critical investigations into the relations between things, as well as relations between concept and object, the issue itself almost disappeared from the critical stage. In KrV it is hardly mentioned and it seems to play a minor role only. In the preceding sections I have been trying to show that real repugnance has not disappeared completely and that it is not insignificant in some specific respects. Furthermore, the pattern of real opposition remains present, after the initial problems of real opposition have been resolved. The pattern of real opposition is also present in the concept of a noumenon in the negative sense, as we shall see in the present section.

Not only was the conception of the negative noumenon developed in close connection to occurrences of real repugnance, the conceptual structure of this notion also resembles its pattern. In what sense exactly is the noumenon

⁵⁵Cf. Rebecca Paimann, ‘Kants Tafel des Nichts in ihrer Bedeutung für die *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*’, in: Volker Gerhardt, editor, *Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationaler Kant-Kongresses*, Volume 2, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001, 791–800.

in the negative sense structured after the pattern of real opposition? How does it show the characteristics of real repugnancy?

Firstly, the fact that it is called “negative” does not indicate a lack⁵⁶ of something. It rather indicates that “noumenon” has a meaning that is determined negatively, sc. in opposition to the meaning of “phaenomena” on the one hand and the meaning of “positive noumena” on the other. This negative determination, does not imply that it is lacking reality in some sense, like the *nihil privativum* in the “Table of nothing”.

Secondly, the negative noumenon, like real opposition, represents an opposition that is categorically different from contradiction. Several times Kant makes explicit reference to the fact that contradiction is absent in case of the negative noumenon. It represents an alternative to contradictories which is neither possible, nor impossible (KrV, B343, 347). Therefore, it is also different from the *nihil negativum*.

Thirdly, the real repugnant nature of the noumenon in the negative sense is most clearly displayed in its function as a limiting concept. As a limiting concept it serves to confirm and secure the position of sensibility on the one hand, and to indicate the problematic extension of the employment of understanding on the other. Understanding is thus provided with “negative Erweiterung” (KrV, B312) which is also explained in terms of real opposition and negative magnitudes: understanding is limitative with respect to sensibility, and negative extension (of understanding) equals limitation. Hence the noumenon indicates nothing; it is neither something objectively real that can be given in possible experience, nor something that can be represented in intellectual intuition. It is nothing to the extent that it is the balanced result of opposite activities.

This noumenon represents the point where sensibility and understanding meet. It represents the union of opposites, and since it is limiting with respect to both faculties it must be from a completely different order than either of these.⁵⁷ The noumenon, as a limiting concept, is an expression of the mutual interconnection, the union between sensibility and understanding so as to contain the proper functioning of either faculty within its limits, but qua concept it doesn’t belong to either faculty. It belongs to the vocabulary of critical reason and transcendental philosophy. From the point of view of knowledge this noumenon amounts to nothing, an empty concept without

⁵⁶ Although the description “nicht Objekt unserer sinnlichen Anschauung” (KrV, B307) may seem to be pointing in this direction.

⁵⁷ If this noumenon would belong to the field of sensibility it would be prone to Kant’s own critique of Locke; if the noumenon would belong to the field of understanding it would be the noumenon in the positive meaning.

object. The most we can say is that it leaves us with a problem which remains unresolved, and which offers the opportunity for practical reason to be employed in accordance with its proper destination: making things real.

This noumenon represents yet another point of unity between sensibility and understanding in addition to the ones already mentioned in §6.4: the original synthetic unity of apperception, critique as the balanced equilibrium of speculative and practical reason. There seems to be a characteristic procedure that Kant is following. Problems that are caused by distinctions made are solved by showing that there is a higher unity from which the distinction is dependent. This higher unity shares the characteristics of real opposition. It unites what has been opposed.

Once the original problems in relation to real opposition have been solved, the pattern of real opposition has not disappeared but turns up again, in the concept of a negative noumenon. This reappearance, however, takes place at another level, the meta-level of critical knowledge. Hence, the solution of the issues related to real repugnance at object level of knowledge can only be reached at the cost of the reappearance of (the structural pattern of) real opposition at the meta-level of critical knowledge. If this would summarize the results achieved thus far, it does not seem to be very much. In fact, it is nothing. From the point of view of knowledge and speculative reason there is nothing beyond the sphere of sensibility and the empirical employment of understanding. As far as knowledge is concerned, there is nothing beyond the analytic of truth. However, from the opposite point of view, i.e. from the point of view of practical reason, all that has been achieved in the analytic of truth amounts to nothing, because it does not help determine our practical employment of reason. All that is left at this stage is nothing.

Chapter 7

The Legal Metaphor

7.1 *Plus ultra*

In the preceding chapter we have argued that real repugnance as it was presented in *Negative Größen* had become part of a more encompassing problem, sc. the question of the possibility of the synthetic a priori. Kant's critical answer to this question also implied the resolution of the issues that had been related to real opposition back in 1763. It turned out that particular parts of Kant's solution of the synthetic a priori were constructed according to the *pattern* of real opposition; original synthetic unity, the interrelation between speculative and practical reason, and the negative noumenon. Explicit occurrence and even the reappearance of real opposition towards the end of the Transcendental Analytic served to emphasise the results of Kant's critical approach, so as to mark the difference with rationalistic and empiristic alternatives. With reference to the conclusion in chapter 5 we can see that also in KrV real opposition offers a pattern for dealing with methodological questions; certain critical, conceptual constructions of methodological importance follow this pattern.

If real opposition offers a framework for the construction of critical philosophy, we may well wonder whether real opposition has any methodological significance after the Transcendental Analytic. What, if anything, could be the contribution of real opposition once critical reason leaves the firm ground of the island of truth to embark on a journey upon an ocean that offers no shelter and security, but only illusions and endless adventures?¹ This is

¹KrV, B294; cf. also the reference to the Pillars of Hercules and the ocean at KrV, A395–396. Hume is the source of this allusion to seamanship, cf. Willi Goetschel, *Constituting Critique. Kant's Writing as Critical Praxis*, Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1994, (translation of: Goetschel, Willi, *Kant als Schriftsteller*, Wien: Passagen Verlag 1990), 133–136 (Goetschel is referring to K. Wright in this regard).

the obvious question if we follow our line of thought in accordance with the lay-out and contents of KrV. There is, however, a more compelling reason to pursue our argument in this direction. While leaving the firm ground of truth, while entering the Transcendental Dialectic we also seem to be losing an indispensable fixed point of reference: possible experience.² In the absence of a reliable touchstone it seems uncertain how critical reason must proceed. Kant's strategy to deal with this omission is to develop a self-conception of reason. Since there is no (external) point of reference, which leaves critical reason incomparable to anything else, reason is only concerned with itself and this characteristic of self-reference can only be expressed by making comparisons. For this reason Kant employs figures of speech throughout KrV. Figurative speech appears to be the proper means to describe the undertakings of critical reason, which is lacking reference to anything else than itself. By means of figurative speech reason can be compared to something else (albeit fictitiously, or merely on account of a superficial resemblance) thereby counterbalancing the risk that self-reference makes the conception of reason viciously circular or empty. In this context real opposition, or rather a construction of real opposites, occupies a prominent position. The question at the beginning of this paragraph, "What, if anything . . . ?", is rhetorical. At the methodological level of critical reason the pattern of real opposition offers a useful guideline to describe the efforts and achievements of critique. As was pointed out in the previous chapter some central, critical notions showed the characteristics of real opposition, but in the following two chapters we will examine to what extent the pattern is present in Kant's figurative speech, notably in its most significant representative: the legal metaphor.

7.2 The legal metaphor

Right at the beginning of the first introduction to KrV Kant describes the institution which judges all claims and pretensions of reason as a tribunal (*Gerichtshof*).³ Although Kant acknowledges that examples and illustrations like this are needed for an intuitively clear presentation of the contents of KrV he presents the text of his major philosophical work in a "dry, purely scholastic fashion" in order not to enlarge it beyond the extensive proportions it had already reached.⁴ Nevertheless, many illustrations or metaphors, the

²Significantly, towards the end of the Transcendental Analytic the two conceptions of "object" had to account for the facticity of real opposition.

³Cf. KrV, Axi. *Gerichtshof* also occurs at B529, 697, 768, 779, 815.

⁴Cf. KrV Axvii–xviii. Cf. also B293 where Kant explains why examples are omitted: "um Weitläufigkeit zu vermeiden".

proper means to bring about this intuitive clearness, are present throughout KrV. There is also a great variety in Kant's use of metaphor. For example, one could refer to predominant metaphors drawn from: politics (KrV, A1x, Bxxv, B372), military science and warfare (KrV, B450–451, B779–780, B783–784), seamanship (KrV, B294–295, A395–396), architecture (KrV, B735–736, B784, B862–863), flying (KrV, B9, B878). With reference to the studies of Eucken and Tarbet these metaphors can be characterized as illustrative⁵; they perform “nur die Rolle eines Begleiters”⁶, or an “important supporting role”.⁷ To some of these, however, a more substantial role may be attributed, because Kant continuously employs them to characterise his own philosophical method. Thus they become “treue Diener besonderer prinzipieller Überzeugungen und methodologischer Richtungen”.⁸ Tarbet deals with them as “metaphors of analogy” and the most telling are those taken from science (physics, chemistry, mathematics, astronomy).⁹

Special attention should be given to metaphorical use of legal discourse, which permeates the entire KrV to an extent that is unparalleled by any other metaphor. Following Tarbet I will use the term “legal metaphor” as the common denominator of all instances of legal discourse.¹⁰ In line with Ishikawa's studies the German term “das Gerichtshof-Modell” would be an appropriate notion. Several authors have underlined the importance of the legal metaphor. More than a century ago, in 1881, Vaihinger remarked: “Dieses bild *des Processes* liegt der *ganzen* Kritik zu Grunde”.¹¹ He continues by pointing to the most important aspects of this image in KrV: the tribunal, the lawbook, the parties involved, the object of dispute, witnesses, documents and proof, and the records of the lawsuit. Rudolph Eucken stated that Kant's far-reaching and radical application of the idea of right is characteristic of his theoretical enterprise and Eucken also acknowledged the importance of the

⁵David W. Tarbet, ‘The Fabric of Metaphor in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*’, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, VI (1968), 257–270, 257.

⁶Rudolph Eucken, ‘Über Bilder und Gleichnisse bei Kant’, in: *Beiträge zur Einführung in die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Leipzig: Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1906², (First published in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* 83, 161–193), 55–82, 57.

⁷Tarbet, ‘The Fabric of Metaphor ...’, 257.

⁸Eucken, ‘Über Bilder und Gleichnisse ...’, 57.

⁹Tarbet, ‘The Fabric of Metaphor ...’, 263; cf. Eucken, ‘Über Bilder und Gleichnisse ...’, 66–68.

¹⁰Tarbet, ‘The Fabric of Metaphor ...’, 265; cf. Eucken, ‘Über Bilder und Gleichnisse ...’, 73 and Saner, *Kants Weg vom Krieg ...*, 279.

¹¹Hans Vaihinger, *Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (erster Band)*, Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Spemann, 1881, 107. Cf. also Saner, *Kants Weg vom Krieg ...*, 239, 278–279.

legal metaphor in other writings of Kant.¹² As far as the metaphor itself is concerned Tarbet claimed that it is the “metaphor around which the entire work [sc. KrV] is constructed” and that “There is justice in calling the legal metaphor the main structural metaphor of the *Critique*”.¹³ More recently, Henrich has pointed to the methodological and argumentative structure of the legal metaphor: “The Critique is not just permeated by juridical metaphors and terminology. Its major doctrines are related to one another by means of the theory of legal disputes presented by Pütter and Achenwall.”¹⁴ In support of the claim that KrV is a political work O’Neill maintains that “a series of connected political and juridical metaphors constitute the deep structure of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.”¹⁵ In view of a survey of Kant’s philosophy of right Küsters underlines the plausibility of the juridical character of Kant’s concept of reason, but he does not seem to be able to appreciate its significance because he does not recognise the proper function of metaphor: “Es besteht die Gefahr einer vorschnellen *Analogisierung* und damit implizit einer Fehldeutung”.¹⁶ However, even greater problems arise if an evaluation of the metaphorical or analogical character is postponed.

Although there seems to be considerable agreement as to the extent and the methodological importance of the legal metaphor, a systematic account of the legal metaphor as a whole is still lacking. The main purpose of this chapter is to provide this account. Therefore we will focus on particular instances of legal discourse in KrV (notably, the question “*Quid iuris?*”, the *ius praetensum*, the antinomy, and the polemical employment of reason) against the background of relevant secondary sources. To complete this

¹²Eucken, ‘Über Bilder und Gleichnisse ...’, 77–78, cf. Eve W. Stoddard, ‘Reason on Trial. Legal Metaphors in the *Critique of Pure Reason*’, *Philosophy and Literature*, 12 (1988), 245–260, 245, 248

¹³Tarbet, ‘The Fabric of Metaphor ...’, 265, 270.

¹⁴Dieter Henrich, ‘Kant’s Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First *Critique*’, in: E. Förster, editor, *Kant’s Transcendental Deductions. The Three Critiques and the Opus Postumum*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989, 29–46. The legal metaphor in KrV has also come to the attention of philosophers from outside the field of strict Kant scholarship, cf. Jacques Derrida, *Du droit à la philosophie*, Paris: Galilée, 1990, 89–102; Jean-François Lyotard, *Het enthousiasme. Kants kritiek van de geschiedenis*, Kampen/Kapellen: Kok Agora/DNB/Pelckmans, 1991, (translation of: Lyotard, Jean-François, *L’enthousiasme: la critique kantienne de l’histoire*, Paris: Editions Galilée, 1986, I (34–46))

¹⁵Onora O’Neill, ‘Reason and politics in the Kantian enterprise’, in: *Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 (1989¹), 3–27, 4, cf. also 14–20.

¹⁶Gerd-Walter Küsters, *Kants Rechtsphilosophie*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988, (Erträge der Forschung, Band 256), 31.

account it is necessary to make additional remarks regarding certain aspects of the metaphor that have been neglected in the literature on KrV, so as to make possible a reconstruction of the metaphor in its entirety. This will be done in the sections on transcendental judgement, on the paralogisms, the proofs of God's existence and the Transcendental Doctrine of Method. The result will be a comprehensive overview of the legal metaphor throughout KrV. To substantiate the claim that this metaphor has a significant structural and methodological function within the critical project of KrV, the Kantian meaning and characteristics of "metaphor" will have to be determined in the next section.

7.3 Kant on analogy

In the previous section "metaphor" referred to illustrations and figurative speech in quite a general way. The present section presents a short overview of "metaphor" in the Kantian sense of the word. According to Nuyen "It seems reasonable to suggest that what Kant calls 'symbol' we call 'metaphor'."¹⁷ A symbol, according to Kant, is an intuition that is (indirectly) related to a concept (KU, B256). To be sure, this is only one of several possible relations between concept and intuition. Right at the beginning of the Transcendental Logic in KrV we find the well-known formula about the necessary relation between intuitions and concepts:

Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind. Daher ist es eben so notwendig, seine Begriffe sinnlich zu machen (d.i. ihnen den Gegenstand in der Anschauung beizufügen), als seine Anschauungen verständlich zu machen (d.i. sie unter Begriffe zu bringen).¹⁸

In fact, this statement implies that it should be possible to provide a corresponding intuition to every concept and vice versa. If not, the knowledge expressed in the concept (or intuition) lacks aesthetic, intuitive clarity (or logical, discursive clarity) and should not be regarded as knowledge at all.

The process of providing intuitions that correspond to given concepts, is what Kant calls proving or showing the reality of our concepts.¹⁹ There is a

¹⁷A. T. Nuyen, 'The Kantian Theory of Metaphor', *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 22 (1989), 95–109, 98.

¹⁸KrV, B75. Here Kant elaborates on the distinction between intuitive and discursive knowledge, cf. KrV, Axvii–xviii, B33, 74, 92–93, 376–377; KU, B256n.

¹⁹"Die Realität unserer Begriffe darzutun werden immer Anschauungen erfordert." (KU, B254). As to "proving" and "showing", cf. also KU, B240. In §6.4 this was discussed in terms of objective reality of concepts.

particular kind of intuition corresponding to every kind of concept. If the concepts are empirical, the intuitions are called *examples*.²⁰ In the case of pure concepts of understanding they are called *schemata* (see §7.5 below). In the case of a concept of reason, however, it is not possible to provide for the corresponding intuition, since by definition such a concept cannot be linked to something sensible. It is a concept “den nur die Vernunft denken, und dem keine sinnliche Anschauung angemessen sein kann”.²¹ In view of theoretical knowledge the reality of such a concept cannot be shown. However, one may symbolically link a concept of reason to an intuition, in which case the latter is called a symbol of that concept. Thus, a symbol shows the reality of a concept by means of an analogy.²²

Kant’s example of a symbol is the living body representing the monarchical state.²³ A living body symbolises a monarchical state not because there are similarities between both objects, but because there is an analogy between the way we reflect on the object of intuition (a living body) and the way we reflect on a monarchical state. More precisely, the rules guiding our reflection upon a living body are *analogous* to those guiding our reflection in case of a monarchical state which makes it possible to represent this state symbolically by a living body. To some extent philosophical language in general is symbolic. In this respect Kant points to notions such as “ground” and “substance” (KU, B257).

Apart from schema and symbol there is yet another relation between intuition and concept which might be regarded as the reverse of symbolisation. An aesthetic idea is a representation to which there is no adequate concept (KU, B193, 240). Nuyen²⁴ argues that the process of providing such a concept

²⁰Several elaborate studies deal with the meaning and significance of “example”, “symbol” and “schema” in Kant’s philosophy, cf. Ingeborg Heidemann, ‘Die Funktion des Beispiels in der kritischen Philosophie’, in: F. Kaulbach and J. Ritter, editors, *Kritik und Metaphysik*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co, 1966, 21–39; Günther Buck, ‘Kant’s Lehre vom Exempel’, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*, XI (1967), 148–183; and Onora O’Neill, ‘The power of example’, in: *Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 (1989¹), (previously published in *Philosophy* 61 (1986), 5–29), 165–186.

²¹KU, B255. Cf. also: “Vernunftidee . . . , welche . . . ein Begriff ist, dem keine Anschauung (Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft) adäquat sein kann.” (KU, B193) and: “Eine Vernunftidee kann nie Erkenntnis werden, weil sie einem Begriff (vom Übersinnlichen) enthält, dem niemals eine Anschauung angemessen gegeben werden kann.” (KU, B240). Cf. also KrV, B384–385.

²²And therefore, Kant states that “Alle Anschauungen, die man Begriffen a priori unterlegt, sind also entweder Schemate oder Symbole” (KU, B256).

²³KU, B257–258; cf. also Nuyen, ‘The Kantian Theory of Metaphor’, 96–98

²⁴Nuyen, ‘The Kantian Theory of Metaphor’, 100–105.

may be compared to symbolisation. The difference between symbolising an idea of reason and symbolising an aesthetic idea is that the former process is “objective”, and the latter is “subjective”.²⁵

In *Prolegomena* §58 knowledge involving symbols is referred to as knowledge by analogy (“Erkenntniß nach der Analogie”). This kind of knowledge enables us to transcend the limits of possible experience, without running the risk of getting caught up in a dialectical, illusory situation.²⁶ In KrV (B222) “analogy” is defined in a philosophical sense by comparing it to “analogy” in mathematics.²⁷ In mathematics analogy is the equality of two quantitative relations. It is constitutive in regard of the objects (magnitudes) involved. Thus, the analogy of relations $((3 : 4) = (6 : x))$ allows us to construct the fourth quantity ($x = 8$). In philosophy, however, analogy is the equality of two qualitative relations, which does not allow us to construct the missing member, but which only enables us to determine the relation in respect of a fourth member, which is not known and remains unknown. The analogy in this case is regulative; it serves as a rule of thinking²⁸, not as a constitutive principle. In *Prolegomena* (§58) Kant gives a definition of analogy: “eine vollkommene Ähnlichkeit zweier Verhältnisse zwischen ganz unähnlichen Dingen”. And he continues in a footnote that we may, for example, determine the relation between the unknown loving God (x) and the well-being of the human species (c), if, by analogy, we compare this relation to the relation between the happiness of children (a) and parental love (b). Thus, the analogy $(a : b) = (c : x)$ does not determine object x in any sense, but it expresses the analogy or complete similarity between both relations. In addition, Kant determines this relation with the help of the category of causality. Thus, analogy allows us to think of relations involving objects that cannot be objects of possible experience, such as God or the situation of mankind as a whole. On the basis of analogy and of the regulative application of “causality”²⁹ such objects are treated *as if* they were objects of possible

²⁵Nuyen, ‘The Kantian Theory of Metaphor’, 101. Cf. KU, B198, 242.

²⁶Knowledge by analogy, inference by analogy or analogous reasoning is also a major characteristic of legal reasoning, especially in the case of the precept to treat similar cases similarly. By means of judgement (see §7.5 and 7.6 below) a judge has to determine whether cases are similar or not, i.e. whether there is an analogy between different cases.

²⁷In fact “analogy” has its origins in mathematics. For this and general information about analogy cf. Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, ‘Analogie’, in: Gert Ueding, editor, *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, Volume Band I, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1992, column 498–514.

²⁸KrV, B222–223 Cf. KU, B448n.

²⁹The reference to “causality” occurs also in the example of the despotic state and the hand mill: “Denn, zwischen einem despotischen Staate und einer Handmühle ist zwar keine

experience.

Apparently, a critique of pure reason is in need of symbols or metaphors since “pure reason” and “critique” are abstract notions lacking intuitive clarity. This lack of clarity would seriously hamper or even prevent any sensible discussion on the subject. The great variety and abundance of metaphors in KrV express Kant’s awareness of the necessity to supply for this clarity. If we take “metaphor”, like Nuyen, in the sense of “symbol”, then the pithy statement that the critique of pure reason is the true tribunal³⁰ is an expression of the fact that the critique can be symbolised by the image of the tribunal. This general function, symbolising the critique of reason, would account for the pervasive presence and predominance of the legal metaphor throughout KrV. In its entirety it is indispensable to characterise and carry out the project of a critique of reason. As a symbol it serves to generate knowledge (about pure reason) by analogy. The analogy, in this case, consists of the similarity between the way we think about a tribunal and its proceedings, on the one hand, and the way we think about reason and its critique, on the other hand. Because of this similarity we are entitled to determine what we do not know (legitimate claims of knowledge), on the basis of what we actually do know (legitimate actions in front of a tribunal). The various constituent parts of the analogy, the systematic relations between these parts and the extent to which the analogy applies will be examined and determined in the following sections.

7.4 The questions *Quid facti?* and *Quid iuris?*

Apart from occasionally used terms like “Anspruch”, “Besitz”, “Anmaßung”, which apparently stem from a juridical context, the first systematic account of a legal metaphor is to be found right at the beginning of the chapter on the deduction of the pure concepts of understanding. Strangely enough Stoddard does not even mention the well-known distinction between *quid facti* and *quid iuris*, although she claims that “legal language plays a major role in

Ähnlichkeit, wohl aber zwischen der Regel, über beide und *ihre Kausalität* zu reflektieren.” (KU, B256; italics WvdK). Cf. also KU, B448n. Kant also describes and exemplifies knowledge by analogy in *Religion* (AA VI, 64n.); and in: *Preisschrift über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik*, AA XX, 279–280.

³⁰KrV, B779. Cf. KrV, Axi, B529, 697, 768, 815. Cf. G. Bien on the more general points of agreement between philosophy and a juridical procedure (Günther Bien, ‘Das Geschäft der Philosophie, am Modell des juristischen Prozesses erläutert’, in: Landgrebe L., editor, *9. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie Düsseldorf 1969. Philosophie und Wissenschaft*, Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1972, 55–77).

this section”.³¹ The beginning of this section, introducing the *quaestiones facti et iuris*, runs as follows:

Die Rechtslehrer, wenn sie von Befugnissen und Anmaßungen reden, unterscheiden in einem Rechtshandel die Frage über das, was Rechtens ist (*quid iuris*), von der, die die Tatsache angeht (*quid facti*), und indem sie von beiden Beweis fordern, so nennen sie den ersteren, der die Befugnis, oder auch den Rechtsanspruch dartun soll, die Deduktion. (KrV, B116).

It is important to see that answers to both questions require some kind of proof (“indem sie von beiden Beweis fordern”) legitimizing a certain competence to use (philosophical) concepts. The problem Kant faces here, is the case in which there is no legal title to be found in experience, since the concepts in question are “marked out for pure a priori employment, in complete independence of all experience; and their right to be so employed always demands a deduction.” (KrV, B117). In line with Kant’s project of transcendental philosophy the *quaestio iuris* regarding pure concepts may be paraphrased as the search not just for any legitimization, but for the ground for legitimization “überhaupt”. The search carried out in the transcendental deduction results in this very concise dictum about the “I think”:

Das: *Ich denke*, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können.
(KrV, B131)

The representation “I think” itself is an act of spontaneity and is also called “pure apperception”, “original apperception” or “transcendental unity of self-consciousness” (KrV, B132, cf. §6.4 above).

Kaulbach suggested a specific reading of this “I think” in relation to the juridical physiognomy of theoretical reason.³² Instances of juridical discourse, like this one, do not have just a “metaphorical function”. Kaulbach assumes: “daß sich in ihnen vielmehr die Figuren gedanklichen Handelns darstellen, die den transzendental-philosophischen Ansatz von seinem Ursprung her

³¹Stoddard, ‘Reason on Trial . . .’, 254. Cf. also David Roland Doublet, *Die Vernunft als Rechtsinstanz. Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft als Reflexionsprozeß der Vernunft*, Oslo/Paderborn: Solum Forlag/Schöningh, 1989, (dissertation Bergen), 65. He recognizes the importance of juridical discourse in this respect. He assigns judicial authority to reason, but the purpose of his examination of KrV is rather to determine the viewpoint and process of reflection, which constitutes this authority, than to pay systematic attention to (the relation between) the legal metaphor and critique.

³²Friedrich Kaulbach, ‘Das transzendental-juridische Grundverhältnis im Vernunftbegriff Kants und der Bezug zwischen Recht und Gesellschaft’, in: F. Kaulbach and W. Krawietz, editors, *Recht und Gesellschaft*, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1978, 263–286.

eigentümlich sind.” Both theoretical and practical reason share a “common root” which may serve as the reason why examples from the field of practical reason (i.e. the legal metaphor) perform a function at the level of theoretical reason. This “common root” is described as:

die transzendentaljuridische Konstellation zwischen der Person als dem Herrn der Sache und dieser als dem Träger von Brauchbarkeit und Verfügbarkeit sowie zwischen den in ihrer Herrschaft über die Sachen einander anerkennenden Personen³³

By “transzendental(juridisch)” Kaulbach means “daß die Konstellation erstens die Bedingung der *Möglichkeit* für das Recht der Person auf gebrauch der Sache darstellt und daß sie zweitens eine auch in der theoretischen Vernunft eigentümliche Selbstgesetzgebung des Denkens—hier des praktischen Denkens—einschließt”.³⁴ On the one hand Kaulbach describes the implications of this root for Kant’s philosophy of right, but he also draws conclusions regarding theoretical reason:

Das in die theoretische Vernunft eingehende transzendentaljuridische Grundverhältnis erweist meine Stellung als die der Freiheit gegenüber der Gegenständlichkeit der Gegenstände. Erkennbarkeit ist eine Art von theoretischer Verfügbarkeit über die Gegenstände. ‘Ich denke’ setzt nur die Sache in ein transzendentales Verhältnis, damit die Ausübung der Erkenntnishandlungen an ihr möglich wird.³⁵

He also maintains that “I want” in practical philosophy equals “I think” in theoretical philosophy.³⁶ In addition he states that “I think” also represents some kind of decision, by means of which I declare representations of the object (*Gegenstand*) to be mine.

In the sense of Kaulbach’s analysis “I think” is the decision which makes possible the theoretical availability of objects, which is based on the transcendental-juridical root and which justifies the applicability of the categories that constitute knowledge of objects.³⁷

³³Kaulbach, ‘Das transzendental-juridische Grundverhältnis . . .’, 268 (cf. also 277). Other phrases characterising this root are: “eine gemeinsame und identische Wurzel von Erkenntnisvernunft und Rechtsvernunft” (265); “Konstellation” (269); “Grundverhältnis” (277); and “transzendentaljuridische Wurzel” (278).

³⁴Kaulbach, ‘Das transzendental-juridische Grundverhältnis . . .’, 268.

³⁵Kaulbach, ‘Das transzendental-juridische Grundverhältnis . . .’, 279.

³⁶Kaulbach, ‘Das transzendental-juridische Grundverhältnis . . .’, 278, cf. also 280.

³⁷Kaulbach, ‘Das transzendental-juridische Grundverhältnis . . .’, 279–280.

Kaulbach's reconstruction of the function of "I think" seems to be confirmed in a more recent article by Henrich on Kant's notion of a deduction.³⁸ In this article Henrich points to the historical background that enables us to determine the function of the deduction in KrV. Deductions or the use of deduction writings (*Deduktionsschriften*) were common juridical practice in The Holy Roman Empire between the fourteenth and nineteenth century. They served to justify claims which were the object of legal controversies. Apart from these deduction writings there were also methodological studies on the best way to write a deduction. Henrich compares Kant's composition of the transcendental deduction to the genre of the *Deduktionsschriften*.³⁹

Theorists of natural law (Wolff, Pütter, Achenwall) distinguished innate (absolute) rights from acquired (hypothetical) rights which originate in a fact or action, and they maintained that only in the case of the latter a deduction could be provided. This deduction justifies the claim to the possession or usage of something by tracing it back to its origin. Thus, the argumentative structure of a deduction would have to relate a claim to an original fact, so as to make clear the legitimacy of the claim (cf. KrV, B285–286).

Henrich⁴⁰ links this methodological notion and the argumentative structure to the epistemological notion of the origin of knowledge in KrV. The deduction of the pure concepts of understanding is intended to discover an origin which would account for the legitimacy of their usage. This factual origin is the "I think": "the unity of apperception is the origin of the system of the categories and the point of departure for the deduction of the legitimacy of their usage."⁴¹

Although the "I think" is a fact⁴², it is not to be confused with the fact of an empirical deduction and the *quaestio facti*. An original fact grounds legitimacy,⁴³ whereas an approach in accordance with the *Quid facti?* merely

³⁸Henrich, 'Kant's Notion of a Deduction ...'. In footnote 4 of this article (at p. 252) he makes a quite astonishing remark about an earlier article which initiated a debate on the transcendental deduction that is still going on: "When I wrote the paper [sc. "The Proof Structure of the Transcendental Deduction" of 1969], I had no idea what a deduction consists in".

³⁹Henrich, 'Kant's Notion of a Deduction ...', 33–34.

⁴⁰Henrich, 'Kant's Notion of a Deduction ...', 35–37, 39–40.

⁴¹Henrich, 'Kant's Notion of a Deduction ...', 45.

⁴²"Fact" in the sense of "action" (Henrich, 'Kant's Notion of a Deduction ...', 35), cf. "ein Actus seiner Selbsttätigkeit [...] Man wird hier leicht gewahr, daß diese Handlung ursprünglich einig, [...] sein müsse" (KrV, B130).

⁴³Henrich refers to "original acquisition" (cf. MS in: AA VI, 258–260 regarding the distinction *facto*, *pacto*, *lege*). Ishikawa also argues that the question *Quid facti?*, against this background of natural law, is relevant in view of the transcendental deduction. Cf. Ishikawa, 'Zum Gerichtshof-Modell der Kategorien-Deduktion'.

yields a physiology of understanding.⁴⁴ There is yet another sense of the unity of apperception which makes it possible to link the methodological notion of a deduction to Kant's other philosophical deductions, especially the deduction of the concepts "space" and "time" and the deduction in the second *Critique*.⁴⁵ Because this "I think" in the second sense has the property of accompanying every case of reflection, it holds a central position in our system of knowledge, a position which may count as "original" with respect to the various fields which are subject to reflection. Henrich's analysis of "reflection" supports this claim of the general methodological role of a deduction.

Apart from Henrich's claim about the relevance of the historical theory of legal disputes for KrV, he also refers to the methodological importance of Kant's constant references to the juridical paradigm and to juridical procedures.

7.5 Transcendental judgement

To my knowledge there is no secondary literature on Kant's work explicitly dealing with the second book of the Transcendental Analytic (viz. The Transcendental Doctrine of Judgement, KrV, B169–349), in the context of the legal metaphor. However, if this metaphor is the main methodological paradigm and argumentative structure of KrV, the introduction and first chapter of this book (KrV, B171–187) seem to be crucial for a coherent reading of KrV in terms of the legal metaphor.

Kant describes the proper function of judgement in relation to the function of understanding:

Wenn der Verstand überhaupt als das Vermögen der Regeln erklärt wird, so ist Urteilstkraft das Vermögen unter Regeln zu subsumieren, d.i. zu unterscheiden, ob etwas unter einer gegebenen Regel (*casus datae legis*) stehe, oder nicht. (KrV, B171)

If we regard the concepts of understanding as "rules", transcendental judgement has to distinguish whether empirical intuitions stand under the categories or not. Adequate subsumption under the categories is also called the application of categories to appearances (KrV, B176–177) and the subsumption of an object under a concept (KrV, B176). Transcendental judgement itself stands under no rule, but it is a "particular talent which can be practised only" (KrV, B172). However, there are particular conditions making the

⁴⁴Henrich, 'Kant's Notion of a Deduction ...', 35–37.

⁴⁵Henrich, 'Kant's Notion of a Deduction ...', 30, 37, 45.

proper employment of judgement possible. These conditions are transcendental schemata, which serve as justifications for the application of categories. Thus, Kant secures the legitimate (cf. an expression like “befugt sein” at KrV, B188) use of transcendental judgement like he did in the case of the transcendental deduction.

The function of judgement corresponds to one of the most important activities of a judge, namely determining whether, and if so, to what extent a given case stands under a certain rule or law.⁴⁶ Both activities consist in the application of rules. Kant refers to juridical terminology “*casus datae legis*” (KrV, B171), and mentions the example of a judge.⁴⁷ In both cases this application of rules itself is not guided by rules, simply because there are no such rules. This lack of meta-rules, so to speak, is exactly what characterises judgement. Therefore, transcendental judgement cannot be taught; it can only be practised. The result of a correct application of judgement is what Kant calls an example, or concrete representation of something abstract. The great benefit of examples or exemplary applications is the fact that they sharpen the faculty of judgement (KrV, B173–174). Hence, the function of examples in case of the faculty of judgement is comparable to the function of jurisprudence in case of jurisdiction. Because there are no general rules to guide and determine the application of judgement, schemata, examples or jurisprudence serve as guidelines. They also serve the educational purpose to “train” the exercise of judgement: “Dieses ist auch der einige und große Nutzen der Beispiele: daß sie die Urteilstkraft schärfen”, and “So sind Beispiele der Gängelwagen der Urteilstkraft”.⁴⁸

Thus we can see that knowledge by analogy is in fact the result of the employment of judgement and it is at the same time the concrete example (the legal metaphor) of something abstract (pure reason) serving to instruct and train the faculty of judgement, a faculty which is indispensable in any exercise of the faculty of knowledge in general. If the legal metaphor is an appropriate image to represent the critique of pure reason, thereby compensating the lack of any other means to represent or express what this critique is about, it would be a token of Kant’s own “mature judgement”. The legal metaphor, if consistently developed in the rest of KrV as an instructive example for judgement, would also provide a framework to determine what rules

⁴⁶In fact, determining whether a case stands under a law or not is a preliminary, but necessary activity in order to decide whether a claim should be allowed or declared inadmissible.

⁴⁷“Richter” at KrV, B173. Other occurrences of “Richter” are: KrV, Axv, xxi, Bxiii, 27, 452, 558, 617, 767, 780, 817.

⁴⁸KrV, B173–174, cf. KrV, B789.

could possibly qualify as valid rules whenever the rules governing experience are no longer applicable, i.e. as soon as the field of possible experience is transcended.⁴⁹

7.6 An example of judgement: *ius praetensum* in R3357

The claim in the previous section about the important role of judgement can be supported by an article by Hans Kiefner in which he maintains that Kant's use of metaphors taken from civil law is not insignificant, because his knowledge of contemporary Prussian civil law ("Zivilrecht") and civil procedural law ("Zivilproceßrecht") was quite precise and sophisticated, and because he knew how to apply this knowledge in a philosophical context.⁵⁰ This claim is founded upon an extensive analysis of Reflexion 3357 (AA XVI, 797) which is compared to legal practices in Kant's time.⁵¹

For our present purpose two specific features of this *Reflexion* need our attention, for, according to Kant, the judge performs two distinct activities:

Der Richter soll 1. als inquirent analytisch verfahren [...] 2. als Richter muß er synthetisch verfahren" (R3357).

Both activities, however, require judgement in the sense of subsumption or comparison of the data involved. In this case these data are: the law or right that has been appealed to, and the facts relevant to this law. On this basis the judge can (synthetically) make a decision.

As to the first, analytic activity of the judge, Kiefner maintains that this is in fact an answer to a *quaestio facti*.⁵² In order to determine what is the

⁴⁹Of course, the relation between judgement, schema and example also points to the relevance of Kant's KU which deals with reflective judgement (as distinguished from determining judgement in KrV). We need to adopt the standpoint of reflection in order to figure out what rules apply when determining whether Kant adopted the appropriate metaphor. Lyotard (in: Lyotard, *Het enthousiasme ...*, I (34–46)) discusses this relevance by pointing to the analogy between critique and politics and by mentioning the tribunal and the judge.

⁵⁰Hans Kiefner, 'Ius Praetensum. Preußisches Zivil- und Zivilprozeßrecht, richterliche Methode und Naturrecht im Spiegel einer Reflexion Kants zur Logik', in: F. Kaulbach and W. Krawietz, editors, *Recht und Gesellschaft*, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1978, 287–318.

⁵¹Kiefner, 'Ius Praetensum ...', 289–290, 294–298, 304–305. On the basis of this analysis and comparison Kiefner offers a reconstruction of a legal case which at least resembles the one Kant is referring to in R3357. The details of Kiefner's reconstruction need not bother us here. He stresses that it has been "erfunden". Sie enthält aber in ihrem verfahrens- und materiellrechtlichen Grundgefüge, auf das allein es ankommt, nichts, was nicht auch Kants Reflexion, im Kontext des zeitgenössischen Zivil- und Zivilproceßrechts gelesen, enthält." (Kiefner, 'Ius Praetensum ...', 299).

⁵²Kiefner, 'Ius Praetensum ...', 300.

case (the relevant facts) it should be clear to the judge what is required to make up a relevant whole of facts *given* the law under consideration (*ius praetensum*). In other words, he has to determine what has to be presupposed in order to make up a case at all, given some law

Also muß er doch das *ius praetensum* vorher erwägen, um a priori zu bestimmen, was dazu erforderlich ist. [...] Dies muß vorher allgemein beym Richter ausgemacht seyn (R3357).⁵³

Thus, the judge has to determine which aspects of the law in general are relevant in the present case. These relevant aspects are called *momenta in iure*, constituting the juridical “fact” (“der rechtliche/gesetzliche Tatbestand”).⁵⁴ According to Kiefner this is the first application of judgement.⁵⁵

In view of these *momenta in iure* the parties involved have to supply factual evidence in support of their claims, and the judge has to examine to what extent these *momenta in facto* are relevant to the *momenta in iure*, in other words: with regard to all possible facts (*varia facti*) he has to determine which particular facts matter in the present case. Therefore, to every *momentum in iure* there has to be a corresponding *momentum in facto*. This requires subsumption of *momenta facti* under *momenta in iure* in view of all *varia facti*.⁵⁶ Thus the judge determines what is the case:

Unter den Tatbestand ist dann der konkrete *Sachverhalt* zu subsumieren, der sich aus den ‘momenta in facto’ zusammensetzt. Genauer: Für jedes momentum in iure muß sich ein ihm entsprechendes momentum in facto feststellen lassen.⁵⁷

Taken together the *momenta in facto* constitute an *idea facti*, a picture or representation of what is the case.⁵⁸

Thus far the method of inquiry has been analytic. Now that it is clear which law applies and what is the case, the judge proceeds to a synthetic activity: passing judgement, i.e. determining the concrete consequences of the application of the law (in general) to this specific case (*idea facti*), which again requires subsumption.⁵⁹ The proper function of judgement is thus

⁵³Still a prior consideration would have had to determine whether the case was admissible or not. Kant was aware of the need to do so in court (cf. R454), but does not deal with it here (Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum ...’, 301–302).

⁵⁴Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum ...’, 302, 313.

⁵⁵Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum ...’, 313.

⁵⁶Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum ...’, 302–303, 305–306.

⁵⁷Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum ...’, 302–303.

⁵⁸Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum ...’, 309, 313.

⁵⁹Kiefner, ‘Ius Praetensum ...’, 307–308, 314–317.

exemplified in the task of a judge as described in R3357 and as summarised by Kiefner as the mediation between what is empirical and what is right.⁶⁰

On the basis of his reconstruction and his analysis of R3357 Kiefner concludes that Kant knew very well what he was talking about when he referred to the judge and the lawsuit. In the course of interpreting Kant's use of juridical argumentation one has to take into account that one is not dealing with meaningless metaphors.⁶¹

7.7 Transcendental Dialectic—paralogisms

Two basic elements have been dealt with in the preceding examination of the legal metaphor in the Transcendental Analytic: 1) the transcendental deduction of the categories and 2) their application by means of transcendental judgement. As far as these elements justify claims of knowledge they can only do so if "knowledge" is understood in the sense of "possible experience". The categories are constitutive to experience. They are the rules that all rational endeavours have to comply with if claims of knowledge are to be valid. Notwithstanding this example of "philosophical legislation" (KrV, B867) or "constitution"⁶² reason has a natural disposition to break these laws and to extend knowledge beyond the limits of (possible) experience. This disposition is called "metaphysics" (KrV, Avii, B21). Especially claims regarding the objects of what is called the *metaphysica specialis*, the soul, the world, and the existence of God, will thus inevitably lead to dialectical illusions. The Transcendental Dialectic of KrV is aimed at discovering the illusory features of this kind of metaphysical knowledge.

While exposing the dialectic of pure reason Kant himself cannot fall back on the pretension of having better knowledge of the soul, the world and God's existence, for any claim about these objects is transcendent and its validity can never be determined. Kant's purpose, therefore, is to discredit the claims and arguments of rational psychology, cosmology and theology. To do so, he employs a specific argumentative strategy. The importance of the legal metaphor in the Transcendental Dialectic consists in the fact that it supplies typically juridical modes of argumentation which are used in the course of assessing the validity of the proofs supporting the claims

⁶⁰Kiefner, 'Ius Praetensum ...', 313–314.

⁶¹Kiefner, 'Ius Praetensum ...', 317: "dass es sich bei der Verwendung zivilprozessualer Vorstellungen in nicht rechtsphilosophischen Texten nur um wenig aussagekräftige Metaphern handelt, kann man danach nicht annehmen. Dies wird man bei der Interpretation aller Stellen, in denen Kant sich zivilprozessualer Argumentation bedient, beachten müssen."

⁶²Friedrich Stenzler, *Die Verfassung der Vernunft*, Berlin: Publica, 1984, ch. III–iii.

of the *metaphysica specialis*. In the present section we will examine Kant's evaluation of paralogisms. In the next two sections his argumentation in case of antinomy and proofs for God's existence will be addressed.

As to the paralogisms chapter one should carefully distinguish the KrV, A-version (A341–405) from the KrV, B-version (B399–432).⁶³ The A-version presents each paralogism and its critical evaluation according to the table of the categories (A 344–345 = B402–403, 406). The end of the chapter is quite an extensive “Consideration of Pure Psychology as a whole, in view of these Paralogisms” (A381–405). All four critical evaluations of the paralogisms maintain that the “I” as a thinking being cannot be dealt with in the same way as sensual objects and concepts are dealt with. Any such attempt will necessarily fail, since the conditions of possible experience are thereby transcended.⁶⁴ Apart from these material considerations Kant makes formal or methodological remarks in the “Consideration of Pure Psychology . . .”. Only “the sobriety of a critique, at once strict and just” will prevent reason from dogmatic illusions about thinking subjects (A 395). The methodological sense of critical objection is indicated in Kant's description of “critical objection” as something directed against the proof of a proposition:

Der kritische Einwurf, weil er den Satz in seinem Werte oder Unwerte unangetastet läßt, und nur den Beweis anficht, bedarf gar nicht, den Gegenstand besser zu kennen, oder sich einer besseren Kenntnis desselben anzumaßen; er zeigt nur, daß die Behauptung grundlos, nicht, daß sie unrichtig sei.⁶⁵

Kant's awareness of the methodological strength of critical objection seems to have been the most important reason for the substantial reduction of the paralogisms chapter in the B-edition.⁶⁶ For, if we assume Kant had written down the paralogisms chapter in the A-version before he started

⁶³Detailed discussion of this point is offered by Rolf-Peter Horstmann, ‘Kant's Paralogismen’, *Kant-Studien*, 84 (1993), 408–425. The beginning of the chapter (A341–348) remained unaltered in the second edition (B399–406). However, the remaining 58 pages of the A-version were cut back to 26 pages (B406–432).

⁶⁴However, a crucial reservation should be made here. One is allowed to claim the substantiality of the soul in the idea (as opposed to real substantiality) (KrV, A350–351) in view of practical employment (A365, B166n, B431–432). The same applies to the existence of God (KrV, B662).

⁶⁵KrV, A388. At A389 Kant goes on: “Der kritische [Einwurf] ist allein von der Art, daß, indem er bloß zeigt, man nehme zum Behuf seiner Behauptung etwas an, was nichtig und bloß eingebildet ist, die Theorie stürzt, dadurch, daß sie ihr die angemessene Grundlage entzieht, ohne sonst etwas über die Beschaffenheit des Gegenstandes ausmachen zu wollen.” Cf. “Beweisart” in KrV, Bxxxixn.

⁶⁶The method of critical objection resembles the strategy of “Verfahrenskritik” mentioned

writing the texts of the following chapters, which clearly elaborate on this conception of critique, critical objection and practical interest, his later work on the B-version of the paralogisms could benefit a great deal from the methodology of critique. This is exactly what seems to be the case, for not only did Kant restrict his material considerations to a brief summary (B406–413) and a refutation of Mendelssohn’s proof (B413–422), but he also phrased his methodological remarks in closer connection to the transcendental doctrine of method (§7.10). For example, he refers to rational psychology as a discipline, setting limits to speculative reason in view of the practical employment of reason (B421, B430–431; cf. B769) and he mentions the practical advantage of critique (B424–425). My claim in this respect would be that the B-version could be cut down to more than half the size, since the function of critical objections (in relation to practical employment) could be emphasized more easily, because it had been dealt with more extensively in subsequent parts of KrV (A). The considerations concerning the philosophical content of the paralogisms did not deserve the attention drawn to them in the A-version and so the argumentative strategy, which had already been prepared in the A-version, could be stressed at the expense of material qualifications. Emphasis on the mode of argumentation confirms an evaluation of Kant’s arguments in terms of the legal metaphor, for, as we shall see, the method of critical objection (as presented in the chapter on the discipline of pure reason) is typically juridical.

7.8 Transcendental Dialectic—antinomy

The chapter on the antinomy of pure reason presents a clear and crucial example of the legal metaphor: the image of a tribunal, or “das Gerichtshof-Modell” (Ishikawa). Its occurrence at this point in the KrV need not come as a surprise. Transcendental Analytic provided the basic (a priori) concepts and principles of the legislation of reason (B350), on which basis an assessment of the validity and legitimacy of the pretensions of reason is possible. Once legislation has taken place reason is able to employ a judiciary function. Both these perspectives on reason are present in the antinomy chapter, but attention shall be focused on the judiciary function. The presence of many references to juridical discourse point to an increasing significance of the legal metaphor: granting a fair hearing and doing justice (“Gehör und Gerechtigkeit”) to the arguments for the counterposition (KrV, B434);

by L. Gäbe in an unpublished dissertation (Marburg 1954). This strategy as well as the reference to Gäbe is mentioned in Horstmann, ‘Kant’s Paralogismen’, 410–411.

“Verlegenheit der Richter bei Rechtshändeln” (B452); legislation (B452); “Advokatenbeweis” (B458; cf. R3474); pretensions and legal claims (B490–491); contested rights (B493); the jury in a trial (B504); knowledge of right and wrong (B504–505); tribunal of reason (B529); rightly (“mit Recht”) (B529, 539); pretension of reason and the judge (B558).

A more specific indication for the image of the tribunal is the description of the antinomy itself: the conflict of (the laws of pure) reason.⁶⁷ This is also called “antithetic” (B433) and “the conflict of the doctrines of seemingly dogmatic knowledge (thesis cum antithesi) in which no one assertion can establish superiority over another.” (B448). Confronted with an antinomical situation there seem to be three options to overcome a deadlock: 1) dogmatic assertion (thesis), 2) sceptical denial (antithesis) and, eventually, refusal to take the antinomy seriously resulting in indifference with regard to its outcome, and 3) critical evaluation of both thesis and antithesis by means of the sceptical method.⁶⁸ The first two options mark the “death of sound philosophy” (KrV, B434) since they are not compatible with the purpose and need of reason, i.e. unity, and the application of the laws of reason. Kant propagates the third option of critical evaluation like he had already done in the paralogisms chapter. “The critical path alone” (B884) is “a path to certainty” (B449) that brings reason and its conflict to a conclusion.

In case of the antinomy this method of evaluation is described as the sceptical method, which is altogether very different from scepticism (B451, 514, 791–792, 797) and sceptical refusal mentioned above.

Diese Methode, einem Streite der Behauptungen zuzusehen, oder vielmehr ihn selbst zu veranlassen, [...] kann man die *skeptische Methode* nennen. Sie ist vom *Skeptizismus* gänzlich unterschieden [...] Denn die skeptische Methode geht auf Gewißheit, dadurch, daß sie, in einem solchen, auf beide Seiten redlichgemeinten und

⁶⁷KrV, B434–435. Stenzler (Stenzler, *Die Verfassung der Vernunft*, ch. III–v) deals with the antinomy as the lawsuit of reason. The dialectical illusion of the antinomy is inevitable and necessary since it originates in a natural inclination of reason to unify knowledge of understanding (experience). Antinomy arises because of the need to unify knowledge (by reason and by means of ideas) on the basis of the rules of understanding. However, this unity will be either too small for reason (due to the conditions of empirical knowledge) or too large for understanding (due to the conditions of rational knowledge), which is exactly the conflict in question.

⁶⁸KrV, B434, 451–452. These three options remind us of dogmatic, sceptical and critical objections at KrV, A388 and of the very beginning of KrV where Kant depicts the “prehistory” of reason: despotic dogmatism, anarchist and nomadic scepticism, and indifference (KrV, Avii–xi). The dogmatic approach in (speculative) philosophy is refuted (KrV, B740–766) just as is unsatisfactory sceptical indifference (KrV, B786–797).

mit Verstande geführten Streit, den Punkt des Mißverständnisses zu entdecken sucht, um, wie weise Gesetzgeber tun, aus der Verlegenheit der Richter bei Rechtshandeln für sich selbst Belehrung [...] zu ziehen. (KrV, B451–452)

It is clear that in Kant's own opinion antinomy and the sceptical method are linked to legal practice. According to Ishikawa⁶⁹ the sceptical method is defined in juridical terms, which led Kant to identify the antinomy with a conflict in court. Both the image of the tribunal and the sceptical method are characteristic of Kant's philosophy throughout its development.⁷⁰ However, sceptical method and critical evaluation should not be identified *tout court*. Such an identification would neglect specific features of either method. Sceptical method as a mode of investigation is applied within a judiciary context to figure out what laws apply and to what extent they apply or fail to apply. Critical examination and the subsequent formulation of critical judgement are carried out in view of *legislation* (of reason). The legal metaphor provides the comprehensive framework for these perspectives, both of which are present in the above quotation (sc. as legislator and judge).

Application of the sceptical method is possible only if there is a third position apart from the two alternatives offered in each antinomy (thesis or antithesis).⁷¹ In view of these alternatives there has to be an *impartial position* from which the sceptical method may be applied, and, secondly, there has to be a typical kind of judgement that is fit to express the results of the sceptical method from an impartial standpoint. This kind of judgement is called *infinite judgement* (see next chapter). Impartiality and infinite judgement refer to the legal practice in a court of justice.

The impartial viewpoint is necessary since the common procedure to construct proofs in support of either thesis or antithesis is not sufficient to come to a conclusive solution. Dogmatic assertions and sceptic denials leave the matter unsettled. The possibility of impartiality with respect to the antinomy is based on the legislation of reason as presented in the Transcendental Analytic which provides the point of reference to determine the validity of (dogmatic or sceptic) claims of (cosmological) knowledge.

This critical impartiality is determined in terms of the legal metaphor. It

⁶⁹Fumiyasu Ishikawa, *Kants Denken von einem Dritten. Das Gerichtshof-Modell und das unendliche Urteil in der Antinomienlehre*, Frankfurt am Main/Bern/New York/Paris: Lang, 1990, (Studien zur Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts, 2), 9–11.

⁷⁰Ishikawa, *Kants Denken* . . . , 16–26.

⁷¹That is why Ishikawa refers to “Kants Denken von einem Dritten”. Cf. also “ein Drittes” which was discussed in the context of synthesis in §6.4.

is the position of an “impartial umpire”.⁷² Kant also appeals to this kind of impartiality on the part of his readers and he calls them “judges”.⁷³ The juridical nature of this impartiality is emphasised when Kant makes a comparison between legislation in case of reason and political legislation which marks the transition from a state of nature to the *status civilis*. Kant explicitly mentions this comparison at KrV, B779–780:

Man kann die Kritik der reinen Vernunft als den wahren Gerichtshof für alle Streitigkeiten derselben ansehen [...] Ohne dieselbe ist die Vernunft gleichsam im Stande der Natur [...].

Antinomy offers an example of reason in its natural state. Kant also adopts the image of chivalrous fights (KrV, B450–451) and the image of (the history of) metaphysics as the battlefield of endless controversies (KrV, Avii–x). Critique and legislation put an end to ongoing struggles and controversies and it “secures to us the peace of a legal order”.⁷⁴ In the case of reason this state of rest is called “indifference”.

Reason is indifferent with respect to what is at stake in the antinomy so long as thesis and antithesis claim theoretical knowledge. Its purpose, however, is not to assign theoretical, objective validity, but to discover the source of dialectical illusion and to offer an assessment of the arguments employed in support of it. An impartial approach, however, seems impossible because reason is not indifferent by nature:

“Es ist nämlich umsonst, Gleichgültigkeit in Ansehung solcher Nachforschungen [sc. in metaphysics] erkünsteln zu wollen, deren Gegenstand der menschlichen Natur nicht gleichgültig sein kann.”
(KrV, Ax)

Also in the antinomy chapter Kant states that there is no excuse for avoiding the antinomy (e.g. by claiming sceptic ignorance); reason is inevitably forced to solve the problem (KrV, B505–506). Therefore, Kant presents “the interest of reason” immediately after his presentation of the antinomy. Reason has specific and quite demanding interests. There is, for example, a practical interest;⁷⁵ a speculative interest;⁷⁶ and an architectonic interest.⁷⁷ Reason has some interest on every side of the antinomical conflict, which seems to

⁷²KrV, B451, 503–504.

⁷³KrV, Axv, xxi; Bxl–xli, xliv.

⁷⁴KrV, B779.

⁷⁵KrV, B492, 496, 769, 772, 832.

⁷⁶KrV, B494, 496.

⁷⁷KrV, B502–503.

endanger a successful appeal to impartiality. In other words, the impartial approach by means of the sceptical method depends on the possibility to formulate a critical alternative to the dialectical illusion of the antinomy which is compatible with legislation as well as with the interest of reason. This brings us to the second point mentioned above; infinite judgement.

After the presentation of the antinomy, and the determination of the interest of reason, Kant stresses once more the necessity to come to a solution (KrV, B504–512) and he presents a sceptical summary of the cosmological questions (KrV, B513–518). Having done so, he is able to come to a critical conclusion with the help of the principles of transcendental idealism.⁷⁸ This critical conclusion, or rather “decision”,⁷⁹ settles the conflict of reason, just like a judicial sentence settles a legal dispute. This decision is reached after an analysis of the (first) antinomy in terms of an infinite judgement. The decision itself is also expressed in the form of an infinite judgement. Infinite judgement is already introduced at the beginning of Transcendental Logic (KrV, B95–98) and it is an affirmative judgement containing a negative predicate, as in Kant’s example “The soul is non-mortal.” Because of this negative predicate infinite judgement cannot be reduced to a simple affirmation, nor to a negation, since the latter would require a negative copula. Therefore, infinite judgement offers the possibility of expressing something that differs from simple affirmation or negation. This characteristic makes it possible to formulate an alternative to the thesis (affirmation) and the antithesis (negation) in the antinomy. It is an alternative that reflects impartiality, as well as a certain indifference regarding the antinomy. The nature of this alternative bears the characteristic mark of real repugnancy (according to the first rule of real opposition in *Negative Größen*); there are two positive grounds (claims of knowledge put forward as thesis and antithesis), the effects of which are reciprocally cancelled and as a result the solution to the antinomy does not represent knowledge, but rather meta-level knowledge.⁸⁰ In the next chapter this relation between infinite judgement and real repugnance will be discussed in greater detail.

The contribution of infinite judgement to the solution of the antinomy is twofold. Firstly, Kant employs an infinite reading of the predicate “endlich”

⁷⁸More particularly: the distinction between appearance and thing in itself (KrV, B518–525); cf. Ishikawa, *Kants Denken . . .*, 101–110.

⁷⁹Kemp Smith translated “Entscheidung” (KrV, B525) into “solution”, whereas “decision” is more appropriate since it reflects the legal connotation of “Entscheidung” (cf. also “Sentenz” in KrV, B780).

⁸⁰Ishikawa also offers this interpretation of the solution in terms of real repugnance, though he puts emphasis on the transcendental aspect, cf. Ishikawa, *Kants Denken . . .*, 104–110.

(“finite”), namely “nichtunendlich” (“non-infinite”) (KrV, B532). Due to this reading Kant is able to discover the source of dialectical illusion in the first antinomy and to unmask it as a dialectical opposition.⁸¹ Secondly, the sentence expressing the critical decision about this dialectical opposition also takes the form of an infinite judgement, since it declares both statements in the (first antinomical) opposition to be untrue.⁸² Ishikawa regards this function of infinite judgement as the most significant example of the presence and importance of the image of the tribunal:

In diesem Sinne kann man zu Recht sagen, daß es das unendliche Urteil ist, das die Tiefenschicht des ganzen Prozesses der Vernunftkritik, insbesondere die der Antinomienlehre, beherrscht. Jene “höhere und richterliche Vernunft” kann deswegen mit Recht als der Träger des unendlichen Urteils, ja sogar als dieses Urteilsmoment selbst, charakterisiert werden in dem Sinne, daß sie bei der Präsentation und der Prüfung der Antinomie sich auf den dritten Standort setzt und am Ende ein drittes Urteil fällt. (Ishikawa, *Kants Denken . . .*, 82)

In addition to this analysis of the first antinomy, which is primarily based on Ishikawa’s study, one could add yet another consideration regarding infinite judgement in the context of the legal metaphor. In fact, infinite judgement creates the possibility of making assertions which are neither purely affirmative, nor negative. Against the background of the Transcendental Analytic one could say that neither the legitimacy (validity), nor the illegitimacy of an infinite judgement can be proven, which makes this kind of judgement *not-invalid* (understood in an infinite sense). In a juridical context it is not uncommon to refer to actions or statements in terms of non-invalidity, or non-illegitimacy. Such references, however, do not imply any validity, or legitimacy. As we shall see in §7.10, §8.5 and §8.7 below, Kant will use this feature of infinite judgement in his argumentative strategy for practical purposes. In doing so he will make explicit reference to the legal metaphor.

7.9 Transcendental Dialectic—proofs of the existence of God

There are no explicit references to the legal metaphor in commentaries and interpretations of the third chapter of the Transcendental Dialectic, “The

⁸¹Ishikawa, *Kants Denken . . .*, 89–100.

⁸²KrV, B532, 559; cf. Ishikawa, *Kants Denken . . .*, 96–98, 117–118. In the case of dynamic antinomy both statements may be true (KrV, B560, 590).

Ideal of Pure Reason”.⁸³ However, the terminology of the legal metaphor turns up again at the beginning and towards the end of this chapter and also in the appendix to the entire Transcendental Dialectic.⁸⁴

As to the ontological, cosmological and physico-theological proofs of the existence of God (KrV, B619), Kant concludes that any such proof is *impossible*, since speculative reason is not fit to claim and justify knowledge about the existence of things transcending the possibility of experience. His arguments are in line with the preceding cases of dialectical illusions.

The reason why juridical terminology turns up again at the end of this chapter and at the end of the Transcendental Dialectic as a whole, is that it supplies the appropriate terms to sum up the main result of the Transcendental Dialectic. The legal metaphor provides the framework for a more general conclusion. Although knowledge of a highest being and proofs of its existence are not possible, transcendental theology may be employed *negatively*, i.e. to prevent speculative reason from transcending experience, while at the same time it is clear that there is no proof to the contrary (the non-existence of God) either. This negative employment is called the permanent censorship of our reason. In the concluding part of the Dialectic, this lack of proof to the contrary causes Kant to speak of the regulative use of ideas, as opposed to the constitutive use. The very last paragraph of this part of KrV provides a short summary of the results thus far. The investigation of the dialectical illusion is called a “laborious interrogation of all dialectical witnesses” and a “lawsuit”, the records of which are to be deposited in the archives of human reason (KrV, B731–732).

⁸³Heimsoeth only mentions it in a footnote, cf. Heinz Heimsoeth, *Transzendente Dialektik. Ein Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co, 1966–1971, 643n.

⁸⁴Tarbet noticed that metaphors often appear at these points in KrV (Tarbet, ‘The Fabric of Metaphor . . .’, 257. Examples of the terminology are: “nichts . . . was . . . einen gegründeten Anspruch machen könnte.” (KrV, B614); “Gunst, um den Mangel seiner Rechtsansprüche zu ersetzen” (B615); “die Vernunft würde bei ihr selbst, als dem nachsehenden Richter, keine Rechtfertigung finden” (B617); “justify” (“mit Recht . . . postulieren”) (B662); “Rechtfertigung” (B663); “rechtfertige(n)” (B666–667, 698); “eine beständige Zensur unserer Vernunft” (B668); “unaufhörliche Zensur einer . . . Vernunft” (B669); “Vernunft . . ., dieser oberste Gerichtshof aller Rechte und Ansprüche unserer Spekulation” (B697); “(transzendente) Deduktion” (B697–699); “Gesetzgebung unserer Vernunft” (B728); “Anmaßung(en)” (B729, 731); “Abhörung aller . . . Zeugen” (B730); “die Akten dieses Prozesses” (B732).

7.10 Transcendental Doctrine of Method

In this part of KrV the notion of a tribunal (“Gerichtshof”) occurs three times (KrV, B768, 779, 815). Discussion of these passages in connection with the legal metaphor is almost absent in secondary sources.⁸⁵ Perhaps this is due to a relative neglect of this part of KrV in Kant scholarship, but there is good reason not only to stress the importance of this part of KrV in regard to the project of critique, but also to regard the doctrine of method as crucial at least insofar as the legal metaphor is concerned. In the doctrine of method the function and significance of the legal metaphor reach their full extent, notably because the tribunal occupies a prominent position.⁸⁶

In the introduction the transcendental doctrine of method is defined as “die Bestimmung der formalen Bedingungen eines vollständigen Systems der reinen Vernunft” and Kant compares it to what is called “practical logic”. This doctrine comprises a discipline, a canon, an architectonic and a history of pure reason (KrV, B735–736). In KrV the former two constitute the major part of the transcendental doctrine of method (sc. B736–859); only 24 pages deal with the latter two. The chapters on discipline and canon deal with two points that have been mentioned above: the *negative* function of critique (discipline) and the *practical relevance* (canon). We will concentrate on this negative function.

Discipline is “the compulsion, by which the constant tendency to disobey certain rules is restrained and finally extirpated” (KrV, B737). Due to its natural tendency to transcend the limits of possible experience, reason is in need of negative instruction preventing itself from errors. As such it is the “natural” and more systematic continuation of censure (safeguarding us from particular errors) and critique (ridding us of their causes) (KrV, B739). If we regard the Transcendental Analytic as the legislation of reason (pure understanding), discipline is a negative legislation providing systematic instructions against systematic errors (KrV, B737). Thus, discipline of pure reason serves formal and methodological purposes regarding the way reason should be employed; it supplies “negative instruction” (KrV, B737) and “admonitory negative teaching” (KrV, B740).⁸⁷ Kant distinguishes between

⁸⁵Exceptions are: Onora O’Neill, ‘Vindicating reason’, in: Paul Guyer, editor, *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 280–308; and Volker Gerhardt, ‘Die Disziplin der reinen Vernunft, 2. bis 4. Abschnitt’, in: G. Mohr and M. Willaschek, editors, *Immanuel Kant. Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998, (Klassiker Auslegen, Band 17/18), 571–595.

⁸⁶O’Neill and Gerhardt discuss the function of the tribunal in light of the political dimension of reason.

⁸⁷As to “discipline”, “canon” and “critique” cf. Giorgio Tonelli, *Kant’s Critique of Pure*

discipline of pure reason in its dogmatical, polemical, hypothetical and demonstrative employment.

Discipline in respect of the dogmatical employment of reason shows the inapplicability of the mathematical method in philosophy. Discipline with regard to hypotheses is to prevent us from improper use of hypotheses (i.e. if they are *not* part of the practical employment of reason, KrV, B804). As to the discipline of pure reason with regard to its proofs, Kant directly refers to the legal metaphor: “Ein jeder muß seine Sache vermittelst eines durch transzendente Deduktion der Beweisgründe geführten rechtlichen Beweises, d.i. direkt, führen” (KrV, B822). The part on discipline regarding the polemical employment of reason, however, deserves more attention, for here the metaphor is present right from the beginning and the relevance of this section stretches over other sections as well (it is used at KrV, B424, B804–810).

The possibility of the polemical employment of reason may come as a surprise to any reader of KrV who is familiar with the results achieved so far. In the course of the critique legislation, application of the rules, and negative legislation have been provided for in order to render impossible any situation that would be polemical, i.e. a situation where opposing parties put forward claims, while denying the claim of the other. In fact, Kant states: “Auf solche Weise gibt es eigentlich gar keine Antithetik der reinen Vernunft” (KrV, B771), and: “So gibt es demnach keine eigentliche Polemik im Felde der reinen Vernunft.” (KrV, B784). By now, it should be clear that the critique of pure reason supplies the means for deciding about claims of knowledge in every possible case of conflict: “Man kann die Kritik der reinen Vernunft als den wahren Gerichtshof für alle Streitigkeiten derselben ansehen” (KrV, B779). This reference to the tribunal is part of a larger passage where Kant compares the function of critique to political legislation, marking the transition from a *status naturalis* into a *status civilis* as described by Hobbes. Conflicts in the state of nature are wars, which can only be ended by victory of one party over another. Conflicts in a *status civilis* have to be submitted to a tribunal and then the conflict has the form of a legal process, which ends in a judicial sentence (making possible perpetual peace, KrV, B779–780).

Subjection to the tribunal of pure reason therefore implies the impossibility of truly polemic conflicts. Yet, Kant describes a kind of polemical employment of reason which is still open for consideration. This description explores the meaning of the legal metaphor to its furthest reaches. The

polemical employment of pure reason means: “die Verteidigung ihrer Sätze gegen die dogmatische Verneinungen derselben.” (KrV, B767–768). This defense is carried out by stressing the fact that any such dogmatic denial cannot be demonstrated. On the other hand there is also no proof available in support of its own assertions, which are, presumably, dogmatic affirmations (cf. KrV, B767, 769). But this lack of proof does not affect this dogmatic claim as long as it is made in view of the (practical) interest of reason (KrV, B769–770, 772). If these affirmative claims were speculative, they would have to be repudiated right away, just like dogmatically negative claims. Hence, reason is employed polemically in defense of dogmatic assertions with respect to the practical interest, if it points to the fact that opposite denials are indemonstrable. Because of the fact that there is no proof to the contrary, reason is entitled to assert its practical-dogmatic standpoint. The burden of proof rests with the party challenging this position: “Der Gegner soll also beweisen.” (KrV, B805). This kind of justification in support of a claim is characterized as “kat’ anthrōpon”, and is further described in legal terms: “eine Rechtfertigung κατ’ ἀνθρώπων [...], die wider alle Beeinträchtigung sichert, und ein titulierten Besitz verschafft” (KrV, B767).⁸⁸ Kant mentions similar justifications in case of the discipline with regard to hypotheses (KrV, B804–806; cf. MS, AA VI, 354) summarizing the main point in the phrase “*melior est conditio possidentis*”.⁸⁹ In §7.7 above it was shown that Kant also applied this argumentative strategy to the subject of thought in a practical perspective.

Polemical employment of reason represents an alternative to legislation and negative legislation of reason. It takes advantage of the opportunity to do what is allowed, which is something that is neither prohibited, nor obligatory. With this alternative function of reason the meaning of the legal metaphor is extended. Not only does it comprise legal and juridical moments, but it also contains an explicitly political connotation.⁹⁰ This shift of perspective

⁸⁸Cf. KrV, B768: “Denn wir sind alsdenn doch nicht bittweise in unserem Besitze, wenn wir einen, obzwar nicht hinreichenden, Titel derselben vor uns haben, und es völlig gewiß ist, daß niemand die Unrechtmäßigkeit dieses Besitzes jemals beweisen könne.”

⁸⁹KrV, B805. Cf. “Besitz” and “titulus possessionis” in MS, AA VI, 251. The formula “*Beati possidentes!*” is a principle of natural right, cf. MS, AA VI, 251, 257; and AA VIII, 395.

⁹⁰Cf. Stenzler expresses this view right from the beginning (and refers to the legal metaphor continuously, but does not evaluate it *expressis verbis*). As to the political implications cf. Peter Burg, ‘Der politische Gehalt der ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’’, in: *Akten des 5. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses Mainz 1981*, Volume I.2, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1981, 898–908; and O’Neill, ‘Reason and politics ...’; and O’Neill, ‘Vindicating reason’. More recently O. Höffe has proposed a political reading of KrV, cf. Otfried Höffe,

into an alternative direction is introduced in Kant's following remark:

Ganz anders ist es bewand, wenn sie [die reine Vernunft] es nicht mit der Zensur des Richters, sondern den Ansprüchen ihres Mitbürgers zu tun hat, und sich dagegen bloß verteidigen soll. (KrV, B767)

This additional connotation of the metaphor does not diminish or alter its importance and function. On the contrary, this enrichment only makes the metaphor more fruitful and increases its expressiveness. It also does not harm the legal and juridical moments contained in the metaphor. What is more, these moments presuppose a political connotation in a twofold sense. Kant's reference to Hobbes's state of nature (KrV, B779–780) makes clear that a lawful order itself is based on pre-eminently political events (termination of the state of nature and submission to the constraint of law). Secondly, the political connotation that is introduced at this stage of KrV makes it possible to differentiate between different perspectives on law. In case of the Transcendental Doctrine of Method it is civil law which provides the context to deal with conflicts.⁹¹ In the case of the transcendental doctrine of elements, on the other hand, it is rather criminal law which provides the framework to employ the legal metaphor in order to describe the purifying, corrective and censoring functions of critique.

7.11 Conclusion

The discussion and detailed evaluation of literature on specific occurrences of the legal metaphor and the additional presentation of neglected but characteristic aspects of this metaphor in KrV show that the legal metaphor is indeed a pervasive and predominant metaphor in KrV. It is clear that the most significant function of the metaphor is to determine the argumentative

'Kritik der reinen Vernunft: Eine kosmo-politische Lektüre', in: *Königliche Völker. Zu Kants kosmopolitischer Rechts- und Friedenstheorie*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001, (Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 1519), 238–263, especially 246. T. Hirata claimed that in KrV B the "Polizeimodell" is substituted for the "Gerichtshofmodell" of KrV, Axi and that this "Polizeimodell" is characteristic of KrV. In this claim the continuous presence of the legal metaphor in KrV, B seems to be underestimated or even misunderstood. The "Polizeimodell" is not a substitute, but rather an addition to, or a modification of the legal metaphor. It seems to highlight the political connotation. (cf. Toshihiro Hirata, 'Kants Modellwechsel im Hinblick auf die *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Vom Gerichtshofmodell zum Polizeimodell', in: *Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationaler Kant-Kongresses*, Volume 2, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001, 748–757).

⁹¹Kiefner, 'Ius Praetensum ...', 293.

or methodological structure of KrV (Tarbet, Henrich). This is not just a superficial similarity between KrV and legal practice and discourse. Influence from juridical discourse is demonstrable at highly specific levels, viz. in the transcendental deduction (Henrich), and in the solution to the antinomy (Ishikawa). There is no reason to assume that Kant dealt with juridical metaphors in a general sense only, since his knowledge of specific legal procedures was highly sophisticated (Kiefner). Kant knew very well what he was talking about. The possibilities of this argumentative strategy are put to the utmost test in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method.

In the context of the legal metaphor the issue of real opposition is present in the sense that it offers a crucial pattern for developing and structuring arguments that allow for a real alternative beyond mere affirmation (thesis, dogmatic affirmation) and negation (antithesis, sceptical denial). This makes the pattern indispensable in view of an essential function of the legal metaphor; deliberating the pros and cons from a neutral position, and thereby bringing a controversy to an end. The common methodological background of the metaphor and the pattern accounts for the fact that the pattern is applicable in the context of the metaphor at all.

Kant's own views on the relation between concept and intuition and the function of analogy account for the necessary predominance of the metaphor. The metaphor completes KrV. Without it, Kant would not have succeeded in complying with his own standard of philosophical clarity. Due to a consequent application of the metaphor, Kant is able to develop his critical project at points where other (conceptual) means are not available. By employing the metaphor he puts into practice the results of his theoretical endeavours thereby creating some sort of "strange loop", since a meaningful application of the metaphor would require the results of critique which could only have been achieved with the help of a persistent application of the metaphor in the first place. Therefore, the relation between the metaphor and KrV is twofold: on the one hand the metaphor serves to make our concept of pure reason sensible, while on the other hand the critique of pure reason serves to make our intuition intelligible. If meaning and function of the metaphor are understood in this sense, one could also counter the common objection of Hegel and others about the uncritical and therefore insufficient basic assumption of KrV, viz. insofar as the text of KrV itself represents knowledge (sc. about pure reason) it is not subjected to the principles of knowledge carefully spelled out in KrV, although it should be so. The metaphor offers a way out of this difficulty, since it represents an image instead of conceptual, discursive knowledge.

Of course, the success of Kant's strategy should be judged by its result,

but apparently, in Kant's view, the use of the legal metaphor would not have been successful if there had not been an analogy to begin with. Kant tried his best to draw as many conclusions from this analogy as possible. This significance of the legal metaphor may once more point to the primacy of practical reason in Kantian philosophy, since the legal metaphor derives its meaning from a practical context and it is applied in view of the practical employment of reason. The legal metaphor is also present in other works of Kant, especially in the notion of conscience as "Das Bewußtsein eines inneren Gerichtshofes im Menschen ('vor welchem sich seine Gedanken einander verklagen oder entschuldigen')"⁹² and in his essay "Über das Mißlingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee" which is deliberately composed so as to represent the proceedings of a trial before the tribunal of reason.⁹³

⁹²Cf. MS, AA VI, 438 (at 400–401 conscience is represented as an "Ästhetischer Vorbe-griff"). As to conscience and the tribunal cf. Fumiyasu Ishikawa, 'Das Gerichtshof-Modell des Gewissens', *Aufklärung*, 7 (1992), 43–55.

⁹³Cf. AA VIII, 255. In line with this juridico-political model of the theodicy the three features of divine wisdom are conceived in correspondence with the *trias politica* (AA VIII, 257).

Chapter 8

Infinite Judgement

8.1 Infinite judgement

In the previous chapter (§7.8) infinite judgement turned out to play a substantial role in the sceptical method of reasoning and the solution of the antinomy. Earlier on we encountered some less explicit occurrences of infinite judgement, sc. in discussions about empty space (§4.2), about *actio in distans* (§4.4) and about the noumenon (§6.6). Apparently, there is something peculiar about infinite judgement that caused Kant to employ this kind of judgement in his arguments. In the current chapter we will show that, due to its distinctive properties, infinite judgement plays a key role in the legal metaphor, since it is capable of doing what a judgement in the legal sense is supposed to do. It can offer an authoritative alternative in cases where opposing, controversial options are at stake. Moreover, this alternative belongs to a categorically different level than the level of the controversy and the possibilities it contains. Infinite judgement is characterised by the fact that it is an affirmation (though not in the ordinary sense) by means of negation (though not in the ordinary sense of logical negation). In this respect infinite judgement expresses the characteristics of the pattern of real opposition.

In the table of logical functions of understanding Kant introduced “infinite judgements” in addition to the common logical distinction between affirmative and negative judgements.¹ Correspondingly, Kant included “limitation” in the table of categories in addition to the categories of reality and negation (KrV, B106). Kant’s example of infinite judgement was “Die Seele ist nichtsterblich.” (The soul is not-mortal). Kant acknowledged that this division of judgements may come as a surprise because in general logic infinite judgement is classed with affirmations (KrV, B96–97). In transcendental logic, however, he took

¹KrV, B95. Cf. *Logik* §22 (AA IX, 103–104).

great care to distinguish it from both negative and affirmative judgements. It is not a negative judgement, since it is a logical affirmation (copula is not negated). Unlike ordinary affirmative judgements, however, it contains a negative predicate. Hence, infinite judgement is a logical affirmation by using merely a negative predicate in order to say something about our total knowledge and the content of knowledge *überhaupt*.²

Notwithstanding this explanation, Kant's introduction of infinite judgement and the category of limitation has met with misunderstanding, neglect and rejection ever since. Schopenhauer, as usual, was clear and quite amusing in his disapproval. According to him Kant only introduced it in the table of logical functions for reasons of symmetry. For Schopenhauer infinite judgement is nothing more than:

“einen spitzfindig erdachten Lückenbüßer, was nicht ein Mal einer Auseinandersetzung bedarf, ein blindes Fenster, wie er [Kant] zu Gunsten seiner symmetrischen Architektonik deren viele angebracht hat.”³

According to Hegel it was not a judgement at all.⁴ Peirce also maintained that Kant added infinite judgements “because it rounded out his triad of categories of quality”⁵ De Vleeschauwer mentioned a philological reason with respect to the category of limitation: “Elle constitue donc une retouche de la dernière heure.”⁶ To Kemp Smith, Kant's distinctions reflected “a very artificial and somewhat arbitrary manner” in preparation “for the ‘discovery’ of the category of limitation.”⁷

²KrV, B97 and B98. The phrase “in Ansehung des Inhalts der Erkenntnis überhaupt” echoes the phrase “in Ansehung des gesammten Erkenntnisses” from the previous page (cf. Jakob Veenbaas and Willem Visser, *Kritiek van de zuivere rede*, Amsterdam: Boom, 2004, (Dutch translation of KrV)). Kemp Smith seems to be missing this reference to knowledge in general; he does not translate *überhaupt*.

³Cf. *Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie*, 559–560, in: Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I*.

⁴Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, ‘Wissenschaft der Logik II. Die subjektive Logik oder die Lehre vom Begriff’, in: *G.W.F. Hegel, Gesammelte Werke*, Volume 12, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1981, 69–70. Nevertheless Hegel states (at p. 70): “Ein reelleres Beyspiel des unendlichen Urtheils ist die böse Handlung.”

⁵Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘Elements of Logic’, in: C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss, editors, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Volume II, Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1960, §376, 223 (cf. also §381 at 228–229)

⁶H.J. de Vleeschauwer, *La déduction transcendentale dans l'œuvre de Kant*, Antwerpen/Paris/'s-Gravenhage, 1934–1937, 231 (and t. II, 55–57)

⁷Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1993 (reprint of 1923²; 1918¹), 192.

Instead of blaming Kant for something he did not write down, i.e. instead of ascribing to him motives that merely serve to account for misunderstandings or unclarity on our own part, Kant's distinction itself should be taken more seriously. In line with our methodological remarks in §1.2 we will assume that Kant must have had good reasons to introduce infinite judgement. There is no reason to assume that he did include the warning observation (KrV, B97) in vain.

Kant's insistence on this form of judgement is not as far-fetched as his commentators would have it. In non-philosophical language it is not unusual to use negative predicates in sentences that are intended to express specific meanings. Many of those sentences resemble the basic structure of infinite judgement. So, for example, the statement "This claim is inadmissible.", uttered in a specific judicial context, is meant to indicate that the necessary requirements for admittance of that claim have not been fulfilled.⁸ According to Kant infinite judgement is affirmative, but the predicate contains a negation, more specifically a single negation ("nichtsterblich", formally represented by not-p). Cases of *double* negation (e.g. "nicht unmöglich", formalised: not(not-p)), however, may even help us better to understand the meaning and function of infinite judgement in the Kantian sense. As we shall see later on, Kant himself will make use of double negation in the context of infinite judgement. Examples of double negation in this sense are "not impossible", "not unimportant", "not insignificant", etc.

Logical analysis of occurrences of double negation in terms of classical bivalent logic, which is the logic most philosophers would be inclined to subscribe to, is insufficient and inappropriate. Application of the law of double negation⁹ to these cases of double negation would reduce these cases to simple affirmations (*duplex negatio affirmat*). This procedure, however, would fail to point out the specific kind of affirmation that is expressed by means of double negation. In non-philosophical, ordinary language it is also not uncommon to employ double negation in this sense.¹⁰ For example, the

⁸Ishikawa is not right in believing that infinite judgement does not seem to make sense in ordinary language, cf. Ishikawa, *Kants Denken . . .*, 34, 99, 100.

⁹On (the law of) double negation cf. Lawrence R. Horn, *A Natural History of Negation*, Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1989, 22, 296–308

¹⁰Cf. for example the claim that "The arrest and extradition of D.B. by the Brazilian government is complicated, but not impossible.", which is a response to a previous claim that there was no point in arresting mr. D.B because subsequent extradition to The Netherlands would be impossible. If "not impossible" in the quotation would be substituted by "possible", something quite different would be implied in the statement. Cf. *De Volkskrant* (August 26, 1997, p. 7), reporting on attempts made and not made by the Dutch government to prosecute the former Surinam head of State D.B. for drugs-related crimes.

use of figures of speech such as understatement and litotes, which may contain double negations, cannot be adequately understood if they are supposed to represent simple affirmations. In order to account properly for occurrences of double negation, we must assume that there are good reasons for using the long-winded expression instead of a shorter one.¹¹ These reasons may be pragmatic, rhetoric, or political, depending on the context of the expression. Moreover, as a consequence of rigorous application of the law of double negation at least some of the information about what is positive and what is negative may be lost. Besides the fact that a predicate like “nichtsterblich” can be represented by not-p, but just as well by p, in which case double negation would be hardly recognisable, one cannot determine whether there is a positive or negative meaning, simply by adding up negative markers like “not”, “un-”, “in-”, etc.¹² In the next section we will have a closer look at the historical and systematic objections raised against Kant’s conception of infinite judgement. Subsequently, we will explicate the immediate context of infinite judgement in the Kantian sense (i.c. transcendental knowledge and transcendental logic) in order to determine its meaning in the Transcendental Dialectic and the Doctrine of Method in KrV.

8.2 Against infinite judgement

Kant’s case is clear: he proposes to make a distinction between affirmative, negative and infinite judgement, which is particularly important in transcendental logic and the field of pure knowledge a priori. If we take Kant’s example as our starting-point we could exemplify the distinction as follows:

1. The soul is mortal. (affirmative judgement)

*Die Seele ist sterblich.*¹³

¹¹Cf. Horn’s principle of the division of pragmatic labour: “The use of a longer, marked expression in lieu of a shorter expression involving less effort on the part of the speaker signals that the speaker was not in a position to employ the simpler version felicitously.” (cf. Horn, *A Natural History* . . . , 304).

¹²G. Peeters, ‘What’s Negative about Hatred and Positive about Love? On Negation in Cognition, Affect and Behavior’, in: H. de Swart and L. Bergmans, editors, *Perspectives on Negation*, Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1995, (Essays in honour of Johan J. de Jongh on his 80th Birthday), 123–133.

¹³Kant does not mention this specific example in this context. It is mentioned though in R 3063: *anima est mortalis*. The fact that he does not mention this corresponding example indicates an important aspect of Kant’s view of judgement: “judgement” means “true judgement”. There is no true, affirmative judgement about the soul’s mortality. Therefore, there is a true, negative judgement: it is not the case that the soul is mortal (cf. 2.). Negative judgements in this sense may prevent us from making mistakes (KrV, B97), which

2. The soul is not mortal. (negative judgement)
Die Seele ist nicht sterblich.
3. The soul is not-mortal. (infinite judgement)
Die Seele ist nichtsterblich.

Simple formalised representations of 1, 2, and 3 are:

4. S is p
5. not(S is p)
6. S is not-p

In his study of Kant's infinite judgement Albert Menne echoed Schopenhauer's reproach: Kant introduced infinite judgement to save the symmetry of the table of categories.¹⁴ According to Menne there is no historical ground to grant infinite judgement a separate position independent from affirmative and negative judgement. Some logicians prior to Kant mentioned infinite judgement, but this usage was not wide-spread.¹⁵ On the one hand, Kant's conception of infinite judgement seems to have originated in a misunderstanding or the incorrect translation of "indefinite judgement" (*enuntiatio infinitus*).¹⁶ On the other hand, it may have been shaped by the notion of "indefinite term" (*terminus infinitum*) which is mentioned by Crusius.¹⁷ So, according to Menne, Kant's limited knowledge of the proper sense of an indefinite term and an indefinite judgement caused him to adopt the notion of infinite judgement (*unendliches Urteil*) for cosmetic reasons. Subsequently, the lack of historical ground caused him to write an extensive though unconvincing justification (KrV, B97).

Apart from this, Menne denied the relevance of Kant's literal reading of "infinite" on systematic grounds. Even if predicate negation would be characteristic of infinite judgement, it would only present something that is logically equivalent to what is expressed in negative judgement. And so

is a characteristic function of negative judgement (KrV, B737).

¹⁴Albert Menne, 'Das unendliche Urteil Kants', *Philosophia naturalis*, 19 (1982), 151–162, 151–152, 159.

¹⁵Menne, 'Das unendliche Urteil Kants ...', 156.

¹⁶However, Kant must have been aware of and familiar with the difference between "infinite" and "indefinite". An important source on logic for Kant was Meier's *Auszug* §294. He wrote several *Reflexionen* about this section (sc. R3062–3072). In R3069 Kant dealt with *judicium indefinitum* in the context of limitation and the infinite sphere outside the sphere of a concept.

¹⁷Menne, 'Das unendliche Urteil Kants ...', 157–158.

Menne maintains that, contrary to Kant's suggestions, infinite judgement resembles affirmative judgement. There is no difference between negative and infinite judgement, if we examine both kinds of judgement from the point of view of set theory. Negative and infinite judgement, represented by formulas 5. and 6. above, are different ways of expressing one and the same set theoretical distribution. According to this approach *not-p* is understood in terms of the complement of *p*.

In addition, Menne called upon the generally accepted laws of traditional logic, particularly Apuleius's laws of equipollence, which state that an affirmative judgement is equipollent to the corresponding negative judgement if the predicate is denied as well.¹⁸ This would entail that 4. is equipollent to:

7. not(S is not-p)

Again, Menne ignores Kant's claim that infinite judgement is logically affirmative. In line with the Kantian idea of infinite judgement, formula 7. would not be logically identical to 4. Instead it would rather be a negative, infinite judgement.

Menne's rejection of infinite judgement is based on the systematic argument that current laws of logic do not allow for an interpretation of infinite judgement in the Kantian sense. Apparently, these principles are the law of double negation (as is clear from 7.), the law of excluded middle (as is clear from his conception of *not-p* in terms of the complement of *p*). Thus he maintains that if the introduction of infinite judgement were to make any sense, it would have been necessary for Kant to show that these formal principles do not hold in the case of transcendental logic. According to Menne¹⁹ Kant failed to supply such arguments and only offered problematic speculation.

Menne's rejection, however, is neither convincing, nor conclusive. It ignores explicit information on the part of Kant about the distinction between transcendental logic and general logic, which will be discussed in the next section, as well as relevant information from other parts of KrV that provides a context for understanding the sense of infinite judgement. Indeed, to some extent the applicability of the above-mentioned logical principles is questionable in case of transcendental logic. This point will be discussed in §8.4 below.

¹⁸Menne, 'Das unendliche Urteil Kants ...', 160. Cf. Horn, *A Natural History ...*, 25. Meier (*Auszug* §294) also regarded predicate and copula negation as equivalent.

¹⁹Menne, 'Das unendliche Urteil Kants ...', 160.

8.3 Transcendental knowledge, transcendental logic

Kant's observation about infinite judgement is one of four observations which are "nicht unnötig" in view of possible misunderstanding.²⁰ In general logic infinite judgement is rightly classed with affirmative judgement. Only in transcendental logic is infinite judgement a separate member in the division of judgements. Apparently, the difference between general and transcendental logic is significant and decisive as far as infinite judgement is concerned. In the present section we will examine this difference and we will try to determine the function of infinite judgement given the characteristics of transcendental logic.

In the introduction to KrV Kant stated:

Ich nenne alle Erkenntnis transzendental, die sich nicht so wohl mit Gegenständen, sondern mit unserer Erkenntnisart von Gegenständen, so fern diese a priori möglich sein soll, überhaupt beschäftigt. (KrV, B25)

Transcendental knowledge does not represent knowledge about objects. It is knowledge about our mode of knowledge, and more specifically about the a priori possibility of our mode of knowledge of objects. Transcendental knowledge is meta-knowledge.

This sense of "transcendental" is highlighted as soon as the notion of transcendental logic is discussed:

nämlich: daß nicht eine jede Erkenntnis a priori, sondern nur die, dadurch wir erkennen, daß und wie gewisse Vorstellungen (Anschauungen oder Begriffe) lediglich a priori angewandt werden, oder möglich sein, transzendental [...] heißen müsse. [...] Der Unterschied des Transzendentalen und Empirischen gehört also nur zur Kritik der Erkenntnisse, und betrifft nicht die Beziehung derselben auf ihren Gegenstand. (KrV, B80–81)

This quotation also contains an additional qualification: the distinction between "transcendental" and "empirical" does not refer to the relation between knowledge (*Vorstellung*) and object (*Gegenstand*), but it belongs to the critique of knowledge. The distinction is a critical distinction.

If we try to order these distinctions there are at least four separate levels in this theory of knowledge: 1) the *object* of knowledge (e.g. a body, the soul);

²⁰KrV, B96. Note that Kant chose to emphasise the significance of these observations by means of a double negation, which is lost in Kemp Smith's translation, which has "may serve" for Kant's "werden [...] nicht unnötig sein".

2) *knowledge* of 1; 3) *transcendental knowledge* about the a priori possibility of 2; and finally 4) *critique*, providing the distinctions and concepts that are needed to put 3 into words. To the extent that transcendental logic represents a specific kind of transcendental knowledge it is part of knowledge at level 3.

General logic, as opposed to transcendental logic, abstracts from all content of knowledge, i.e. from all relation of knowledge to the object. It does not consider the possible variety of objects involved in knowledge and it only considers the logical form and the form of thought in general, as Kant maintains in the introductory remark of the section on transcendental logic.²¹ Therefore, general logic—in so far as it represents knowledge at all—differs categorically from the kinds of knowledge we have just identified.

In transcendental logic, on the other hand, the content of knowledge is taken into consideration and therefore the content or worth of the logical affirmation by means of a negative predicate is considered, as Kant explicated in his explanatory observation (KrV B97-98). Although the form of infinite judgement is affirmative, its content is negative (and even infinite as far as logical extension is concerned). Precisely this feature of infinite judgement makes it “wirklich bloß *beschränkend* in Ansehung des Inhalts der Erkenntnis überhaupt”.²² This indicates that “content” must not be taken in the current sense just mentioned (i.e. in the sense of the a priori applicability of representations, or the a priori possibility of objective knowledge). It refers to knowledge in general and in this context infinite judgement has a function with respect “to our total knowledge” (KrV, B97). Thus, infinite judgement is a particular critical means to make a distinction between knowledge in the sense of level 2 and 3 above and knowledge in a general sense which comprises, for example, practical knowledge as well. Knowledge that is limited (in this case: objectively valid knowledge) is of a different kind than knowledge expressing this limitation (infinite judgement). Knowledge that is required to make a distinction, cannot be the object of distinction and therefore infinite judgement belongs to the level of critical knowledge.

In the context of transcendental logic infinite judgement serves a specific, limitative, *critical* function with respect to knowledge in general.²³ The

²¹KrV, B79. Cf. also KrV, B76, 78, 97, 102, 171, and *Logik*, AA IX, 101.

²²KrV, B98 (italics added). Regarding the limitative function of transcendental logic in relation with formal logic, cf. Vladimir Bryushinkin, ‘The Interaction of Formal and Transcendental Logic’, in: H. Robinson, editor, *Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress Memphis 1995*, Volume I-2, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995, 553–566.

²³See also Mellin’s explanation of “Unendliches Urtheil” and “Limitation 2”: “Das Begrenzen, Limitiren, einer Sphäre durch andre Dinge, die nicht zu derselben gehören, ist also der Hauptact in den unendlichen Urtheilen.” (Mellin, *Enzyklopädisches Wörterbuch*

employment of this function is intended to make a distinction between objectively valid knowledge on the one hand, and knowledge that is *not* objectively valid, on the other hand. It represents transcendental knowledge, but it is not a transcendently logical term in the sense that it serves to determine the a priori and objective applicability of concepts.

8.4 Infinite judgement and transcendental logic

According to Menne Kant failed to show that the formal principles of logic (especially the laws of double negation and excluded middle) do not apply in case of transcendental logic in order to account for a meaningful sense of infinite judgement. In support of Kant's claim we will now address the issue of formal principles in transcendental logic.

Firstly, it is important to see that it is not necessary for Kant to show the inapplicability of the formal principles. In Menne's view it is, because he interpreted infinite judgement as a kind of negative judgement. Kant, on the other hand, regarded infinite judgement right from the beginning as a kind of affirmative judgement. To this extent Menne's arguments simply miss Kant's point. Nevertheless, it is very instructing to evaluate Kant's view of formal principles in relation to transcendental logic, because it helps understanding the nature of infinite judgement.

Later on, the laws of double negation and excluded middle will be examined, but first we will focus on the principle of contradiction. The position of this principle in (transcendental) logic is typical of the way Kant deals with formal principles of logic. In the context of general logic it would be better to speak of the principle of non-contradiction.²⁴ The most general requirement with respect to knowledge is that it is not contradictory, i.e. that is in conformity with the general rules of thought. Non-contradiction in this sense is a logical and purely formal criterion of truth. Non-contradiction, however, does not warrant the agreement of knowledge with its object (i.e. material truth). Therefore, non-contradiction is a *conditio sine qua non*, a negative condition of all truth and it applies to thought in general (KrV, B84), or knowledge in general (KrV, B190).

Non-contradiction as a formal and negative principle belongs to general logic, which abstracts from all content. However, in transcendental logic, which considers content as well, the formal principle of contradiction²⁵ also

..., Band 4, 9–10.)

²⁴Cf. KrV, B82–85 as regards non-contradiction in general logic.

²⁵KrV, B190 defines this principle as: "Keinem Dinge kommt ein Prädikat zu, welches ihm widerspricht". It is "a universal, though merely negative, criterion of all truth.", cf.

applies, and it even allows for a positive employment. It is called “the universal and completely sufficient principle of all analytic knowledge” (KrV, B190), which indicates that the field of application is limited to analytic knowledge (KrV, B190-191). This does not mean that the principle is not valid in case of synthetic knowledge. On the contrary, it does apply to this kind of knowledge, but only in so far as another synthetic proposition has been presupposed.²⁶ Although it does not suffice to warrant material truth (of synthetic knowledge), we must at least conform to it. In view of synthetic knowledge this principle counts as negative condition comparable to the function of non-contradiction in general logic.

The applicability of both non-contradiction, and the principle of contradiction is far-reaching. Only the part of transcendental logic dealing with synthetic knowledge is excluded from the positive employment of the principle of contradiction. Surely, it is no coincidence that it is precisely this part that is at the core of Kant’s investigation of the synthetic a priori (i.e. the a priori applicability of concepts to objects). In this respect there is only one highest principle of all synthetic judgements, which—not surprisingly—does not belong to general or formal logic:

ein jeder Gegenstand steht unter den nothwendigen Bedingungen
der synthetischen Einheit des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung in
einer möglichen Erfahrung. (KrV, B197).

This principle answers the question as to the a priori applicability of representations to objects, i.e the objective validity of synthetic knowledge. In addition to the formal and logical criterion of truth this is the material and transcendental criterion. The part of Transcendental Logic which is devoted to this criterion is the Transcendental Analytic, also called “a logic of truth” (KrV, B87).

The material insufficiency of the principle of contradiction in case of synthetic judgement is presented quite detailed in Kant’s exposition of the principle of synthetic judgements (KrV, B193–194). The possibility of affirmative analytic judgements can be explained by reference to some identity of the concepts involved. In case of negative judgements this can be explained by the contradiction of the concepts involved. Neither identity, nor contradiction suffice to account for the possibility of synthetic judgements. Something else is needed to account for the synthetic relation between

²⁶§6.2 above.

²⁶Cf. KrV, B14: “ein synthetischer Satz kann allerdings nach dem Satz des Widerspruchs eingesehen werden, aber nur so, daß ein anderer synthetischer Satz vorausgesetzt wird, aus dem er gefolgert werden kann, niemals aber an sich selbst.”.

the concepts that make up a synthetic judgement.²⁷ In Kant's words this "something else" is *ein Drittes*.

Thus, in transcendental logic something else, something apart from affirmation and negation, is required for the sake of answering the question about the a priori possibility of synthetic judgements. This need for something else is reflected in Kant's system of judgements. Apart from affirmative and negative judgement, he introduced a third kind, sc. infinite judgement, which offers an alternative to affirmation and negation; affirmation by negation.

Menne's refutation of the systematic relevance of infinite judgement was primarily based on the analysis of infinite judgement in terms of the laws of double negation and excluded middle. As far as double negation is concerned Kant does not seem to be implying that this principle is not valid in transcendental logic.²⁸ His point is rather that predicate negation is not cancelled by an additional copula negation. Therefore, he would simply deny the equivalence of 4 and 7 above. Kant does not reject the law of excluded middle either. As is clear from the function of the principle of contradiction in general logic and in transcendental logic, Kant recognises its validity in so far as the principle of contradiction is applicable. The truth of an analytic judgement can be explained on the basis of the principle of contradiction (KrV, B190), but only—we would have to add in the present context—if a third possibility has been excluded. Therefore, Kant maintains that the truth of an analytic judgement implies the falsity of the opposite judgement. Again, Kant introduced infinite judgement not because the current formal laws of logic do not apply, but rather because these laws are simply *insufficient* with respect to Kant's question about the synthetic a priori. The highest principle of synthetic judgements fills the crucial need of a critique of reason that cannot be satisfied by applying current laws of logic. So does infinite judgement.

Conformity to the principle of synthetic judgements constitutes material truth, or objectively valid knowledge. In this respect Kant called the Transcendental Analytic "a logic of truth". The principle itself, however, is not an instance of material truth. It is neither true nor untrue, but transcendental, and in terms of the four levels of knowledge mentioned at p.151 above it belongs to the level of transcendental knowledge (level 3) specifying the a

²⁷KrV, B194: "Also zugegeben [...]: so ist ein Drittes nötig." Cf. KrV, B315: "Wo ist hier das Dritte, welches jederzeit zu einem synthetischen Satze erfordert wird, um in demselben Begriffe, die gar keine logische (analytische) Verwandtschaft haben, mit einander zu verknüpfen?"

²⁸Cf. KrV, B532 where Kant explains that "endlich" is equivalent to "nichtunendlich". Detailed interpretation of this point is offered in §8.5 below.

priori possibility of material truth (level 2). Thus, objectively valid relations between representation and object are determined. The principle states which knowledge is to be regarded as real knowledge. If we realise that truth may be either positive or negative, and if we consider this distinction in close connection with the distinction between the categories of reality, negation and limitation, which are based on the affirmative, negative and infinite function of understanding, then there is an obvious correspondence between affirmation and reality, and between negation and negation (as a category). Knowledge in accordance with the principle of synthetic judgements is real knowledge which—if we take the correspondence seriously—is expressed in affirmative judgements. Likewise, negative judgement serves to express negative truth (i.e. claims of knowledge which are not in accordance with the principle, and which are *not* objectively valid). Infinite judgement, however, is a transcendental means to express claims of knowledge which are neither true nor false in the sense of objectively valid (and real) or objectively invalid (and not real). Claims of knowledge expressed by infinite judgement represent some truth outside the field of objective validity, and hence beyond the field of possible experience. Yet the very fact that these claims exceed the domain of the principle of all synthetic judgements does not render them invalid or false; these qualifications and the dichotomy of (in)validity do simply not suffice to characterise this type of claims. Infinite judgement refers to non-validity, i.e. validity which is categorically different from objectively real (in)validity.

As to the formal principles of logic, Kant does not deny their applicability, but he rather denies the claim that application of those principles is exhaustive with respect to knowledge. Kant needs a technical vocabulary to put his critical epistemological position into words. “Infinite judgement” is a significant and major term in this respect. It is there to make possible a kind of knowledge that stretches beyond the domain of objective validity and the formal principles of logic.

In addition to the conclusion of the previous section we can even extend the comparison. Affirmation with respect to reality is possible only in accordance with the principle of synthetic judgements. This is the major tenor of the Transcendental Analytic in KrV. Negation with respect to the reality of claims which are not in accordance with the principle (e.g. claims about the objective reality of the soul, or God) is the typical subject of the Transcendental Dialectic. Limitation, on the basis of infinite judgement, is a critical operation consisting of two opposite functions that are performed at the same time. On the one hand it recognises the results of the Transcendental Analytic, but on the other hand it recognises that it is possible to make

claims of knowledge which go beyond the field of possible experience. Of course these latter claims are very different from false claims about the soul, the world and God. They do not pretend to express theoretical, objectively valid knowledge but rather practical knowledge about objects of our will. Critical limitation is structured according the pattern of real repugnance; opposing realities are linked together and balanced so as to make possible yet another (i.e. practical) reality.

8.5 Infinite judgement and antinomy

The function of negative judgement in the Transcendental Dialectic is comparable to and implied by the function of affirmative judgement in the Transcendental Analytic. Affirmative judgement are true judgements which represent transcendental knowledge about what is to be considered as objectively real knowledge. Negative judgements, on the other hand, are true judgements representing negative transcendental knowledge, i.e. knowledge of what is *not* to be considered as objectively real knowledge (i.e. a false, affirmative claim, or any claim regarding objects that cannot be given in possible experience such as the soul, the world and God). Affirmative claims regarding these objects are denied by true negative judgements. This makes the Transcendental Dialectic the negative counterpart of the Transcendental Analytic. In this sense Kant referred several times to the important negative function of critique (KrV, Bxxiv–xxv, 25, 740, 823). With respect to each of the “impossible” objects mentioned, one could refer to even more specific formulations.²⁹

However, the main focus of attention is not negative, but infinite judgement which occurs several times in the Transcendental Dialectic and which has an even more significant role in this part of KrV. The most telling example of infinite judgement is to be found in the “Kritische Entscheidung . . .” (KrV, B531–532) and it is presented in preparation of the solution to the antinomy, especially the first one about the spatial and temporal (in)finity of the world.

²⁹For example, with respect to the thinking subject: it is impossible to know oneself as noumenon (KrV, B430). With respect to the paralogisms in general Kant concludes at B432: “Dieses hat nur zur Verhütung des Mißverständes, dem die Lehre von unserer Selbstanschauung, als Erscheinung, leicht ausgesetzt ist, gesagt sein sollen.” With respect to God, the object of a speculative use of reason, Kant maintains: “Ich behaupte nun, daß alle Versuche eines bloß spekulativen Gebrauchs der Vernunft in Ansehung der Theologie gänzlich fruchtlos und ihrer inneren Beschaffenheit nach null und nichtig sind” (B664). Cf. also the titles of chapters about the impossibility of certain proofs of God’s existence (B620, 631, and 648).

The general description of “antinomy” is “conflict of laws” (sc. of pure reason, KrV, B434). Detailed examination of this conflict shows that there are four possible, concrete conflicts, each of which is related to a cosmological idea. It has become common practice to use the terms “first antinomy”, “second antinomy”, etc. if a conflict in the latter sense is meant. Kant, however, prefers to speak of “antinomy” in a general sense,³⁰ because there is fundamental pattern underlying each of the four conflicts mentioned. This pattern is described in the chapter on the system of cosmological ideas (sc. KrV, B445–446).

Dialectical illusion in case of the cosmological ideas is a result of a requirement of reason, sc. the principle that states that when the conditioned is given, the sum total of conditions (i.e. the absolute unconditioned) is also given (KrV, B436; cf. also B364, 525). The pattern or the basic structure of the antinomy is described by Kant when he specifies two possible relations between the (series of) conditioned (elements) and the unconditioned: either the unconditioned consists of a complete series, which—in its entirety—is unconditioned, whereas all of its elements are conditioned (in which case the successive regressus from conditioned to condition is infinite), or the unconditioned is an element of the series (in which case it is the first element to which all other elements in the series are subordinated). If the first relation applies, the regressus is infinite (sc. “*potentialiter* unendlich” as Kant remarks at KrV, B445). If, however, the second relation applies we are forced to acknowledge the (spatial and temporal) finity of the world, the simplicity of the parts of the world, causality based on freedom, and an absolute natural necessity.

Both alternatives seem to meet with the requirement of reason and both are supported by elaborate arguments. Because this antinomical state of reason is a consequence of the application of its own principle, and because reason is forced by nature to apply this principle, the dialectical illusion of the antinomy is natural, inevitable, even necessary.

The pattern describing the two alternatives regarding the possible relations between the unconditioned and conditioned, together with the consequences following from either alternative are subject to detailed examination in the *antithetic* of pure reason (KrV, B448). There Kant provides the analysis of the antinomy in terms of each of the four cosmological ideas (KrV, B454–489). Each analysis presents a thesis and antithesis together

³⁰With the exception of KrV, B592: “die Antithesis der vierten Antinomie”. For discussion of “antinomy” and “antinomies” cf. Wolfgang Malzkorn, *Kants Kosmologie-Kritik. Eine formale Analyse der Antinomienlehre*, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1999, (Kantstudien, Ergänzungshefte 134), 91–97.

with arguments in support of both thesis and antithesis. The proof-structure of all of these arguments is indirect. To put in Kant's own terms: in every conflict of transcendental ideas both thesis and antithesis are supported by *apagogical proof* (KrV, B817, 819–820), which means that a certain claim is proven to be true by the indirect means of the refutation of the opposite claim. This proof-structure could also be described as *reductio ad absurdum*. This argumentative strategy is only successful under logical conditions of the principles of non-contradiction, of excluded middle and of double negation.

As has been stated above infinite judgement plays an important role in the solution to the antinomy. In order to determine the function and significance of infinite judgement in this respect, we will first analyse its function with respect to the first conflict of transcendental ideas. Then we will address the issue of the function of infinite judgement for the antinomy at large.

In case of the first cosmological idea the conflict is formulated as follows: “The world is finite.” (thesis) versus “The world is infinite.” (antithesis).³¹ To prove either of these statements Kant formulates a *reductio ad absurdum*. In case of the thesis it runs as follows: Assume that the world has no beginning in time, then up to a given moment an eternity has elapsed (and there has passed away an infinite series of successive states of things in the world). Since the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it can never be completed through successive synthesis (cf. also KrV, B460), Kant concludes that is impossible for an infinite successive series to have passed away. This impossibility would make the existence of the world impossible (since, presumably, its existence requires a completed successive series) and therefore, Kant finally concludes, a beginning of the world is a necessary condition for its existence, which is precisely what was expressed in the thesis. So the *absurdum* in this case is the impossibility of a complete successive series, and—by implication—the non-existence of the world, which forces Kant to regard the thesis to be proven. Proofs regarding the spatial finity of the world, as well as the (spatial and temporal) infinity of the world are *mutatis mutandis* also based on a *reductio ad absurdum*.

As a result of this line of argument both antithesis and thesis are proven

³¹Kant's formulations are more extensive: “Die Welt hat einen Anfang in der Zeit, und ist dem Raum nach auch in Grenzen eingeschlossen.” (thesis) and “Die Welt hat keinen Anfang, und keine Grenzen im Raume, sondern ist sowohl in Ansehung der Zeit, als des Raums, unendlich.” (antithesis). The latter formulation (“Die Welt [...] ist [...] unendlich.”), together with the formulations “unendlich” and “endlich” in the proofs of both statements has led me to employ the shorter phrases for the sake of clarity. Later on we will see that Kant's own solution is based on phrases like these (cf. KrV, B532).

to be false in support of the truth of the thesis and antithesis respectively. The result is a deadlock; a conflict between two opposed claims which are grounded on the requirements of reason and developed in accordance with the standards of reason, and which therefore can not be solved by an appeal to experience.

Kant's solution to this conflict is formulated very simple: the world is neither conditionally nor unconditionally limited (B550). To conform to the above formulation of the conflict one might say: the world is neither finite nor infinite. Formulated this way the solution exceeds the original options as presented in the antinomy, sc.: the world is either finite or infinite. Going beyond these alternatives implies that the principle of excluded middle³² does not apply in case of the antinomy (although the antithetic construction as well as the attempted solution of the first conflict was based on the assumption that it did). However, this does not mean that the principle of excluded middle is invalid altogether, but only that is not a suitable means to solve (logical) problems at this (critical, transcendental) level. Its application is limited.³³

At the critical level other logical means are needed to make a solution possible. This is clear from the fact that each of the four solutions presented by Kant (KrV, B545–593) is preceded by a preparatory “Kritische Entscheidung des kosmologischen Streits der Vernunft mit sich selbst” (KrV, B525–534). In this section Kant carries out the logical analysis that is needed to solve the antinomy. The main point of this analysis is the introduction of the distinction between analytical opposition and *dialectical opposition* (KrV, B532).³⁴ The former kind of opposition is an opposition between contradictory opposites, and therefore it would be solvable by means of the principle of excluded middle:

Sage ich [...]: die Welt ist dem Raume nach entweder unendlich,
oder sie ist nicht unendlich (non est infinitus), so muß, wenn der

³²Kant's formulation of this principle is to be found in his *Logik* §48 (in: AA IX, 116–117): two contradictory opposed judgements cannot both be true, and they cannot both be false; if one of these judgements is true, then the other is false and vice versa. A formal reconstruction of the principle in relation to the first antinomical conflict is offered by Zeljko Loparic, ‘The Logical Structure of the First Antinomy’, *Kant-Studien*, 81 (1990), 280–303, 282–283.

³³Cf. Loparic, ‘The Logical Structure ...’, 295: “This explains why [...] L₄ [sc. the principle of excluded middle with predicate negation, WvdK] is not a universally valid logical law.”, and cf. Ishikawa, *Kants Denken ...*, 96. About Ishikawa's study see also Takuji Kadowaki, ‘Zur Wiedereinsetzung des unendlichen Urteils’, *Aufklärung*, 7 (1992), 75–76.

³⁴J. E. Llewelyn, ‘Dialectical and analytical opposites’, *Kant-Studien*, 55 (1964), 171–174.

erstere Satz falsch ist, sein kontradiktorisches Gegenteil: die Welt ist nicht unendlich, wahr sein. (KrV, B531)

Kant's addition of the Latin "non est infinitus"³⁵ indicates that this opposition consists of contradictory opposites: an affirmative and a negative judgement (with copula negation). Therefore it is an analytical opposition that could—in principle—be solved by means of the *reductio ad absurdum*. In case of the antinomy, however, application of this strategy fails. This failure should not lead us to reject the logical principles involved, but rather to question underlying assumptions. How do we find out what assumptions have been made in case of the antinomy?

In order to find out the basic assumption Kant proposes to reconstruct the conflict with the help of infinite judgement so as to show that the opposition involved is dialectical:

Hieße es aber: die Welt ist entweder unendlich, oder endlich (nicht-unendlich), so könnten beide falsch sein [...] wenn nämlich die Welt *gar nicht als ein Ding an sich*, mithin auch nicht ihrer Größe nach, weder als unendlich, noch als endlich gegeben sein sollte. (KrV, B532).

Unlike the case of the analytical opposition, in which copula negation was employed, in the dialectical opposition Kant reconstructs the second part of the opposition in terms of predicate negation. Explicit reference to "nicht-unendlich" indicates that this part of the opposition is to be understood in terms of infinite judgement: it is a logical affirmation by means of a negative predicate. Moreover, in case of this predicate the principle of double negation applies since "nichtunendlich" is equivalent to "endlich".³⁶ The first part of the opposition also consists of an infinite judgement: "The world is infinite" (logical affirmation and predicate negation).

Once the conflict has been restated in these terms, Kant is able to uncover the underlying assumption. This formulation of the conflict clearly states that there is a world which is either not-E (negative predicate) or E (a positive predicate equivalent to (not(not-E))). The statement that there is a world, or, as Kant states in technical terms, that the world is a thing in itself, is the basic assumption: "Denn ich sehe alsdenn die Welt, als an sich selbst, ihrer Größe nach bestimmt an" (B532). Once the assumption has been exposed,

³⁵About Kant's reason for using Latin phrases cf. Ishikawa, *Kants Denken . . .*, 91–93.

³⁶This equivalence implies that "nichtunendlich" is not a predicate with an infinite sphere which seemed to play an important role in the (nominal) explanation of "infinite judgement" at B97–98.

the solution of the conflict that is based on this assumption is simple: don't make the assumption,³⁷ deny that the world in these formulations is to be treated as a thing in itself. As a consequence the solution is that the world is neither infinite, nor finite.³⁸ So the antinomy can be solved if the basic assumption is rejected and this can only be done after the conflict has been reformulated with the help of infinite judgement so as to indicate that the opposition at hand is dialectical (instead of analytical).³⁹

This analysis in terms of a dialectical opposition seems to suggest that the solution applies to the first conflict only. At B533, however, Kant maintains that the same argument goes for the other three conflicts as well. Nevertheless, it seems strange that so much attention is devoted to the first conflict, and there is also the peculiarity that Kant's phrase "neither infinite, nor finite" does not correspond to the respective alternatives offered in the formulations of the first conflict, sc. that the world is either finite or infinite. In these formulations "finite" and "infinite" are put in the reverse order. An answer to both of these questions—why does there seem to be so much emphasis on the first conflict, and why is the solution not formulated in correspondence to the initially formulated conflict?—will eventually help us to understand the significance of infinite judgement.

In order to answer these questions we should take a close look at the construction of this part of the Transcendental Dialectic. The table of contents shows that Kant's exposition of the four conflicts (KrV, B454–488) and their solutions (KrV, B545–593) are "merely" concrete elaborations of the main point he is trying to make. The main line of argument, however, is constructed so as to present the main systematic problem (sc. the antinomy in the singular), to put it in the context of the interest of reason and in the context of the results of the Transcendental Analytic (sc. transcendental idealism), to solve the antinomy and to reformulate the result in terms of "regulation" (instead of "constitution"). Finally, the concluding note on

³⁷Cf. "Voraussetzung", KrV, B532, 535 and "falsche Voraussetzungen" at KrV, B557.

³⁸The fact that both statements are false, already expressed in the quotation from KrV, B532 above, indicates that Kant has offered a reconstruction in terms of the traditional square of opposites; contraries may both be false (KrV, B559), whereas subcontraries may both be true. The latter analysis is employed in case of the dynamical antinomy (KrV, B560), cf. Ishikawa, *Kants Denken ...*, 96, 117–118.

³⁹Strobach offers an analysis of the first antinomical conflict and its solution in terms of predicate negation. He also mentions, but does not explicate, the relation between predicate negation and infinite judgement. Cf. Niko Strobach, 'Qualifizierte Negation als Schlüssel zum Verständnis der 1. Antinomie in Kants *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*', in: Volker Gerhardt, editor, *Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationaler Kant-Kongresses*, Volume 5, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001, 94–105.

the antinomy (KrV, B593–595) summarises the results and anticipates the exposition of a loose end that is left over (sc. absolutely necessary being). If we look at the line of argument this way, we should not be led astray by comparing the solution to the first antinomical conflict (although Kant seems to be suggesting this to exemplify his solution). We should rather compare the solution to the initial formulation of the antinomy and then it is clear that both formulations correspond perfectly well. As has been stated above the basic pattern of the antinomy offers two alternatives: a series is either infinite or finite (cf. KrV, B445–446). The solution denying both alternatives deals with the options of infinity and finity in exactly the same order.

This shows why the solution to the first antinomy is not restricted to the first conflict only. This shows why one should not compare the solution to the first conflict exclusively. Although “The world is either finite or infinite” (first conflict) has a similar terminology, the solution refers to the antinomy *tout court*.⁴⁰ It is not primarily intended to provide the answer to this specific conflict and therefore it does not correspond to its formulation.⁴¹

Thusfar we have seen that Kant used infinite judgement as a means to analyse and solve the antinomy. It is a clear example of the assumption he made with respect to infinite judgement at B98: the function of understanding expressed by infinite judgement may perhaps be of importance in the field of its pure a priori knowledge. According to Ishikawa there is yet another instance of infinite judgement that is present in Kant’s formulations. Infinite judgement is also the appropriate means to express the result of the analysis. Ishikawa⁴² deals with this point quite briefly. He refers to the “weder . . . , noch . . .” formulations in the “Kritische Entscheidung . . .” (KrV, B533–534) and the solution to the first antinomical conflict (KrV, B550) and he reconstructs a “sowohl . . . , als auch . . .” formulation with respect to the solution of the dynamical-transcendental ideas. These formulations themselves are also to

⁴⁰Malzkorn’s reconstruction of dialectical opposition shows that all four conflicts represent cases of dialectical opposites (cf. Wolfgang Malzkorn, ‘Analytical and Dialectical Oppositions Reconsidered: New Perspectives on Kant’s Antinomies’, in: Volker Gerhardt, editor, *Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationaler Kant-Kongresses*, Volume 5, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001, 37–44).

⁴¹Ishikawa points out why the solution may nevertheless be said to apply to the first conflict although it is formulated in the reverse order: since the dialectical opposition is a contrary opposition, both elements are positive and therefore interchangeable (Ishikawa, *Kants Denken . . .*, 111). With this analysis of the construction of the main line of argument of this part of KrV I offer an alternative quite opposite from the analysis carried out by Bennett who claims that sections 1, 3, 4, and 5 are less important and who maintains that the antinomy (in the singular) is a mirage (Bennett, *Kant’s Dialectic*, 116, 115).

⁴²Ishikawa, *Kants Denken . . .*, 117–118 (with references to p. 87 as well).

be regarded as instances of judgement. However, they are meta-judgements, i.e. judgements *about* the issues at stake (sc. thesis and antithesis of the antinomy). As such they are critical judgements representing the concluding result of Kant's analysis. In relation to the legal metaphor in KrV Ishikawa maintains that reason in case of the presentation and examination of the antinomy places itself in a different position than the two alternatives under consideration and that it forms a judgement about the alternatives that expresses the reality of this third possibility.⁴³ Infinite judgement possesses the properties to function in a meaningful sense at this critical (or meta-) level.

In addition to Ishikawa, some of Kant's own expressions could be referred to to show this. For example, with respect to the third antinomical conflict Kant concludes that the least we can say is that nature does not contradict causality through freedom ("daß Natur der Kausalität aus Freiheit wenigstens nicht widerstreite", KrV, B586). If the phrase "nicht widerstreite" was taken in a merely negative sense it would just deny something. An infinite reading of the phrase, however, would imply that nature in relation to causality from freedom is really something else than a contradiction, which is exactly the point that Kant wants to make: "So würde dann Freiheit und Natur, jedes in seiner vollständigen Bedeutung, [...] zugleich und ohne allen Widerstreit angetroffen werden." (KrV, B569). In terms of infinite judgement the phrase "zugleich und ohne allen Widerstreit" is another way of indicating the possibility of their mutual relation, which is announced in the title of the section beginning at B566. Another example can be taken from the solution to the fourth antinomical conflict: the law of the empirical employment of understanding must be limited in order that it does *not* declare the intelligible *impossible* (KrV, B590). This phrase "not impossible", in terms of a limitative and infinite reading, would mean "possible" in view of a practical, not a speculative employment of reason.

The third, or critical position from which these judgements are passed is to be understood against the background of the objective Kant intends to attain in (this part of) KrV. As has been noted above the construction of this part of the Transcendental Dialectic is important in this respect. It is constructed along a main line of thought: the antinomy *tout court* and its solution. To put this line of thought in its proper perspective Kant elaborates on the interest of reason and the regulative principle of reason. Detailed analysis of the four antinomical conflicts, as well as the four solutions seem

⁴³Ishikawa, *Kants Denken ...*, 78–83.

to be of secondary importance.⁴⁴ In §8.7 we will deal more specifically with this background in terms of the practical perspective in relation to infinite judgement.

8.6 Infinite judgement and *omnimoda determinatio*

In addition to Menne's historical account there is more to be said about infinite judgement if we look at the beginning of the third chapter of the Transcendental Dialectic. At KrV, B599–600 Kant stated that every thing, as regards its possibility, is subject to the (ontological) principle of complete determination (*omnimoda determinatio*), “nach welchem ihm von allen möglichen Prädikaten der *Dinge*, so fern sie mit ihren Gegenteilen verglichen werden, eines zukommen muß.” (cf. also KrV, B596). This principle concerns the content, rather than the mere logical form of knowledge. This feature distinguishes it from the logical determinability of concepts, which is in fact the combination of the principle of contradiction and excluded middle (KrV, B600n). As we have pointed out above, this distinction is exactly what makes the difference between infinite judgement, on the one hand, and affirmative and negative judgement, on the other.

There is a close link between infinite judgement and the *omnimoda determinatio*. This principle represents the (historical) origin of infinite judgement.⁴⁵ It also confirms systematic points that were neglected by Menne, which make Kant's use of infinite judgement meaningful. The main point of agreement between infinite judgement and the principle is that they relate to a content, i.e. a thing. Every thing that exists is completely determined (KrV, B601). In accordance with this proposition specific pairs of contradictory predicates are not only compared with one another logically, but the thing itself is transcendently compared with the sum total of all possible predicates (KrV, B601). In its turn, this sum total is also completely determined as the concept of a thing called the ideal of pure reason (KrV, B601–602). This

⁴⁴This interpretation of the construction of the antinomy chapter would probably also account for the fact why Kant was forced to insert additional considerations following the solutions of the second and third antinomy; in the course of the detailed analysis of the second conflict Kant recognised that he had to make additional specifications with respect to the antinomy. Cf. for example the phrase “Wir haben aber hiebei einen wesentlichen Unterschied übersehen” (KrV, B557), sc. the distinction between a mathematical and dynamical synthesis of appearances (KrV, B557). Formal analysis of the logic of Kant's cosmological conflicts shows that Kant's arguments are not conclusive, and, what is more, that the conflict of reason is not inevitable, as Kant would have it, cf. Malzkorn, *Kants Kosmologie-Kritik* . . .

⁴⁵Ishikawa, *Kants Denken* . . . , 57–69.

ideal represents the transcendental content, the transcendental substrate, the matter, the whole of reality or the *omnitude realitatis* of the possibility and complete determination of all things.

The complete determination of a particular thing is based on the limitation of this *omnitude*; some thing is completely determined in so far as the *omnitude* is limited to a certain extent or, as Kant puts it “die durchgängige Bestimmung eines jeden Dinges beruht auf der Einschränkung dieses All der Realität” (KrV, B605). It is exactly at this point that infinite judgement is a meaningful means to express a partial step in the process of complete determination. The negation contained in the judgement does not affect the copula nor does it express the non-existence of a thing, since the existence is presupposed as soon as we take up the determination of a thing. Kant referred to this “presupposition” by calling it “transzendente Bejahung” in contradistinction to a “transzendente Verneinung”, which means “das Nichtsein an sich selbst” (KrV, B602). Infinite judgement refers to a thing while expressing transcendental affirmation, but it also expresses that only one of two contradictory predicates is to be assigned to a thing, thereby limiting the infinite sphere of all possible predicates represented by the *omnitude*. In this context it is clear why Kant’s example of the not-mortal soul (KrV, B97–98) is not identical to a negative judgement. In “The soul is not-mortal”, “the soul” refers to something and this something is determined to the extent that “mortal” is not an appropriate predicate belonging to that thing.

8.7 Infinite judgement and the polemical employment of reason

Speaking about something does not necessarily entail the real existence of the things spoken about. In fact, in the Transcendental Analytic existing things are limited to whatever can be given in possible experience. In the Transcendental Dialectic, judgements about illusory objects and their presumed existence are unmasked. Still, Kant allowed for some kind of judgement about these objects, although not in theoretical perspective. In order to say something relevant about these “objects” we see them in a practical perspective, *as if* they were practically real, not objectively real. In this respect infinite judgement plays its most significant role.

We have to be brief about this “as if” character of objects in a practical perspective. As early as his critical examination of dialectical illusion Kant alluded to the practical use of objects. As to the substantiality and perma-

nence (immortality) of the soul, for example, we cannot claim knowledge because any such claim would transcend the limits of possible experience, but:

Gleichwohl wird hiedurch für die Befugnis, ja gar die Notwendigkeit, der Annehmung eines künftigen Lebens, nach Grundsätzen des mit dem spekulativen verbundenen praktischen Vernunftgebrauchs, hiebei nicht das mindeste verloren (KrV, B424).⁴⁶

Although we cannot claim knowledge, we are entitled to postulate a future life. Strictly speaking, this postulate is not legitimate because there is no possible proof to support it; it transcends the possible limits of knowledge. It is not illegitimate, either, because there is no (possible) proof that it is. The only way left open is to claim some right to postulate a future life as if the soul were an object, as long as it serves a practical interest. The proper judgement to express this claim is infinite: it is not illegitimate to claim a future life, since this illegitimacy, expressed in a negative judgement, cannot be proven.

Apparently, an interpretation of the critical result in terms of infinite judgement must also allow the occurrence of double negation (e.g. “not illegitimate”) in infinite judgement. In the previous section this was already pointed out in the case of Kant’s solution to the antinomy. There are also examples of Kant’s employment of double negation concerning the critical results in view of a practical perspective: the problematic noumenon is the representation of something that is *neither* possible, *nor* impossible (KrV, B343); neither the severity of criticism has rendered reason a *not unimportant* service (KrV, B424); transcendental employment of pure reason prepares the site for building our moral edifices, a task that is *not unmeritorious* (KrV, B375); we limit the law of the empirical use of understanding, but *not* to declare the intelligible *impossible* (KrV, B590) (all italics mine). These are telling examples, but Kant’s systematic employment of infinite judgement and his arguments are found in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method.

In the chapter on the discipline of pure reason, Kant supplied a negative legislation (discipline) in addition to the positive legislation of the Transcendental Analytic. In so far as the speculative use of reason is dialectical, transcendental logic is nothing but a discipline (KrV, B824). Hence, a discipline of pure reason supplies a systematic account of the negative function of critique, which was mentioned at the end of §8.4 and the beginning of §8.5 above: it is “admonitory negative teaching” (KrV, B740).

⁴⁶Cf. also KrV, B166n, 421, B431–432. In the antinomy chapter the practical view is dealt with in the section on the interest of reason.

The section on the discipline of the *polemical* employment of reason seems to be an exception in this respect. It seems to represent a relapse into a purely polemical situation, i.e. a situation in which opposing claims constitute a conflict of reason. However, conflicts of this kind have already been solved in the Transcendental Dialectic on the basis of the formal conditions of knowledge. Hence, conflicts and polemics have basically been prevented: “So gibt’s demnach keine eigentliche Polemik im Felde der reinen Vernunft.” (KrV, B784; cf. KrV, B771, 778). Nevertheless, reason may be employed polemically, but only to defend certain propositions against opposite dogmatic denials (KrV, B767). These defensive propositions are also dogmatic, but they are affirmative and they are made in view of the practical interest of reason (KrV, B769–770; cf. KrV, B777). Here we encounter the same strategy that Kant employed in his solution to the antinomy. Neither the assertion nor the denial can be demonstrated conclusively. If the assertion is made in respect of the practical interest, however, there is no conclusive proof to support it, but, what is more important, there is also no valid proof of the opposite dogmatic denial. This lack of proof leaves open the very possibility of practical dogmatic assertions and, consequently, these assertions are not illegitimate. In this sense the position of polemical employment of reason is expressed by the double negation of “not illegitimate” in an infinite judgement, which should not be reduced to the simple affirmation of the legitimacy of that claim. An infinite judgement declaring certain claims “not illegitimate” secures the provisional competence or authority in preparation for the practical employment of reason. Its function is exactly to formulate one of Kant’s main objectives: to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith (KrV, Bxxx).

Finally, even this denial of knowledge is expressed in terms of an infinite judgement. In the section on the impossibility of a sceptical satisfaction of reason, following the section on polemical employment, Kant presented his version of the *docta ignorantia* in the form of *critical ignorance* expressing the scope and limits of our knowledge. Ignorance in this sense is not a lack of knowledge, but it is affirmative knowledge about what cannot be known. To be critically ignorant one needs fundamental knowledge of what can and what cannot be known. This ignorance delimits the room available for practical assertions and faith.

8.8 Conclusion

Infinite judgement may have different functions, but the differences should not obstruct our view on the basic pattern of infinite judgement. Infinite

judgement is structured in accordance with the pattern of real opposition. Therefore, infinite judgement is fit to represent a (non-contradictory) relation between opposites. On the same account, infinite judgement is the appropriate means to express a viable alternative to either of the (undesired, untrue or impossible) opposites involved.

Therefore, infinite judgement is not insignificant. In fact, it is the most important kind of judgement in KrV, since it has the particular properties that are necessary to express the results of Kant's critical project. Apart from the fact that the distinction between affirmative, negative and infinite judgements corresponds to the structure of KrV (viz. Transcendental Analytic, Dialectic and Doctrine of Method), Kant employed infinite judgement in his solution to the antinomy and paralogisms and in the critical limitation of knowledge which prepares for the practical employment of reason. Furthermore, infinite judgement is used in polemical and defensive strategies to ensure realization of the practical interest of reason.

Neglect of the systematic and structural importance of infinite judgement would pose serious problems to any interpretation of Kant's critical work.

Conclusion

The importance of *Realrepugnanz* for Kant's philosophy and his philosophical development may have been mentioned and highlighted in occasional remarks by authors commenting on Kant's philosophy and philosophical development, but a systematic account of the meaning, and an assessment of its importance are not provided in secondary sources. This gap has caused us to inquire into the *background*, the *meaning*, and the *significance* of the notion in (a part of) Kant's work.

Kant's interest in metaphysics as well as his concern for the methodological issues of philosophy constitute the *background* of real opposition (chapter 2–4). Despite his undeniably sceptical attitude toward metaphysics before 1771, his philosophical efforts are just as well aimed at metaphysical reform. These efforts are concerned with an evaluation of force and action, as well as closely related issues like space, time and the highest degree of reality. Real repugnance, which is a specific relation (*respectus*), sc. an opposition between realities, represents an exemplary case of fundamental relations that are characteristic of metaphysics in the broader sense of the term: being and non-being, identity and contradiction, position and exclusion, positive and negative truth, attraction and repulsion. A concern for methodological issues is an important element in these metaphysical attempts. A crucial consideration in this respect is the extent to which mathematics is relevant or fruitful for metaphysics, and for philosophy in general. The mathematical concept of negative magnitude makes a significant contribution to philosophy, but contradiction—representing another instrument of rational thought—is only applicable to a limited extent. This insufficiency of contradiction is due to the fact that (human) knowledge is not absolute, it does not produce the objects of knowledge, but it is dependent on the limitations of our cognitive faculties. Metaphysics and a strong methodological awareness constitute the systematic background of real repugnance.

The *meaning* of real opposition is something that is always presented as the negative counterpart of logical opposition (contradiction): real opposition is something that logical opposition is *not* (chapter 3, §5.2 and §6.2). It is a relation between opposite realities, that can exist (either potentially or actually), whereas a contradiction, a merely logical relation between opposites, cannot possibly exist at all. In this respect real opposition is something categorically different, but since its meaning is developed in contradistinction to logical opposition it is also systematically dependent on it. In the context of Kant's methodological awareness introduction of the mathematical notion of negative magnitude made it possible to deal with opposition in a way that offered a philosophically relevant alternative to contradiction.

So, in addition to the negative definition Kant also presented a positive description of real repugnance: whenever there is a positive ground, as well as a result that amounts to nothing (= zero), there is *eo ipso* a case of real repugnance. Given the metaphysical background *a variety of meanings* can be assigned to real repugnance, for this background provides a quite general, but firm basis for the application of real repugnance to various philosophical areas. The nature of the realities involved may vary—it may be moral, mental, physical, natural, et cetera—but on account of the underlying metaphysics and the application of negative magnitude oppositions between realities in each of the areas mentioned, are to be counted among the real oppositions. Fundamental relations in each of the areas mentioned (knowing and not knowing, love and hate, virtue and vice) are relations that are structured according to the pattern of real opposition (§4.5); they are not to be understood in terms of contradictory opposites.

Real repugnance may have emerged in a metaphysical context, and it may have been presented in all its glory on the occasion of *Negative Größen*, but its *significance* extends well beyond these particular circumstances. Real repugnance offers a general pattern of thought that enables Kant to structure his philosophical thought beyond the scope of mere contradiction in a way that makes oppositions fruitful instead of impossible. The extent to which this pattern is deployed suggests that it is a fundamental trait of Kant's thought. In the course of the development of Kant's thought real opposition appears as a general pattern of thought in various contexts and in relation to various topics. It is present in the way Kant conceives the relation between sensibility and understanding (chapter 5, §6.4 and §6.5), it is a structural element in Kant's argumentative strategy, in the solution of the conflict of reason (§7.8, §8.5), and in the conceptual structure of crucial notions (such as critique and the noumenon).

Firstly, the importance of real opposition consists in the fact that it offers a systematic alternative to logical opposition and its alleged function in philosophy. The insufficiency of contradiction, and hence the shortcomings of rationalistic philosophy are exposed by the emphatic introduction and explanation of real opposition. From the perspective of real opposition it is possible to offer a systematic critique of contradiction as a philosophical and methodological tool.

Secondly, the elaborate explanation of real opposition is significant in view of the development of Kant's thought. The considerations about real opposition enable him to question the nature of experience, to question the relation between experience and rational knowledge and to evaluate the function of the cognitive faculties involved.

So, thirdly, in the course of Kant's evaluation of the relation between rational knowledge and experience the pattern of real repugnance is applied so as to structure the opposition between sensibility and understanding. In the *Dissertation*, propagating the subjectivity of space and time, as well as the systematic separation between sensibility and understanding, the pattern of real repugnance is applied so as to structure the interrelation between both faculties. This construction of the opposition in terms of *dissensus* also plays a crucial part in methodological considerations at this point of Kant's philosophical development.

Fourthly, application of this pattern of thought reaches its full extent in KrV. The initial problem that was raised with reference to *Realrepugnanz* (e.g. the epistemological foundation of causality) is solved once the problem about the systematic relation between representation and object has been solved in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic. The solution to this latter problem is dependent on the pattern of real opposition. The opposition between both cognitive faculties in KrV is no longer just a matter of *dissensus*, but by means of the transcendental deduction both faculties are systematically *linked* together. Original synthesis is the point (in the sense of Zero = 0) that both faculties have in common. Because there is something in common the opposites involved are not related as contradictories, but rather as supplementary and interdependent realities. As long as this relation of dependency is properly balanced it is constitutive of knowledge.

In the fifth place, the significance of real opposition is shown by the fact that the pattern plays a decisive role in Kant's argumentative strategy. Infinite judgement is used in the solutions of dialectical problems, and in the methodological context of the polemical use of reason. Well before 1770 Kant had already employed this mode of argumentation in case of empty space and the *actio in distans* (§4.2 and §4.4), but by 1781 it has become a

systematic and powerful tool of the critique of reason. Further occurrences of the pattern of real opposition are results of a typical *modus operandi* of Kant's thought. If a distinction needs to be made in order to solve a problem, then the opposite elements contained in the distinction are related as negative magnitudes, and there is a meta-level unity—which is real in its own right—from which this distinction is dependent. This is displayed in the notion of the negative noumenon which is limiting with respect to sensibility (and the empirical employment of understanding), and with respect to the transcendental employment of understanding (§6.6). Yet, a positive interpretation of the noumenon is not ruled out inasmuch as an *ens rationis* can be the object of practical reason.

The argumentative force of the pattern of real opposition is also displayed in the Transcendental Dialectic and the remainder of KrV. Once the firm ground of possible experience is left, Kant has to resort to other means in order to create clarity and certainty. These means are found in the juridical way of reasoning which takes place within the framework of the legal metaphor (chapter 7). This specific metaphorical means enable Kant to express (at a critical level) what is inexpressible (at the object level). Especially infinite judgement (chapter 8) plays a key role in this respect. It offers the technical means to express the alternative to (dogmatic) affirmation and (sceptical) denial: sc. affirmation by negation.

Given the significance of the pattern of real repugnance in Kant's argumentation, and given the fact that this mode of argumentation belongs to the meta-level language of critical, or transcendental philosophy, application of the pattern is characteristic of critique. In fact, it is a decisive feature of critical reasoning. In accordance with this pattern 1) critical reasoning is able to make non-exclusive distinctions in regard of the object of critique; 2) the elements of this distinction are related as negative magnitudes, which—as such—make possible a situation of rest; and 3) given this neutral situation of rest, critical reasoning can offer perspectives on alternative possibilities or realities, and 4) the argumentative force of critical reasoning requires adequate figurative speech which is derived from the legal metaphor. As to possible alternative realities, Kant's attention is primarily focused on practical reality. At several points in our study we have pointed in this direction, but a systematic assessment was not aimed at. This point, as well as an inquiry into the significance of real repugnance in the context of the faculty of judgement and Kant's political philosophy, would require further study.

As a result of the practical orientation of Kant's philosophy, particularly in

KrV, there are two fundamental features of real opposition that have changed considerably in comparison with the early 1760's. Firstly, the principle that both positive moments of opposition are of equal value is abandoned. In 1763 both moments in a real opposition were considered to be equally positive and neither of these was to be considered as something negative in itself: only their combination resulted in negation. After 1781 priority is given to one moment over the opposite moment, and—for that very reason—this latter moment is considered to be something intrinsically negative, like it is expressed in the case of knowledge versus faith: "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge." Secondly, in 1763 examples of cancellation resulting in $\text{Zero} = 0$ were typical, but this zero-sum of real repugnancy was not necessary at all; another outcome (such as $4a - a = 3a$) could just as well be the result. After 1781, however, $\text{Zero} = 0$ seems to have become the preferable outcome of real opposition. Rest and balance, the annihilation of something that is considered to be inferior or negative have become the desired effect of real opposition. Both changes enable Kant to employ the pattern of real opposition in order to make something counterbalance or even outweigh the (possible) negative effect of something that is regarded as objectionable. Thus, the pattern of real repugnance has become a significant instrument to prevent or combat negative, i.e. undesired, effects. Exactly this instrument was deployed when Kant was trying to dispel the gloomy thoughts associated with the name of his former servant.

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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)

In 1763 publiceert Immanuel Kant zijn essay *Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen*. In dit essay doet hij verslag van zijn poging om de wiskundige notie van negatieve grootte een zinvolle toepassing te geven binnen de wijsbegeerte. Op basis van deze notie construeert hij in het eerste deel van zijn essay het begrip *Realrepugnanz* (reële repugnantie, reële tegenstelling, reële oppositie). Er is sprake van een reële tegenstelling tussen twee dingen wanneer het ene ding de werking van het andere ding teniet doet. Beide dingen zijn weliswaar reël, maar het ene verhoudt zich tot het andere als iets negatiefs en ook het resultaat van deze verhouding kan iets negatiefs zijn. Zo kan, aldus Kant's voorbeeld, een schip op zijn reis 's morgens door de oostenwind worden voortbewogen, maar de westenwind zal het schip 's avonds in tegenovergestelde richting doen bewegen. De verplaatsing in westelijke richting wordt teniet gedaan door de verplaatsing in oostelijke richting en wanneer beide winden die dag even lang en even hard hebben gewaaid, zal het schip na een dag niet verplaatst zijn. Dit gebrek aan beweging, deze stilstand, is niet veroorzaakt door de afwezigheid van voortstuwing, maar door het feit dat voortstuwing in de ene richting werd opgeheven door negatieve beweging (voortstuwing in de tegenovergestelde richting).

Vervolgens laat Kant in een opsomming van voorbeelden zien dat de reële tegenstelling ten grondslag ligt aan de centrale noties in verschillende wijsgerige disciplines. Hij stelt dat de verhoudingen tussen terugstotings- en aantrekkingskracht in de fysica, tussen lust- en onlustgevoelens in de psychologie, tussen deugd en ondeugd in de ethiek, tussen warmte en koude, tussen elektrische ladingen, en tussen magnetische ladingen in de fysica allemaal verhoudingen zijn die begrepen moeten worden in termen van reële tegenstelling.

In het derde en laatste deel van zijn essay trekt Kant een paar algemene conclusies en geeft hij het verhaal tot slot nog een andere wending met een fundamenteel wijsgerige vraag. We kunnen de reële tegenstelling weliswaar

herkennen en toepassen binnen een groot aantal gebieden van de filosofie, maar het blijft de vraag hoe we het überhaupt kunnen verklaren en begrijpen dat er een verband kan zijn tussen twee reëel tegengestelde dingen: “Hoe moet ik het begrijpen dat, omdat iets is, er iets anders (niet) is?”. Hoe kan, met andere woorden, een ding dusdanig op iets anders betrokken zijn, dat het dit andere ding kan beïnvloeden? In een meer specifieke kontekst zou deze vraag geherformuleerd kunnen worden als een vraag naar het systematische verband tussen oorzaak en gevolg.

Het is bekend dat dergelijke vragen een leidraad zijn geweest in de filosofische ontwikkeling van Kant. In de slotalinea van zijn essay kondigt hij dan ook aan dat hij in de toekomst uitvoerig zal terugkomen op de antwoorden van dergelijke vragen. In zijn latere werk van na 1780 zijn de antwoorden echter niet meer in het jargon van de *Realrepugnanz* gesteld. We komen deze technische notie in het latere werk dan ook niet meer tegen. Toch is de constructie van de reële tegenstelling later nog wel degelijk herkenbaar, bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van de antinomie (KrV), in de onmaatschappelijke maatschappelijkheid (in *Idee*), en in de notie van de doelmatigheid zonder doel (in KU). In de secundaire literatuur over Kant's filosofie wordt het belang van dit essay en van het begrip *Realrepugnanz* voor het geheel van Kant's werk onderstreept (Rosenkranz, Heimsoeth, Saner, Wolff, Baumanns). Een systematische presentatie en analyse van dit belang wordt echter nergens geleverd. Het is de bedoeling van het hier gepresenteerde onderzoek om in die lacune te voorzien. Dit onderzoek richt zich in het bijzonder op de *achtergrond*, de *betekenis* en het *belang* van het begrip van de reële repugnantie in Kant's vroegere werk en in de *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*.

In het eerste hoofdstuk wordt het onderwerp van de studie gepresenteerd aan de hand van een persoonlijk katebelletje dat de hoogbejaarde Kant schreef op een moment dat de verschijnselen van vergeetachtigheid en dementie zich bij hem definitief hadden geopenbaard. Begin 1802, na een dienstverband van enkele decennia, had Kant zijn dienaar Martin Lampe ontslagen, vanwege dronkenschap en ander ongepast gedrag. Om niet voortdurend geconfronteerd te worden met deze onverkwikkelijke episode schreef Kant het volgende briefje: “De naam Lampe moet nu helemaal vergeten worden.” Het is makkelijk om zich vrolijk te maken over het feit dat iemand opschrijft wat vergeten moet worden, maar in dit geval handelt Kant in overeenstemming met metafysische beginselen die hij veertig jaar eerder al had gepubliceerd. Wie iets is vergeten heeft bepaalde kennis, of bepaalde gedachten niet meer. De afwezigheid van bepaalde gedachten is een toestand die op twee manieren tot stand kan zijn gekomen. Gedachten kunnen afwezig zijn simpelweg omdat je ze nooit

gehad hebt, of omdat de gedachten die je had, verloren zijn gegaan. Het tweede geval, zegt Kant, kan zich alleen voordoen als bestaande gedachten worden opgeheven, teniet worden gedaan door tegengestelde gedachten. De verhouding tussen bestaande gedachten en daaraan tegengestelde gedachten is een geval van reële tegenstelling. Kant's kattebelletje moet tegen deze achtergrond begrepen worden. Onaangename herinneringen aan Lampe zullen niet verdwijnen, tenzij ze worden tegengewerkt; de naam Lampe moet vergeten worden! En wie vergeetachtig aan het worden is, zal dat moeten opschrijven om het goed te onthouden.

De uitvoerige presentatie en uitleg van deze anecdote dienen ook om het methodologische uitgangspunt van de studie duidelijk te maken. Dit uitgangspunt stelt dat we Kant's woorden voor lief moeten nemen. Hiermee is niet bedoeld dat Kant de waarheid in pacht heeft, maar dat we er van uit gaan dat ze zinvol zijn, ook al lijken ze—zoals de woorden uit het kattebelletje—op het eerste gezicht absurd. Het zijn immers de woorden waar we de interpretatie van moeten laten afhangen, niet Kant's vermeende geestesgesteldheid (een veronderstelling die al een interpretatie is). Dit uitgangspunt confronteert ons wel met de heterogeniteit van de bronnen waar we Kant's woorden kunnen vinden: het verhaal over het kattebelletje is ons overgeleverd door Kant's vriend Wasianski; we hebben aantekeningen van Herder, gemaakt tijdens een college waarin Kant de reële tegenstelling ter sprake bracht; er is Kant's eigen (gepubliceerde) werk; en er zijn Kant's *Reflexionen* bij de handboeken waarover hij doceerde. Deze heterogeniteit is geen belemmering, maar veeleer iets dat interpretatie eerst mogelijk maakt. De woorden winnen aan betekenis wanneer we ze in relatie tot andere, soms zelfs in relatie tot anderssoortige teksten beschouwen.

Aan het begin van hoofdstuk 2 wordt kort de historische achtergrond van de termen *repugnantia* en *Realrepugnanz* uiteengezet. Tot in Kant's tijd was het Latijnse *repugnantia*, naast *contradictio*, de gebruikelijke technische term geweest om een logische tegenstelling of tegenspraak mee aan te duiden. Met het voorvoegsel *real-* smeedde Kant van het verduitste *Repugnanz* een neologisme dat de wijsgerig onderlegde Duitser onmiddellijk duidelijk was. Deze begreep dat hiermee een tegenstelling in de realiteit was bedoeld, die heel iets anders was dan de logische tegenspraak.

Kant introduceert deze notie tegen de achtergrond van de metafysica, die voor hem een cruciale wijsgerige discipline is ondanks het feit dat ze haar aanspraken niet kan waarmaken. De achtergrond wordt ook gevormd door zijn methodologische inspanningen ten bate van metafysische kennis. Op grond van methodologische overwegingen erkent Kant dat de mathematica weliswaar succesvol is op verschillende terreinen van wetenschap (m.n. in de

vorm van Newton's fysica), maar dat een louter mathematische benadering van de filosofie onbevredigend moet zijn omdat bepaalde, specifiek metafysische thema's daarmee niet aan de orde kunnen komen. Kant bedoelt dan met name het thema "kracht" dat hij in termen van een substantie-ontologie begrijpt als de verhouding tussen substantie en accident. De verhoudingen die in Kant's metafysica verder vooral in het geding zijn, zijn ruimtelijke verhoudingen, tijdelijke verhoudingen, de verhoudingen tussen dingen (identiteit, tegenstelling) en de verhouding tussen gedachten. Een volwassen metafysica waarin het thema van de verhouding adequaat kan worden begrepen is niet op mathematische leest geschoeid.

In hoofdstuk 3 staat een bijzonder soort verhouding centraal: de logische repugnantie (contradictie, logische tegenspraak of tegenstelling). Logische tegenspraak kan als principe van metafysische kennis functioneren, maar aanvulling met een aantal andere principes is vereist om die kennis inhoud te geven: het principe van bepalende grond, en de principes van successie en coëxistentie. Ondanks de aanvullingen blijft deze vorm van metafysische kennis beperkt: ze biedt geen kennis van zijnsgronden, geen kennis van niet-logische relaties, geen kennis van verhoudingen die empirische gegeven zijn. Om kort te gaan: ze biedt geen reële kennis. De beperkingen van de logische, of rationalistische middelen voor metafysische kennis benadrukken weliswaar het belang van de ervaring, maar welke status deze dan precies heeft, is onduidelijk.

Na de logische verhouding staat in hoofdstuk 4 de reële verhouding, en dan met name de reële tegenstelling, centraal. Volgens Kant vinden we deze tegenstelling in allerlei disciplines van filosofie en wetenschap (ethiek, fysica, psychologie, economie, etc.). Het is zo'n wijdverbreid verschijnsel, zou je kunnen zeggen, omdat het een exponent is van zijn metafysica van "kracht", en omdat deze tegenstelling in algemene, wiskundige termen van de negatieve grootte beschreven kan worden. De specifieke verschijningsvormen van deze tegenstelling zijn gebaseerd op algemenere metafysische en mathematische principes. Deze toepassing van een wiskundige notie is volgens Kant een leerzaam voorbeeld van het nut dat de wiskunde kan hebben voor filosofie en metafysica. Mathematica kan de filosofie, en met name de krachtenmetafysica, ook nog op een andere manier van dienst zijn: de mathematische formulering waarin Newton de aantrekkingskracht beschreef, verschaft het ervaringsgegeven van de attractie zijn verklarende waarde. Zonder een dergelijke ondersteuning zou een verwijzing naar "attractie", "kracht", of "verhouding" een lege metafysische speculatie blijven. Dit laatste lijkt te gelden voor de terugstotingskracht, de tegenhanger van de aantrekkingskracht. Voor deze kracht bestaat immers geen mathematische beschrijving, maar dit gemis

compenseert Kant met een metafysische evaluatie van een gegeven uit de innerlijke ervaring. Bovendien argumenteert Kant, op basis van de reële tegenstelling, dat deze kracht zich ten opzichte van de attractie verhoudt als een negatieve grootte.

Kant's inhoudelijke en methodologische bemoeienis met de metafysica leidt er toe dat de positie van de ervaring, waarin ons de reële verhoudingen gegeven zijn, geproblematiseerd wordt. Een beroep op de ervaring, ondersteund door mathematische formulering of metafysische analyse, kan weliswaar voorzien in de tekorten van een logische, rationalistische benadering als het gaat om attractie en repulsie, maar een afdoende verklaring van reële verbanden in de ervaring is daarmee nog niet gegeven. De vraag naar de kentheoretische positie van de zintuiglijkheid als bron van ervaring is in toenemende mate van belang voor Kant's filosofie. Binnen de metafysica die hij ontwikkelt gelden vóór 1770 in ieder geval een aantal fundamentele relaties: parallel aan de ontologische tegenstelling tussen zijn en niet-zijn is er de epistemologische tegenstelling tussen positieve en negatieve waarheden waarvoor het tweeledige principe van identiteit (ondersteund door het principe van tegenspraak) geldt; binnen het domein van de ervaring is er de fundamentele relatie van de reële tegenstelling, waarvoor de tegengestelde krachten van attractie en terugstoting exemplarisch zijn.

In hoofdstuk 5 wordt vervolgens de thematiek uit de voorafgaande hoofdstukken besproken in het kader van Kant's inaugurele dissertatie uit 1770. De notie van reële tegenstelling komt daar niet in voor, maar wel de verwante begrippen *reluctantia subiectiva*, *repugnantia obiectiva*, en *dissensus*. Logische repugnantie is in ons onderzoek het ijkpunt, zoals dat het ook was in Kant's eigen analyse in *Negative Größen*. Kant bespreekt de logische repugnantie in een methodologische kontekst en hij maakt wederom duidelijk dat de reikwijdte van de contradictie beperkt is en dat overschrijding van die beperking tot fouten leidt, en vooral ook tot miskenning van de eigen aard van de ervaring of zintuiglijk gegeven kennis. De belangrijke boodschap van Kant's methodologische overwegingen aan het begin en eind van de dissertatie is dat verstandelijke kennis en zintuiglijke kennis niet met elkaar verward moeten worden. Niet alles van verstandelijke oorsprong kan conform de condities van zintuiglijke kennis worden voorgesteld. Dat iets onvoorstelbaar is in termen van zintuiglijke kennis, betekent nog niet dat het onmogelijk is. "Onmogelijk" is immers een term van begrippelijke aard. Dit verschil tussen beide soorten kennis berust op het verschil tussen verstand en zintuiglijkheid, de kenvermogens waaraan die kennis ontsprongen is. Dit verschil kenschetst Kant als een *dissensus* (onenigheid). Ofschoon de notie van reële repugnantie in de dissertatie niet voorkomt, vertoont de *dissensus* tussen kenvermogens

de karakteristieke eigenschappen van de reële tegenstelling: de onenigheid verwijst niet naar een logische onmogelijkheid, of de afwezigheid van overeenstemming, maar naar een reële toestand (miskenning van de onenigheid leidt namelijk tot fouten, misvattingen, wat Kant op vergelijkbare wijze herhaalt ten aanzien van de antinomie in KrV); in de onenigheid zijn beide vermogens nog op elkaar betrokken, en wel dusdanig dat beide op elkaar moeten zijn afgestemd. Reële repugnantie levert hiermee een model om de verhouding, de tegenstelling tussen oorspronkelijke vermogens vorm te geven. Kant's aandacht binnen de metafysica voor de verhouding tussen gedachten, is nu ook gericht op de verhouding tussen de onderliggende vermogens. In de context van Kant's methodologische overwegingen, heeft de reële repugnantie, in onze reconstructie, een methodologisch belang als fundamentele denkvorm waarmee over tegenstellingen gedacht kan worden in andere termen dan die van de tegenspraak.

Los van de methodologische overwegingen zet Kant ook een belangrijke inhoudelijke stap in de dissertatie. Ruimte en tijd zijn de formele gronden van het fenomenale, de subjectieve vormen van zintuiglijke kennis. Deze subjectivering van ruimte en tijd geeft Kant's vroegere denken over tijdelijke en ruimtelijke verhoudingen in de metafysica een vorm die het ook in KrV nog zal hebben.

In KrV, die in hoofdstuk 6 centraal staat, treffen we de term *Realrepugnantz* niet aan. De thematiek is echter niet verdwenen, netzomin als de verwante terminologie. Bovendien blijkt dat Kant het stramen van reële tegenstelling als denkvorm toepast op niet-contradictoire tegenstellingen. Een directe verwijzing naar de reële tegenstelling is niet aanwezig, omdat in KrV de kwestie onder de meer algemene noemer van synthese wordt behandeld. In tegenstelling tot analytische kennis, kan synthetische kennis niet afdoende worden verklaard op basis van het principe van tegenspraak, dat dus wederom het ijkpunt vormt. Weliswaar kan verwijzing naar de ervaring het synthetische karakter van kennis verklaren, maar dit maakt de vraag naar de mogelijkheid van ervaring als synthetisch geheel alleen maar urgenter. Beantwoording van deze vraag in KrV sluit aan bij eerdere ontwikkelingen. De kenvermogens waarop kennis, meer in het bijzonder de ervaring, gebaseerd is, worden gekenmerkt door momenten van synthese: ruimte en tijd in geval van de zintuiglijkheid, begrippelijke structuur voor het verstand. Het verband tussen beide vermogens, dat uiteindelijk de ervaring als één geheel eerst mogelijk maakt, benoemt Kant met het "Ik denk" en de "origineel-synthetische eenheid van apperceptie". Dit origineel-synthetische punt is gemodelleerd naar het stramen van de reële tegenstelling: het is het moment waarin beide tegengestelde, maar onderling afhankelijke vermogens verbonden zijn zonder

dat er sprake is van een contradictie. Dit moment waarborgt dat de werking van het ene vermogen beperkt wordt door die van het andere. Deze fundering van de ervaringskennis als zinvolle vorm van mogelijke kennis legt Kant in de Transcendentale Analytik. Niet voor niets duikt op het eind van dit deel van KrV de terminologie weer op die ten nauwste verwant is met de *Realrepugnanz*. Het beroep op deze terminologie (zoals *realiter entgegengesetzt*, *reale Widerstreit*) dient ertoe om de noodzakelijke, zintuiglijke condities van kennis te onderstrepen. Met de afbakening van het veld van mogelijke kennis, waarmee tevens de grenzen aan de speculatieve rede zijn gesteld, is ook het gebied van illusoire kennis of de dialektische schijn gelocaliseerd: die ligt namelijk daarbuiten en stelt niets voor. Alleen het noumenon als grensbegrip, is nog een zinvol object van het denken dat weliswaar buiten het veld van mogelijke ervaring ligt, maar dat in het perspectief van de praktische rede toch iets voorstelt. De structuur van het noumenon als grensbegrip, alsook de verhouding die er tussen speculatieve en praktische rede bestaat, hebben de vorm van een reële tegenstelling. Met Kant's kritische oplossing van het probleem van de synthese, van oorzakelijke verbanden, en daarmee ook van de *Realrepugnanz*, zien we de reële tegenstelling terugkeren, en wel in die zin dat haar structuur een denkmodel is waarmee Kant problemen van methodologische aard te lijf gaat. Het denkmodel is met name van belang wanneer het vaste referentiepunt van de ervaring ontbreekt.

In hoofdstuk 7 zien we dat Kant dit denkmodel toepast binnen de kaders van de juridische metafoor waar heel de KrV van is doordrongen. Waar het vaste referentiepunt van de ervaring ontbreekt, en waar geen adequate terminologie is om de zelfopvatting van de rede tot uitdrukking te brengen, valt Kant terug op beeldspraak, en wel de juridische beeldspraak van het tribunaal van de rede. Het is geen oppervlakkige gelijkenis die met deze beeldspraak wordt uitgedrukt. Kant was van bepaalde aspecten van het Pruisische civiel(proces)recht goed op de hoogte en de metafoor vinden we in alle delen van KrV, soms zelfs op cruciale punten (de transcendentale deductie, de Transcendentale Dialektiek en de Transcendentale Methodenleer). Het denkmodel van de reële repugnantie wordt met name toegepast in argumentatiestrategieën die, net als in het geval van rechtspraak, tot doel hebben om een oordeel te vellen in een zaak waarin twee tegengestelde posities aanspraak maken op het gelijk. Het oordeel bestaat in het geval van KrV niet uit toekenning van dit gelijk aan een partij, maar veeleer uit de kritische overweging dat de bewijslast van een partij, of van elk der partijen niet voldoet om de aanspraak waar te maken. Zo'n overweging, of tegenwerping maakt Kant ten aanzien van de paralogismen, de antinomie, de godsbewijzen en hij systematiseert het in het polemische gebruik van de rede.

Het vertoont de structuur van de reële tegenstelling omdat de tegengestelde aanspraken zich niet als logische tegenstelling verhouden (ofschoon dat soms wel zo lijkt), omdat het oordeel dat de kritische tegenwerping uitdrukt het midden houdt tussen beide aanspraken en omdat het zelf een reële positie uitdrukt, zij het op het meta-niveau van de kritiek.

Het geëigende technische middel om de kritische tegenwerping te verwoorden, zo wordt betoogd in hoofdstuk 8, is het oneindige oordeel. Naast negatieve en bevestigende oordelen is dit een derde oordeelsvorm die in de receptie van Kant's werk onderbelicht is gebleven of als curiosum is afgedaan. Het is echter een oordeel waarin ontkenning en bevestiging zinvol samengaan ten behoeve van transcendentiaal-logische, of kritische kennis. De combinatie van ontkenning en bevestiging vormt géén logische tegenspraak, en is ook niet iets dat te reduceren is tot louter bevestiging óf ontkenning. Het is de typische oordeelsvorm die Kant gebruikt ten behoeve van zijn argumentatieve strategie om een kritische oordeel uit te drukken in geval van met name de antinomie en het polemische gebruik van de rede. Een vergelijkbare strategie en oordeelsvorm had Kant ook al gehanteerd bij zijn bespreking van de *actio in distans*, en de legitimiteit voor het praktisch gebruik van de rede.

Het belang van de notie van reële repugnantie is er op de eerste plaats in gelegen dat het gedurende Kant's wijsgerige ontwikkeling altijd als contragewicht heeft gediend tegen overspannen rationalistische aspiraties. Het toonde de beperkingen van de logische tegenspraak als filosofisch of epistemologisch instrument. Het vormde een alternatief waar een volwassen metafysica een antwoord op zou moeten kunnen geven.

Kant's antwoord in KrV op de vraag naar de mogelijkheid van a priori synthese lost de problemen op die hij eerder naar aanleiding van de reële tegenstelling formuleerde. De term verdwijnt uit zijn werk, maar het stramien blijft aanwezig als een denkvorm die Kant op verschillende momenten toepast. Het lijkt zich zelfs te hebben ontwikkeld tot een grondtrek van Kant's methodologie; wanneer hij onderscheidingen maakt, verhouden de elementen uit zo'n onderscheiding zich als negatieve grootten, en wordt het verband tussen de elementen gedacht als een eenheid die van een andere orde is dan de gemaakte onderscheidingen. De verhouding tussen zintuiglijkheid en verstand volgt het stramien van de reële tegenstelling (de dissertatie uit 1770 gaf hiertoe de aanzet reeds), en culmineert in het "Ik denk" als punt waar alles van af hangt. De verhouding tussen speculatieve en praktische rede is gemodelleerd als reële tegenstelling en het oneindige oordeel, waarin Kant zijn kritische resultaten kan uitdrukken, volgt ook dat model.

Met de toepassing van de reële tegenstelling als denkmodel is er wel een

subtiële verschuiving opgetreden in vergelijking met de structuur van de reële tegenstelling zoals die in *Negative Größen* werd beschreven. “Negatief” duidde toen op de onderlinge verhouding (kapitaal is een negatieve schuld, maar evenzogoed is schuld een negatief kapitaal), maar bij de toepassing van de tegenstelling als denkmodel krijgt een van beide momenten de voorkeur boven het andere dat daarmee als iets intrinsiek negatiefs wordt beschouwd (het weten, bijvoorbeeld, moet worden opgeheven). Daarnaast is de uitkomst $\text{Zero} = 0$, als resultante van een reële tegenstelling, de gewenste uitkomst geworden, terwijl dat in 1763 nadrukkelijk één van de mogelijkheden was. De toestand van balans of rust vormt de gewenste uitkomst in een situatie waarin iets negatiefs moet worden tegengewerkt. Dit was precies de situatie waarin Kant voor zichzelf het kattebelletje schreef. Wilde hij zijn gemoedsrust terugwinnen, dan moesten de negatieve gedachten over Lampe verdreven worden. Gemoedsrust is het resultaat van de nodige inspanning.

Curriculum vitae

Willem van der Kuijlen (1964) was born in Emmen, The Netherlands, as the second of three children of Engelina de Kievid and Willem van der Kuijlen sr. In 1968 the family moved to Tilburg where Willem spent the major part of his childhood.

He attended secondary school (gymnasium β) at the Mill Hillcollege in Goirle. In 1982 he started studies in biology (Wageningen University), but once he had experienced that these studies did not match his kind of interest in nature he started studying philosophy in Nijmegen. He graduated in 1990 with a thesis about Nietzsche's view on Kant.

As a conscientious objector to military service he fulfilled a community service. The first ideas about the research presented in this dissertation originated in this period. He taught philosophy at Radboud University Nijmegen. At the Christoffelschool (Tilburg) he taught philosophy to young children (aged 9–12). He currently works as a student advisor at the Faculty of Philosophy (Radboud University Nijmegen).

Willem is married to Christel van Neerven. Together they have two daughters.